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CHAPTER 2
International Status and Navigation of
Warships and Military Aircraft
2.1 STATUS OF WARSHIPS
2.1.1 Warship Defined. International law defines a warship as a ship belonging
to the armed forces of a nation bearing the external markings distinguishing the
character and nationality of such ships, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government of that nation and whose name appears in the
appropriate service list of officers, and manned by a crew which is under regular
armed forces discipline. 1 In the U.S. Na'i.' those ships designated "uss" are
"warships" as defined by international law. U.S. Coast Guard vessels designated
"USCGC" under the command of a commissioned officer are also "warships"
under internationallaw. 3

1. High Seas Convention, art. 8(2); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 29; Hague Convention No.
VII Relating to the Conversion ofMerchant Ships into Warships, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 2
Am.]. Int'IL. (Supp.) 133, Schindler & Toman 591, arts. 2-5; GP I, art. 43. The service list for U.S.
naval officers is the Register ofCommissioned and Warrant Officers ofthe United States Navy and
Naval Reserve on the active duty list (NAVPERS 15018); the comparable list for the U.S. Coast
Guard is COMDTINST M1427.1 (series), Subj: Register of Officers.
2. U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0406; SECNAVINST 5030.1 (series), Subj:
Classification of Naval Ships and Aircraft. It should be noted that neither the High Seas
Convention nor the LOS Convention requires that a ship be armed to be regarded as a warship.
Under the LOS Convention, however, a warship no longer need belong to the "naval" forces ofa
nation, under the command of an officer whose name appears in the "Navy list" and manned by a
crew who are under regular "naval" discipline. The more general reference is now made to
"armed forces" to accommodate the integration of different branches of the armed forces in
various countries, the operation ofseagoing craft by some armies and air forces, and the existence
of a coast guard as a separate unit of the armed forces of some nations. Oxman, The Regime of
Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 Va.]. Int'l L. 813
(1984).
3. The U.S. Coast Guard is an armed force ofthe United States. 10 U.S.C. sec. 101 (1988),14
U.S.C. sec. 1 (1988). U.S. Coast Guard cutters are distinguished by display of the national ensign
and the union jack. The Coast Guard ensign and Coast Guard commission pennant are displayed
whenever a USCG vessel takes active measures in connection with boarding, examining, seizing,
stopping, or heaving to a vessel for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the United States. U.S.
Coast Guard Regulations, 1985, secs. 10-2-1, 14-8-2 & 14-8-3; 14 U.S.C. secs. 2 & 638 (1988);
33 C.F.R. part 23 (distinctive markings for USCG vessels and aircraft).
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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2.1.2 International Status. A warship enjoys sovereign immunity from
interference by the authorities of nations other than the flag nation. 4 Police
and port authorities may board a warship only with the permission of the
commanding officer. A warship cannot be required to consent to an
onboard search or inspection, S nor may it be required to fly the flag of the
host nation. 6 Although warships are required to comply with coastal nation
traffic control, sewage, health, and quarantine restrictions instituted in
conformance with the 1982 LOS Convention, a failure of compliance is subject
only to diplomatic complaint or to coastal nation orders to leave its territorial sea
immediately. 7 Moreover, warships are immune from arrest and seizure, whether
in national or international waters, are exempt from foreign taxes and regulation,
and exercise exclusive control over all passengers and crew with regard to acts
performed on board. 8
2.1.2.1 Nuclear Powered Warships. Nuclear powered warships and
conventionally powered warships enjoy identical international legal status. 9
4. High Seas Convention, art. 8; 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 32, 58(2), 95 & 236. The rules
applicable in anned conflict ate discussed in Part II, particularly Chapters 7 and 8. The historic basis
of this rule ofinternationallaw is evidenced in TIle SdlOoner Exdwnge v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116
(1812).
5. U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0828. CNO Washington DC message 032330Z MAR
88, NAVOP 024/88, regarding foreign port visits, points out that the United States also will not
respond to host nation requests for specific information on individual crew members including
crew lists and health records, and will not undertake other requested actions upon which the
Commanding Officer's certification is definitive. See also Annex A2-1 (p. 155) for a more recent
summary of U.S. sovereign immunity policy regarding U.S. warships, auxiliaries and military
aircraft promulgated as ALPACFLT message 016/94, 020525Z J un 94.
6. The U.S. Navy has provided, as a matter ofpolicy and courtesy, for the display ofa foreign
flag or ensign during certain ceremonies. See U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, arts. 1276-78.
7. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 30; U.S. Navy
Regulations, 1990, art. 0832, 0859, & 0860. Quarantine is discussed in paragraph 3.2.3 (p. 216). As
stated in paragraph 2.3.2.1 (p. 116), force may also be used, where necessary, to prevent passage
which is not innocent.
8. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 22; High Seas Convention, art. 8(1); 1982 LOS
Convention, arts. 32, 95 & 236. While on boatd ship in foreign waters, the crew of a warship ate
immune from local jurisdiction. Their status ashore is the subject of SECNAVINST 5820.4
(series), Subj: Status of Forces Policies, Procedure, and Infonnation. Under status of forces
agreements, obligations may exist to assist in the arrest ofcrew members and the delivery ofthem to
foreign authorities. See AFP 110-20, chap. 2; U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0822; and JAG
Manual, sec. 0609.
9. C£ 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 21(1), 22(2) and 23, and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Unifonn
Interpretation of Rules ofInternational Law Governing Innocent Passage, Annex A2-2 (p. 161),
para. 2. For further infonnation and guidance see OPNAVINST C3000.5 (series), Subj: Operation
of Naval Nuclear Powered Ships (U). See also Roach & Smith, at 160-1.
The Department of State has noted that:
(continued...)
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2.1.2.2 Sunken Warships and Military Aircraft. Sunken warships and
military aircraft remain the property of the flag nation until title is formally
relinquished or abandoned, whether the cause of the sinking was through
accident or enemy action (unless the warship or aircraft was captured before it
9.(... continued)
[I]n recognition of the sovereign nature of warships, the United States pennits their
[nuclear powered warships] entry into U.S. ports without special agreements or
safety assessments. Entry ofsuch ships is predicated on the same basis as U.S. nuclear
powered warships' entry into foreign ports, namely, the provision of safety
assurances on the operation of the ships, assumption ofabsolute liability for a nuclear
accident resulting from the operation of the warship's reactor, and a demonstrated
record of safe operation of the ships involved....
1979 DigestofU.S. Practice in International Law 1084 (1983). Exec. Order 11,918, IJune 1976,3
C.F.R. part 120 (1976), 42 U.S.C. sec. 2211n (1988), was issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 2211
to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the unlikely event ofinjury or damage
resulting from a nuclear incident involving the nuclear reactor of a U.S. warship. 1976 Digest of
U.S. Practice in International Law 441-42 (1977).
Although nuclear powered warships frequendy pass through the Panama Canal, they have
transitted the Suez Canal only infrequendy. The transit by USS ARKANSAS (CGN 41) on 3
November 1984 was the first (U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1985, at 48); the transit by USS
ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal on 28
April 1986 was the second (U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1987, at 38). A request for ENTERPRISE
to return to the Pacific via the Suez Canal was denied by Egypt "because it is reviewing its new
rules governing passage... Washington Post, 4 July 1986, at A21. The Egyptian President noted in a
newspaper interview that safety ofthe waterway and residents on both banks had to be considered,
along with a possible surcharge for the passage of nuclear ships, as well as a guarantee for
compensation in case of nuclear accidents. USS EISENHOWER (CVN-69) on 7 August 1990
and USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71) on 14 January 1991 transited the Suez Canal
into the Red Sea in response to Iraq's attack on Kuwait on 2 August 1990. See paragraph 2.3.3.1,
note 36 (p. 124) for a discussion of canals.
With regard to nuclear armed warships and aircraft, U.S. policy is to neither confirm nor deny the
presence of nuclear weapons on board specific U.S. ships and aircraft. The firmness of the U.S.
policy is illustrated by the U.S reaction to the February 1985 decision of the Government of New
Zealand to deny permission for USS BUCHANAN (DDG 14) to enter Auckland Harborsince the
U.S. would not confirm the absence ofnuclear weapons in BUCHANAN. The U.S. suspended all
military cooperation with New Zealand, including the ANZUS agreement, training, foreign
military sales, and intelligence exchange. Dep't St. Bull., Sep. 1986, at 87; Note, The
Incompatibility of ANZUS and a Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 455 (1986);
Woodlife, Port Visits by Nuclear Armed Naval Vessels: Recent State Practice, 35 Int'l & Compo
L.Q. 730 (1986); Recent Developments, International Agreements: United States' Suspension of
Security Obligations Toward New Zealand, 28 Harv. Int'l LJ. 139 (1987); Chinkin, Suspension
of Treaty Relationship: The ANZUS Alliance, 7 UCLA Pac. Bas. LJ. 114 (1990). Cj. FIacco,
Whether to Confirm or Deny?, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc.,Jan. 1990, at 52. See also Thies & Harris, An
Alliance Unravels: The United States and Anzus, Nav. War Coll. Rev., (Spring 1993), at 98. On
27 September 1991, President Bush ordered the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from all
U.S. surface ships, tactical submarines and land-based naval aircraft bases, reserving the right to
return them during a crisis. The President also ordered the elimination ofground-launched tactical
nuclear weapons, stood down strategic bombers from alert and stood down all ICBM's scheduled
for deactivation under START. See N.Y. Times, 28 Sept. 1991, atAl; id. 29 Sept. 1991, sec. I, at 1
& 10; Dep't State Dispatch, 30 Sep. 1991, at 715.
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sank}. As a matter of policy, the U.S. Government does not grant pennission to
salvage sunken U.S. warships or military aircraft that contain the remains of
deceased service personnel or explosive material. Requests from foreign
countries to have their sunken warships or military aircraft, located in U.S.
national waters, similarly respected by salvors, are honored. 10

2.1.3 Auxiliaries. Auxiliaries are vessels, other than warships, that are owned by
or under the exclusive control of the armed forces. Because they are state owned
or operated and used for the time being only on government noncommercial
service, auxiliaries enjoy sovereign immunity. This means that, like warships,
10. 9 Whiteman 221 & 434; Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State letter to Deputy
General Counsel, Maritime Administration, 30 December 1980, reprinted in 1980 Digest of U.S.
Practice in International Law 999-1006; Roach, France Concedes United States Has Title to CSS
ALABAMA, 85 Am.]' Int'l L. 381 (1991); 29 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 114-15, 185-87 (1986); 30 id.
182-83 (1987). Under analogous reasoning, on 12 November 1976 Japan returned a MiG-25
Foxbat flown by LT Victor 1. Belenko from Chuguyevka, U.S.S.R., to Hakodate Airport,
Hokkaido,Japan on 4 September 1976, albeit the Foxbat was returned disassembled. Barron, MiG
Pilot: The Final Escape of LT. Belenko 129, 180 (1980); 28 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 142-43, 146-47
(1985). See paragraph 3.9 (p. 228) regarding attempts by other nations to recover U.S. government
property at sea, and paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259) regarding the right ofself-defense.
The procedures for abandonment ofsunken U.S. warships and aircraft located outside the territory
of the United States are set forth in 40 U.S.c. sec. 512 (1987 Supp. V), and its implementing
regulation, 41 CFR sec. 101-45.9 (1989). Hatteras, Inc. v. 771e U.S.S. Hatteras, her engines, etc., ill
rem, and the United States of America, ill personam, 1984 AMC 1094 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (failure to
follow disposal procedures renders null purported abandonment by the Secretary of the Navy),
affd wlo opinion 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 815 (1983). Government and
military vessels are exempt from the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Salvage of Vessels at Sea, 23 September 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T.I.A.S 576, art. 14; the
1989 International Convention on Salvage, art. 4; and 46 U.S.c. sec. 731 (1982).46 U.S.C. App.
sec. 316(d) (1988) forbids foreign vessels from engaging in salvaging operations within the
territorial or inland waters of the United States, except pursuant to treaty or 46 U.S.C. App. sec.
725. However, the United States is subject to claims for salvage outside U.S. territorial waters.
Vemicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 223 F. Sur;. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), tif/'d, 349 F.2d 465 (2d
Cir. 1965) (tugs prevented USS ALTAIR and USS MERCHANT from sinking in Piraeus harbor,
Greece); B. V. Bureau Wijsmullerv. United States, 487 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), tif/'d 633 F.2d
202 (2d Cir. 1980); 8]. Mar. L. & Com. 433 (1977) (tugs pulled USSJULIUSA. FURER from a
sandbar off the Dutch coast). The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of1987, 43 U.S.c. sec. 2101 etseq.
(1988), is not applicable to sunken warships which have not been affirmatively abandoned.
H. Rep. 100-514(1), at 3, 4 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 367-68 (1988); H. Rep. 100-514(II), at 5, 4
U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 374 & 381.
Control over shipwrecks and sunken aircraft is distinguished from control over the environs
surrounding a wreck. When a sovereign immune vessel or aircraft lies \vithin what is or becomes
the territorial sea or internal waters of a foreign nation, the flag State retains control over the
disposition of the vessel or aircraft, while the coastal nation controls access to its situs. As a practical
matter, such situations may be the subject of cooperative arrangements for the preservation or
exploration of the site. See, for example, the U.S.-French agreement concerning the CSS
ALABAMA, 3 Oct. 1989,85 Am.]. Int'l L. 381 (1991).

See also Roach, Sunken Warships and Military Aircraft, 20 Marine Policy 351 (1996).
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they are immune from arrest and search, whether in national or international
waters. Like warships, they are exempt from foreign taxes and regulation, and
exercise exclusive control over all passengers and crew with respect to acts
performed on board. 11
U.S. auxiliaries include all vessels which comprise the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) Force. The MSC Force includes: (1) United States Naval
Ships (USNS) (i.e., U.S. owned vessels or those under bareboat charter, and
assigned to MSC); (2) the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) (when activated and assigned to MSC); (3)
privately owned vessels under time charter assigned to the Afloat Prepositioned
Force (APF); and (4) those vessels chartered by MSC for a period of time orfor a
12
specific voyage or voyages. The United States claims full rights of sovereign
immunity for all USNS, APF, NRDF and RRF vessels. As a matter of policy,
however, the U.S. claims only freedom from arrest and taxation for those MSC
Force time and voyage charters not included in the APF. 13
11. Territorial Seas Convention, art. 22; High Seas Convention, art. 9; 1982 LOS
Convention, arts. 32, 96 & 236. The right of self-defense, explained in paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259),
applies to auxiliaries as well as to warships. Auxiliaries used on commercial service do not enjoy
sovereign immunity. See Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 21-22; High Seas Convention, art. 9;
1982 LOS Convention, arts. 27-28, 32 & 236.
12. Commander Military Sealift Command Force Inventory, MSC Rep. 3110-4, Pub. 8 (8
Aug. 1988); Whitehurst, The U.S. Merchant Marine 113-27 (1983) (describing U.S.
government-owned shipping).
13. 1985 SECSTATE Washington DC message 317062, Subj: Status ofMSC vessels. The
United States also claims sovereign immunity for the ships belonging to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce. See Leonard, NOAA
and the Coast Guard Ark, U.S. Naval Inst. Proceedings, Dec. 1990, at 81.

Merdwllt Ships. In international law , a merchant ship is any vessel, including a fishing vessel, that is
not entitled to sovereign immunity, i.e., a vessel, whether privately or publicly owned or
controlled, which is not a warship and which is engaged in ordinary commercial activities. For an
excellent discussion on the distinction between commercial and non-commercial service, see
Knight & Chiu, The International Law of the Sea: Cases, Documents, and Readings at 364-69
(1991).
III IlItematiolUl/ Waters (i.e., beyond the territorial sea). Merchant ships, save in exceptional
cases expressly provided for in international treaties, are subject to the flag nation's exclusive
jurisdiction in international waters. High Seas Convention, art. 6(1}; 1982 LOS Convention, art.
92(1). Unless pursuant to hot pursuit (see paragraph 3.11.2.2.1 (p. 235», merchant vessels in
international waters may not be boarded by foreign warship personnel without the master's or flag
nation consent, unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy,
unauthorized broadcasting, or the slave trade, that the ship is without nationality, or that, though
flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship, High Seas Convention, art. 22; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 110. Warship's right of
approach and visit is discussed in paragraph 3.4 (p. 221). The belligerent right of visit and search is
discussed in paragraph 7.6 (p. 387). On flags ofcOllvell;erue, see 1982 LOS Convention, art. 91, and
Mertus, The Nationality ofShips and International Responsibility: The Reflagging of the Kuwaiti
Oil Tankers, 17 Den.]. Int'l L. & Pol'y 207 (1988).
(continued ...)
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u.s. Navy and u.s. Coast Guard vessels which, except for the lack of a
commissioned officer as conunanding officer would be warships, also are auxiliaries.
2.2 STATUS OF Mll.ITARY AIRCRAFT
2.2.1 Military Aircraft Defined. International law defines military aircraft to
include all aircraft operated by commissioned units of the anned forces ofa nation
bearing the military markings of that nation, commanded by a member of the
anned forces, and manned by a crew subject to regular anned forces discipline. 14
2.2.2 International Status. Military aircraft are "state aircraft" within the
meaning of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (the
"Chicago Convention"), and, like warships, enjoy sovereign immunity from
foreign search and inspection. Subject to the right of transit passage, archipelagic
sea lanes passage, and entry in distress (see paragraph 2.5.1), state aircraft may not
enter national airspace (see paragraph
or land in the sovereign territory of
another nation without its authorization. 5 Foreign officials may not board the

1.8i

13.{... continued)
The coastal nation may, in the exercise ofits economic resource rights in the EEZ, take
such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings against foreign flag
merchant vessels as are necessary to ensure compliance with coastal nation rules and regulations
adopted in conformity with the Convention. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 73. Compare id., art. 220.

In the Territorial Sea. Foreign merchant vessels exercising the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea have the duty to comply with coastal nation rules and regulations, as
discussed in paragraph 2.3.2.2 (p. 118). On board the transiting vessel, the coastal nation may
exercise its criminal jurisdiction, ifa crime is committed on board the ship during its passage and:
a. the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal nation;
b. the crime is a kind which disturbs the peace of the coastal nation or the good order
of the territorial sea;
c. assistance oflocal authorities has been requested by the flag nation or the master of
the ship transiting the territorial sea; or
d. such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit drug trafficking.
The above circumstances do not affect the broader right of the coastal nation to take any steps
authorized by its laws for the purpose ofan arrest or investigation on board a foreign merchant ship
passing through the territorial sea after leaving that coastal nation's internal waters. Territorial Sea
Convention, art. 19; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 27. See Nordquist, Vol. II, at 237-43.
14. AFP 110-31, para. 2-4b, at 2-4 to 2-5. Commissioned units of U.S. military aircraft are
c:;lled squadrons and are established pursuant to the authority of the chief ofservice concerned. All
aircraft, like ships, assume the nationality ofthe nation in which they are registered, and are marked
with symbols or designations of their nationality. The markings of military aircraft should differ
from those of other state aircraft and of civil aircraft. AFP 110-31, para. 2-4d.
15. "State aircraft" include aircraft used in "military," "customs" and "police" service.
Chicago Convention, art. 3{b). Transit passage through intemational straits and archipelagic sea
lanes passage are discussed in paragraphs 2.3.3 (p. 121) and 2.3.4.1 (p. 127) respectively. See also
paragraph 2.3.2.5 (p. 120) regardi.ng the right of assistance entry.
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aircraft without the consent of the aircraft commander. Should the aircraft
commander fail to certify compliance with local customs, immigration or
quarantine requirements, the aircraft may be directed to leave the territory and
national airspace of that nation immediately.16

2.2.3 Military Contract Aircraft. Civilian owned and operated aircraft, the

full capacity of which has been contracted by the Air Mobility Command
(AMC) and used in the military service of the United States, qualify as "state
aircraft" if they are so designated by the United States. In those circumstances
they too enjoy sovereign immunity from foreign search and inspection. 17 As a
matter of policy, however, the United States normally does not designate
AMC-charter aircraft as state aircraft.

2.3 NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFIlGHT OF NATIONAL WATERS
2.3.1 Internal Waters. 18 As discussed in the preceding chapter, coastal
nations exercise the same jurisdiction and control over their internal waters and
supeljacent airspace as they do over their land territory. Because most ports and
harbors are located landward of the baseline of the territorial sea, entering a
port ordinarily involves navigation in internal waters. Because entering
internal waters is legally equivalent to entering the land territory of another
nation, that nation's pennission is required. To facilitate international
maritime commerce, many nations grant foreign merchant vessels standing
pennission to enter internal waters, in the absence of notice to the contrary.
Warships and auxiliaries, and all aircraft, on the other hand, require specific and
advance entry pennission, unless other bilateral or multilateral arrangements
have been conduded. 19

16. AFP 110-31, paras. 2-2a & 2-5a, at 2-3 & 2-5. CNO Washington DC message 032330Z
MAR 88, NAVOP 024/88, reinforced the u.s. position that detailed lists ofpersonnel embarked
in military aircraft visiting foreign airfields may not be released to foreign governments. See also
Annex A2-1 (p. 155). See paragraph 2.3.1 (p. 115) regarding entry in distress. Quarantine is
discussed in paragraph 3.2.3 (p. 216). Self-defense is discussed in paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259).
17. Taylor, Fed. B.J., Winter 1968, at 48. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is distinguished from
military contract aircraft and discussed in Bristol, CRAF: Hawks in Doves Clothing? 20 A.F. L.
Rev. 48 (1978).
18. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 5, 1982 LOS Convention, art. 8.
19. For further information and guidance, see OPNAVINST 3128.3 (series), Subj: Visits by
U.S. Navy Ships to Foreign Countries, and OPNAVINST 3128.10 (series), Subj: Clearance
Procedures for Visits to United States Ports by Foreign Naval Vessels.
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Exceptions to the rule of non-entry into internal waters without coastal nation
pennission, whether ~ecific or implied, arise when rendered necessary by force
majeure or by distress, 0 or when straight baselines are established that have the
effect of enclosing, as internal waters, areas of the sea previously regarded as
territorial seas or high seas. 21 In the latter event, international law provides that the
right of innocent Rassage (see paragraph 2.3.2.1)22 or that of transit passage in an
international strait23 (see paragraph 2.3.3.1) may be exercised by all nations in
those waters.
2.3.2 Territorial Seas24
2.3.2.1 Innocent Passage. International law provides that ships (but not
aircraft) of all nations enjoy the right of innocent passage for the purpose of
continuous and expeditious traversing of the territorial sea or for proceeding to
or from internal waters. Innocent passage includes stopping and anchoring, but
only insofar as incidental to ordinary navigation, or as rendered necessary byforce
majeure or by distress. 25 Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation. 26 Military activities
considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal
nation, and therefore inconsistent with innocent passage, are:
1. Any threat or use offorce against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or
political independence of the coastal nation
2. Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind
3. The launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft or of any
military device
4. Intelligence collection activities detrimental to the security of that coastal
nation
20. Force majeure includes a ship forced into internal waters by distress or bad weather. The
distress must be caused by an uncontrollable event which creates an overwhelming or grave
necessity to enter port or risk loss of the vessel or her cargo. See paragraph 3.2, note 1 (p. 213). See
also TIle New York, 3 Wheat. 59 (16 U.S. 59) (1818); see also O'Connell 853-58; Restatement
(Third) sec. 48. See paragraph 3.2.2 (p. 215) regarding safe harbor, and paragraph 4.4 (p. 265)
regarding interception of intruding aircraft.
21. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 8(2).
22. [d.
23. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 35(a).
24. Navigation by foreign vessels in the territorial sea is regulated by the regimes of innocent
passage, assistance entry, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage which are discussed in
paragraphs 2.3.2.1 (p. 116),2.3.2.5 (p. 120),2.3.3.1 (p. 121), and 2.3.4.1 (p. 127), respectively.
25. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(2), (3) & (6); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 18. Stopping
or anchoring is also permitted to assist those in danger or distress.
26. What constitutes prejudice under art. 14(4) of the Territorial Sea Convention was left
undefined. The 1982 LOS Convention endeavors to eliminate the subjective interpretative
difficulties that have arisen concerning the innocent passage regime of the Territorial Sea
Convention.
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5. The carrying out of research or survey activities
6. Any act aimed at interfering with any system of communication of the
coastal nation
7. Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the
coastal nation
8. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of
the coastal nation
9. Any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to the 1982 LOS
Convention
10. Any fishing activities
11. Any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 27
27. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 19. This is an "exhaustive list of activities that would render
passage not innocent." Joint Interpretation ofthe Rules ofIntemational Law Governing Innocent
Passage, attached to the Joint Statement by the United States ofAmerica and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 23 September 1989, Dep't St. Bull., Nov. 1989, at
25,28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1445 (1989), 84 Am.]. Int'l L. 239 (1990), AnnexA2-2, para. 3 (p. 161).
On the other hand, 1 O'Connell 270 suggests the list may not be complete since the list does not
say "only" the listed actions are prejudicial. The Territorial Sea Convention contains no
comparable listing. See Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: the 1975 Geneva Session, 69 Am.]. Int'l L. 763, 771-72 (1975); Froman, Uncharted
Waters: Non-innocent Passage ofWarships in the Territorial Sea, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 625, 659
(1984); Gramrnig, The YoronJima Submarine Incident ofAugust 1980: A Soviet Violation of the
Law of the Sea, 22 Harv. Int'l LJ. 331, 340 (1981). See also Nordquist, Vol. II, at 164-178.
Since these activities must occur "in the territorial sea" (LOS Convention, art. 19(2», any
determination of noninnocent passage by a transiting ship must be made on the basis of acts
committed while in the territorial sea. Thus cargo, destination, or purpose ofthe voyage can not be
used as a criterion in determining that passage is not innocent. Professor H.B. Robertson
testimony, House Merchant Marine & Fisheries Cornm., 97th Cong., hearing on the status of the
law of the sea treaty negotiations, 27 July 1982, Ser. 97-29, at 413-14. Accord Oxman, paragraph
2.1.1, note 2 (p. 109), at 853 (possession of passive characteristics, such as the innate combat
capabilities ofa warship, do not constitute "activity" within the meaning ofthis enumerated list).
The 1983 Soviet "Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Waters
and Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR," trallSlation in 24 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1717 (1985), were
not entirely consistent with the relevant provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention. Buder,
Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81 Am.].
Int'l L. 331 (1987). In particular, the Soviet claim to limit the innocent passage of warships to five
"routes ordinarily used forintemational navigation" was inconsistent with the Convention's terms
and negotiating history, and prior Soviet support therefor. Neubauer, The Right of Innocent
Passage for Warships in the Territorial Sea: A Response to the Soviet Union, Nav. War Coll.
Rev., Spring 1988, at 49; Franckx, Further Steps in the Clarification of the Soviet Position on the
Innocent Passage of Foreign Warships through its Territorial Waters, 19 Ga.]. Int'l & Compo L.
535 (1990). That portion ofthe 1983 Rules was amended effective 23 September 1989 to conform
to the Uniform Interpretation, Annex A2-2 (p. 161). See paragraph 2.6, note 105 (p. 143)
regarding U.S. challenges to this and other excessive maritime claims.
Since coastal nations are competent to regulate fishing in their territorial sea, passage of foreign
fishing vesseIs engaged in activities that are in violation ofthose laws or regulations is not innocent.
Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(5}; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 21(l)(e}.
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Foreign ships, including warships, exercising the right ofinnocent passage are
required to comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal nation in
conformity with established principles of international law and, inlarticular,
with such laws and regulations relating to the safety of navigation. 2 Innocent
passage does not include a right of overflight.
The coastal nation may take affirmative actions in its territorial sea to prevent
passage that is not innocent, including, where necessary, the use of force. If a
foreign ship enters the territorial sea and engages in non-innocent activities, the
appropriate remedy, consistent with customary international law, is first to
inform the vessel of the reasons why the coastal nation questions the innocence
of the passage, and to provide the vessel a reasonable opportunity to clarify its
intentions or to correct its conduct in a reasonably short period of time. 29

2.3.2.2 Pennitted Restrictions. For purposes such as resource conservation,
environmental protection, and navigational safety, a coastal nation may establish
certain restrictions upon the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels. Such
restrictions upon the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea are not
prohibited by international law, provided that they are reasonable and necessary;
do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent
passage; and do not discriminate in form or in fact against the ships ofany nation or
those carrying cargoes to, from, or on behalfofany nation. The coastal nation may,
where navigational safety dictates, require foreign ships exercising the ri~ht of
innocent passage to utilize designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. 0
28. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(1} & 17; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 21(1} &21(4}.
29. This concept of customary intemationallaw was incorporated into the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Uniform Interpretation ofthe Rules ofInternational Law Governing Innocent Passage. See Annex
A2-2, para. 4 (p. 161). See also Kinley, The Law ofSelf-Defense, Contemporary Naval Operations,
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 19 L. Sea Inst. Proc. 10, 12-15 (1987)
discussing coastal nation enforcement options in light of the U.N. Charter and the law of the sea,
particularly articles 25,27,28 and 30 of the 1982 LOS Convention.
30. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 21. Tankers, nuclear powered vessels, and ships carrying
dangerous or noxious substances may be required, for safety reasons, to utilize designated sea lanes.
1982 LOS Convention, art. 22(2}. These controls may be exercised at any time.
Art. 21 of the 1982 LOS Convention empowers a coastal nation to adopt, with due publicity, laws
and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea in respect of all or any of the
following eight subject areas (which do not include security, but see art. 25(3) re temporary closure
of the territorial sea for security purposes}:
1. The safety ofnavigation and the regulation ofmarine traffic (including traffic separation
schemes).
2. The protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations.
3. The protection of cables and pipelines.
4. The conservation ofliving resources of the sea.
(continued ...)
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2.3.2.3 Temporary Suspension of Innocent Passage. A coastal nation may
suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea when
it is essential for the protection of its security. Such a suspension must be
preceded by a published notice to the international community and may not
discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships.31

2.3 .2.4 Warships and Innocent Passage. All warships, including submarines,

32
enjoy the right of innocent passage on an unimpeded and unannounced basis.
Submarines, however, are required to navigate on the surface and to show their
30.(...continued)
5. The prevention of infringement of the fisheries regulations of the coastal nation.
6. The preservation of the environment of the coastal nation and the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution thereof.
7. Marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys.
8. The prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations of the coastal nation.
This list is exhaustive and inclusive.
The coastal nation is required to give appropriate publicity to any dangers to navigation ofwhich it
has knowledge within its territorial sea. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 15; 1982 LOS
Convention, art. 24. The u.S. Inland Rules are discussed in paragraph 2.7.2.1 (p. 146).
31. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 25(3). Authorization to
suspend innocent passage in the U.S. territorial sea during a national emergency is given to the
President in 50 U.S.C. sec. 191 (1988). See also 33 C.F .R. part 127. "Security" includes suspending
innocent passage for weapons testing and exercises.
For instances in which innocent passage has been suspended, see 4 Whiteman 379-86.
The Conventions do not define how large an area of territorial sea may be temporarily closed off.
The 1982 LOS Convention does clearly limit the maximum breadth of the territorial sea to 12
nautical miles, and thus any nation claiming to close areas beyond 12 NM during such a suspension
would be in violation of international law. The Conventions do not explain what is meant by
"protection of its security" beyond the example of "weapons exercises" added in the 1982 LOS
Convention. Further, how long "temporarily" may be is not defined, but it clearly may not be
factually permanent. Alexander, 39-40; McDougal & Burke 592-93. The prohibition against
"discrimination in form or fact among foreign ships" clearly refers to discrimination among flag
nations, and, in the view of the United States, includes direct and indirect discrimination on the
basis of cargo, port of origin or destination, or means of propulsion. This position is strengthened
by the provisions of the LOS Convention explicidy dealing with nuclear powered and nuclear
capable ships (arts. 22(2) & 23).

See the last subparagraph of paragraph 2.3.3.1 (p. 126) regarding the regime ofnonsuspendable
innocent passage in international straits.
32. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(1); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 17. Some nations view
the mere passage offoreign warships through their territorial sea per se prejudicial (e.g., because of
the military character of the vessel, the flag it is flying, its nuclear propulsion or weapons, or its
destination), and insist on prior notice and/or authorization before foreign warships transit their
territorial sea. See the list of such nations at Table A2-1 (p. 204). The United States' position,
(continued ...)
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flag when passing through foreign territorial seas. 33 If a warship does not comply
with coastal nation regulations that conform to established principles of
international law and disregards a request for compliance which is made to it, the
coastal nation may require the warship immediateI; to leave the territorial sea in
which case the warship shall do so immediately.3

2.3.2.5 Assistance Entry. All ship and aircraft commanders have an obligation
to assist those in danger of being lost at sea. See paragraph 3.2.1. This
long-recognized duty of mariners permits assistance entry into the territorial sea
by ships or, under certain circumstance~, aircraft without permission of the
coastal nation to engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to
those in danger or distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the
danger or distress is reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the
32.(...continued)
consistent with the travaux preparatoires of the Territorial Sea Convention and the 1982 LOS
Convention, is that warships possess the same right ofinnocent surface passage as any other vessel in
the territorial sea, and that right cannot be conditioned on prior coastal nation notice or
authorization for passage. Oxman, paragraph 2.1, note 2 (p. 109), at 854; Froman, paragraph
2.3.2.1, note 27 (p. 117), at 625; Harlow, Legal Aspects ofClaims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters,
JAG]., Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970, at 86; Walker, What is Innocent Passage?, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Jan.
1969, at 53 & 63, reprinted in 1 Lillich & Moore, at 365 & 375. The Soviet Union (now Russia) has
accepted the United States' position. See para. 2 of the Uniform Interpretation of the Rules of
International Law Governing Innocent Passage, Annex A2-2 (p. 161), and Franckx, Innocent
Passage ofWarships: Recent Developments in US-Soviet Relations, Marine Policy, Nov. 1990, at
484-90. For the earlier Soviet views, see Franckx, The U.S.S.R. Position on the Innocent Passage
of Warships Through Foreign Territorial Waters, 18]. Mar. L. & Com. 33 (1987), and Butler,
Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81 Am.].
Int'l L. 331 (1987). Attempts to require prior authorization or notification of vessels in innocent
passage during the Third LOS Conference were focused on warships. All attempts were defeated:
3d session, Geneva 1975; 4th session, New York 1976; 9th session, New York 1980; 10th session
1981; 11th session, New York 1982; and 11th resumed session, Montego Bay 1982. The United
States' views on innocent passage in the territorial sea were set forth in its 8 March 1983 statement
in right of reply, 17 LOS Documents 243-44, Annex Al-l (p. 27).
33. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 20. Unless the coastal
nation has consented to submerged passage, which none has done publicly to date Ganuary 1997).
For discussions of the incident in which the Soviet Whiskey-class submarine U-137 grounded
outside the Swedish naval base of Karlskrona, after having entered Swedish territorial and internal
waters submerged without Swedish permission, see Sweden and the Soviet Submarine--A Diary
of Events, 112 Army Q. & Def.]. 6 (1982); Leitenberg, Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish
Waters 1980-1986 (1987); Bildt, Sweden and the Soviet Submarines, Survival, Summer 1983, at
168; Lofgren, Soviet Submarines Against Sweden, Strategic Review, Winter 1984, at 36; Delupis,
Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 53 (1984); Amundsen, Soviet
Submarines in Scandinavian Waters, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, at Ill.
34. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 30. A warship required to
leave for such conduct shall comply with the request to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Uniform Interpretation of the Rules ofInternational Law Governing Innocent Passage, para. 7,
Annex A2-2 (p. 161).
(continued ...)
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territorial sea or superjacent airspace to conduct a search, which requires the
consent of the coastal nation. 35

2.3.3 International Straits
2.3.3.1 International Straits Overlapped by Territorial Seas. Straits used
for international navigation through the territorial sea between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone are subject to the legal regime of transit passaJte. 36

34.{...continued}
Under art. 23 of the 1982 LOS Convention, foreign nuclear-powered ships, and ships carrying
nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances, exercising the right of innocent
passage must "carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such
ships by international agreements," such as Chap. VIII of the 1974 International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea {SaLAS}. 32 U.S.T. 275-77, 287-91, T.I.A.S. 9700 {nuclear passenger
ship and nuclear cargo ship safety certificates}. These provisions of the 1974 SaLAS are specifically
not applicable to warships.
35. Art. 0925, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990; COMDTINST 16100.3, Subj: Search and
Rescue in Foreign Territory and Territorial Seas, 3 December 1987; National Search and Rescue
Manual, vol. I, COMDTINST M16120.5A, para. 1222 {1991}. The U.S. Department of State is
of the view that the right of assistance entry for aircraft is not as fully developed as that for vessels.
The efforts to render emergency assistance must be undertaken in good faith and not as a
subterfuge. See Statement of Policy by The Department of State. the Department ofDefense, and
the United States Coast Guard Concerning Exercise ofthe Right ofAssistance Entry, Annex A2-3
(p. 163). That Statement ofPolicy, extended to include assistance entry into archipelagic waters, is
implemented within the Department of Defense by ClCSI 2410.01A, Subj: Guidance for the
Exercise of Right of Assistance Entry, of23 April 1997. Annex A2-4 (p. 165).
36. Under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, international straits overlapped by territorial
seas were subject to a regime providing only nonsuspendable innocent surface passage. Territorial
Sea Convention, arts. 14 & 16{4}. Part III of the 1982 LOS Convention establishes the regime of
transit passage for international straits overlapped by territorial seas. Transit passage also applies in
those straits where the high seas or exclusive economic zone corridor is not suitable for
international navigation. See 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 36 & 37. See also Nordquist, Vol. II at
279-396.
The United States' view regarding the status ofthe transit passage regime as existing law is reflected
in its 3 March 1983 Statement in Right of Reply, Annex Al-l (p. 27), and Presidential
Proclamation 5928, AnnexAl-6 (p. 78). The right of transit passage was fully recognized in art. 4
of the Treaty offielimitation between Venezuela and the Netherlands, 21 March 1978, an English
translation of which is set out in Annex 2 to U.S. Dep't of State, Limits in the Seas No. 105,
Maritime Delimitations, and in Art. VI of the Agreement on the Delimitation of Maritime and
Submarine Areas between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, 18 April 1990, reprinted in U.N.
LOS Bull., No. 19, Oct. 1991, at 24. Although the term "transit passage" was not used in the
statement in connection with extension of Great Britain's territorial sea to 12 NM (apparently to
preclude any implication of incorporation by reference of the entire straits regime, 37 Infl &
Compo L.Q. 415 (1988», the "transit passage" regime was used in a Declaration issued by
France and GreatBritain setting out the governing regime ofnavigation in the Dover Straits in
{continued ...}
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36.(... continued)
conjunction with signature on 2 November 1988 of an Agreement establishing a territorial sea
boundary in the Straits of Dover. U.K. White Paper, France No.1, Cm. 557 (1989); FCO Press
Release No. 100, 2 Nov. 1988.

Straits used for internationailiavigation: In the opinion of the International Court ofJustice in the
Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.CJ. 4, reprinted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law
Documents 1948-1949, "Blue Book" series, 1950, v. 46, at 108 (1950), the decisive criterion in
identifYing international straits was not the volume of traffic flowing through the strait or its
relative importance to international navigation, but rather its geographic situation connecting, for
example, the two parts of the high seas, and the fact ofits being "used for international navigation."
/d. at 142. This geographical approach is reflected in both the Territorial Sea Convention (art.
16(4» and the 1982 LOS Convention (arts. 34(1), 36 & 45). The geographical definition appears to
contemplate a natural and not an artificially constructed canal, such as the Suez Canal. Efforts to
define "used for international navigation" with greater specificity have failed. Alexander, 153-54.
The United States holds that all straits susceptible of use for international navigation are included
within that definition. Grunawalt, United States Policy on International Straits, 18 Ocean Dev. &
Int'l LJ. 445, 456 (1987).
Part III of the 1982 LOS Convention addresses five different kinds ofstraits used for international
navigation, each with a distinct legal regime:
1. Straits connecting one part of the high seaslEEZ and another part of the high seas/EEZ
(art. 37, governed by transit passage, see paragraph 2.3.3.1 (p. 121».
2. Straits connecting a part of the high seas/EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign nation
(art. 45(1)(b), regulated by nonsuspendable innocent passage, see paragraph 2.3.3.1, last
subparagraph (p. 126».
3. Straits connecting one part of the high seas/EEZ and another part of the high seas/EEZ
where the strait is formed by an island ofa nation bordering the strait and its mainland, ifthere exists
seaward of the island a route through the high seas/EEZ of similar convenience with regard to
navigation and hydrographical characteristics (art. 38(1), regulated by nonsuspendable innocent
passage). (Table A2-2 (p. 204) lists 22 such straits, including the Strait of Messina (between the
Italian mainland and Sicily). Difficulties in defining "mainland" and alternate routes are discussed
in Alexander, 157-61.)
4. Straits regulated in whole or in part by international conventions (art. 35(c». The 1982
LOS Convention does not alter the legal regime in straits regulated by long-standing international
conventions in force specifically relating to such straits. While there is no agreed complete list of
such straits, the Turkish Straits and the Strait of Magellan are generally included:
- the Turkish Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, governed by the Montreux
Convention of20 July 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213, 31 Am.). Int'l L. Supp. 4; and
- the Straits of Magellall, governed by article V of the Boundary Treaty
between Argentina and Chile, 23 July 1881, 82 Brit. Foreign & State Papers 1103,
159 Parry's T.S. 45 (Magellan Straits are neutralized forever, and free navigation is
assured to the flags ofall nations), and article 10 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship
between Argentina and Chile, 29 November 1984, 24 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 11, 13 (1985)
("the delimitation agreed upon herein, in no way affects the provisions of the
Boundary Treaty 0[1881, according to which the Straits ofMagellan are perpetually
neutralized and freedom ofnavigation is assured to ships ofall flags under the terms of
ArtS of said Treaty").
(continued ...)
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36.(...continued)
Alexander 140-50 and Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am.]. Int'lL. 77,111 (1980) also list in this category TI,e Oresund and tile
Belts, governed by the Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues, Copenhagen, 14 March
1857,116 Parry's T.S. 357, 47 Brit. Foreign & State Papers 24, granting free passage of the Sound
and Belts for all flags on 1 April 1857, and the U.S.-Danish Convention on Discontinuance of
Sound Dues, 11 April 1857, 11 Stat. 719, T.S. 67, 7 Miller 519, 7 Bevans 11, guaranteeing "the free
and unencumbered navigation ofAmerican vessels, through the Sound and the Belts forever" (see
Figure A2-1 (p. 190». Warships were never subject to payment of the so-called "Sound Dues,"
and thus it can be argued that no part of these "long-standing international conventions" are
applicable to them. 7 Miller 524-86; 2 Bmel, International Straits 41 (1947). The U.S. view is that
warships and State aircraft traverse the Oresund and the Belts based either under the conventional
right of "free and unencumbered navigation" or under the customary right of transit passage. The
result is the same: an international right of transit independent of coastal nation interference. The
Danish view is, however, to the contrary. Alexandersson, The Baltic Straits 82-86 & 89 (1982).
Both Denmark and Sweden (Oresund) maintain that warship and State aircraft transit in the Baltic
Straits are subject to coastal nation restrictions. They argue that the "longstanding international
conventions" apply, as "modified" by longstanding domestic legislation. The United States does
not agree. SeeTableA2-3 (p. 205) (listing the Bosporus, Dardanelles, Magellan, Oresund and Store
Baelt) and Alexander, 140-50.
Sweden and Finland claim Aland's Hav, the 16 NM wide entrance to the Gulf ofBothnia,
as an exception to the transit passage regime, since passage in that strait is regulated in part by the
Convention relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland Islands, Geneva, 20
Oct. 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 211, art. 5 ("The prohibition to send warships into [the waters ofthe Aaland
Islands] or to station them there shall not prejudice the freedom ofinnocent passage through the
territorial waters. Such passage shall continue to be governed by the international rules and usage in
force.") Declarations on signature ofthe 1982 LOS Convention, 10 December 1982. It should be
noted that under art. 4.11 of the 1921 Convention, the territorial sea of the Aaland Islands extends
only "three marine miles" from the low-water line and in no case extends beyond the outer limits
ofthe straight line segments set out in art. 4.1 ofthat convention. The 1921 Convention is therefore
not applicable to the remaining waters that form the international strait. The United States, which
is not a party to this Convention, has never recognized this strait as falling within art. 35(c) of the
LOS Convention. The parties to the 1921 Convention include Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Estonia and Latvia.
It may be noted that free passage of the Strait oj Gibraltar was agreed to in a series of
agreements between France, Spain and Great Britain in the early 20th Century. Article VII of the
Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, London, 8
April 1904, 195 Parry's T.S. 198, acceded to by Spain in the Declaration of Paris, 3 Oct. 1904, 196
Parry's T.S. 353; Declarations on Entente on Mediterranean Affairs, Paris, 16 May 1907, 204
Parry's T.S. 176 (France and Spain) and London, 16 May 1907, 204 Parry's T.S. 179 (United
Kingdom and Spain); and art. 6 ofthe France-Spain Convention concerning Morocco, Madrid, 27
Nov. 1912, 217 Parry's T.S. 288.
5. Straits through archipelagic waters governed by archipelagic sea lanes passage (art. 53(4)
(see paragraph 2.3.4.1 (p. 127». For a listing of nations claiming the status of archipelagic States in
accordance with the 1982 LOS Convention see Table Al-7 (p. 101).
There are a number ofstraits connecting the high seas/EEZ with claimed historic waters (see Table
A2-4 (p. 206». The validity ofthose claims is, at best, uncertain (see paragraph 1.3.3.1 (p.
The
regime of passage through such straits is discussed in Alexander, at 155.

11».
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2.3.3.1 International Straits Overlapped by Territorial Seas. Straits used
for international navigation through the territorial sea between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an
. econonuc
. zone are sub·~ect to tee
h 1 gal regtme
.
· passaJte. 36
exc1USlve
0f
transIt
Transit passage exists throughout the entire strait and not just the area overlapped
by the territorial sea of the coastal nation(s).
36.(... continued}
Canals. Man-made canals used for international navigation by definition are not "straits used for
international navigation," and are generally controlled by agreement between the countries
concerned. They are open to the use of all vessels, although tolls may be imposed for their use.
They include:
- the Panama Canal, governed by the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, 33 U.S. T.
1, T.LA.S. 10,029, ("in time of peace and in time of war it shall remain secure and
open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality ....
Vessels ofwar and auxiliary vessels of all nations shall at all times be entided to transit
the Canal, irrespective of their internal operation, means of propulsion, origin,
destination or armament");
- the Suez Canal, governed by the Convention respecting the Free
Navigation of the Suez Canal, Constantinople, 29 October 1888, 79 Brit. Foreign &
State Papers 18, 171 Parry's T.S. 241, 3 Am.]. Int'l L. Supp. 123 (1909) ("the Suez
maritime canal shall always be free and open, in time of war and in time ofpeace, to
every vessel of commerce or war, without distinction offlag"), reaffirmed by Egypt in
its Declaration on the Suez Canal, 24 April 1957, U.N. Doc. A/3576 (S/3818), and
U.N. Security Council Res. 118, S/3675, 13 Oct. 1956 ("There should be free and
open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert-this covers
both political and technical aspects"), Dep't St. Bull., 22 Oct. 1956, at 618; and
- the Kiel Canal, governed by art. 380 of the Treaty of Versailles, 28 June
1919, T.S. 4,13 Am.]. Int'IL. 128, Malloy 3329, 2 Bevans 43, 225 Parry'sT.S. 188
("the Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of
commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire
equality"). The Federal Republic of Germany does not consider the Treaty of
Versailles to apply to the Kiel Canal. Alexander, at 181. See also TIle SS Wimbledon,
P.C.!J., Sere A, No.1, 1923.
The passage ofnuclear powered warships through the Suez Canal is discussed in paragraph 2.1.2.1,
note 9 (p. 110). Canals are further discussed in Alexander, at 174-81. Other canals may involve
internal waters only, such as the U.S. Intracoastal Waterway, and the Cape Cod and Erie Canals.
37. The great majority ofstrategically important straits, i.e., Gibraltar (Figure A2-2 (p. 191»,
Bab el Mandeb (Figure A2-3 (p. 192», Hormuz (Figure A2-4 (p. 193», and Malacca (Figure A2-5
(p. 194» fall into this category. Transit passage regime also applies to those straits less than six miles
wide previously subject to the regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage under the Territorial
Sea Convention, e.g., Singapore and Sundae See Table A2-5 (p. 207). It should be noted that transit
passage exists throughout the entire strait and not just the area overlapped by the territorial seas of
the littoral nation(s}. Navy JAG message 061630Z]UN 88 (Annex A2-5, (p. 175». See, e.g.,
Figure A2-4 (p. 193).
38. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 38(2} & 39(1}(c}; Moore, The Regime of Straits and The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am.J. Int'lL. 77, 95-102 (1980); 1
O'Connell 331-37 . Compare art. 53(3} which defines the parallel concept ofarchipelagic sea lanes
(continued ...)
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Under international law, the ships and aircraft of all nations, including
warships, auxiliaries, and military aircraft, enjoy the right of unimpeded transit
passage through such straits and their approaches. 37 Transit passage is defined as
the exercise of the freedoms ofnavigation and overflight solely for the purpose of
continuous and expeditious transit in the normal modes of operation utilized by
ships and aircraft for such passage. 38 This means that submarines are free to transit
international straits submerged, since that is their normal mode ofoperation, and
that surface warships may transit in a manner consistent with sound navigational
practices and the security of the force, including formation steaming and the
launching and recovery of aircraft. 39 All transiting ships and aircraft must
proceed without delay; must refrain from the threat or the use offorce against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of nations bordering
the strait; and must otherwise refrain from any activities other than those incident
to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit. 40
Transit passage through international straits cannot be hampered or suspended
by the coastal nation for any purpose during peacetime. 4 This principle of
international law also applies to transiting ships (including warships) of nations at
peace with the bordering coastal nation but involved in armed conflict with
. 42
another natton.
Coastal nations bordering international straits overlapped by territorial seas may
designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes to promote navigational
safety. However. such sea lanes and separation schemes must be approved by the
38.(... continued)
passage as "the exercise ... of the rights ofnavigation and overflight in the nomla/mode solely for the
purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or
an exclusive economic zone and another part ofthe high seas or an exclusive economic zone." The
emphasized words do not appear in art. 38(2), but rather in the plural in art. 39(1)(c); art. 39 also
applies mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage.
39. Burke, Submerged Passage Through Straits: Interpretations ofthe Proposed Law ofthe Sea
Treaty Text, 52 Wash. L. Rev. 193 (1977); Robertson, Passage Through International Straits: A
Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 20 Va.]. Int'l L.
801 (1980); Clove, Submarine Navigation in International Straits: A Legal Perspective, 39 Naval
L. Rev. 103 (1990). But see Reisman, The Regime ofStraits and National Security: An Appraisal of
International Lawmaking, 74 Am.]. Int'l L. 48 (1980). See also Nordquist, Vol. II at 342.
40. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 39(1).
41. Id., at art. 44.
42. Warships and other targetable vessels of nations in armed conflict with the bordering
coastal nation may be attacked within that portion of the international strait overlapped by the
territorial sea of the belligerent coastal nation, as in all high seas or exclusive economic zone waters
that may exist within the strait itsel£
43. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 41(1) & 41(3). Traffic separation schemes have been adopted
for the Bab el Mandeb (Figure A2-3, (p. 192)), Hormuz (Figure A2-4, (p. 193)), Gibraltar (Figure
A2-2, p. (191)), and Malacca-Singapore straits (Figure A2-5, (p. 194)).
44. Merchant ships and government ships operated for commercial purposes must respect
properly designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Warships, auxiliaries and government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes, e.g., sovereign immune vessels (see paragraph 2.1
(continued ...)
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competent international organization (the International Maritime Organization)
in accordance with generally accepted international standards. 43 Ships in transit
must respect properly designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. 44
The regime of innocent passa~e (see paragraph 2.3.2.1), rather than transit
passage, applies in straits used for international navigation that connect a part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone with the territorial sea of a coastal
nation. There may be no suspension ofinnocent passage through such straits. 45
2.3.3.2 International Straits Not Completely Overlapped by Territorial
Seas. Ships and aircraft transiting through or above straits used for international
navigation which are not completely overlapped by territorial seas and through
which there is a high seas or exclusive economic zone corridor suitable for such
navigation, enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight while
44.{... continued)
(p. 109» are not legally required to comply with such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes while
in transit passage. Sovereign immune vessels must, however, exercise due regard for the safety of
navigation. Warships and auxiliaries may, and often do, voluntarily comply with IMO-approved
routing measures in international straits when practicable and compatible with the military
mission. When voluntarily using an IMO-approved traffic separation scheme, such vessels must
omply with applicable provisions of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collision at
Sea (COLREGS). (Annex A2-6 (p. 179».
45. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 45. These so-called "dead-end" straits include Head Harbour
Passage, the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage, and the Gulf of Honduras. Moore, The Regime of
Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am.]. Int'l L. 112
(1980). Alexander, 154-55 & 186 n.46, asserts the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which is capable of
shallow water passage, would belong in this list when the U.S. clairns a 12 NM territorial sea, as it
now does.
As between Israel and Egypt at least, the Strait ofTiran (Figure A2-6, (p. 195» is governed by the

Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, 26 March 1979,18 Int'ILeg. Mat'Is 362, art. V(2) ("the
Parties consider the Strait ofTiran and the Gulf ofAqaba to be international waterways open to all
nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight"). See the list at
Table A2-4 (p. 206). Israel did not object to Part III of the LOS Convention "to the extent that
particular stipulations and understandings for a passage regime for specific straits, giving broader rights to
their users, are protected, as is the case for some of the straits in my country's region, or ofinterest to my
country." 17 LOS Official Records 84, para. 19. Egypt's declaration accompanying its ratification of
the LOS Convention on 26 August 1983 stated "[t]he provisions of the 1979 Peace Treaty Between
Egypt and Israel concerning passage though the Strait ofTiran and the Gulf ofAqaba come within the
framework of the general regime of waters forming straits referred to in part III of the Convention,
wherein it is stipulated that the general regime shall not affect the legal status of waters forming straits
and shall include certain obligations with regard to security and the maintenance of order in the State
bordering the strait." At a 29 January 1982 press conference, U.S. LOS Ambassador Malone said, "the
U.S. fully supports the continuing applicability and force offreedom ofnavigation and overflight for the
Strait ofTiran and the GulfofAqaba as set out in the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. In the U.S.
view, the Treaty of Peace is fully compatible with the LOS Convention and will continue to prevail.
The conclusion of the LOS Convention will not affect these provisions in any way." 128 Congo Rec.
S4089, 27 April 1982. Compare Lapidoth, The Strait ofTiran, the GulfofAqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of
Peace Between Egypt and Israe~ 77 Am.]. Int'l L. 84 (1983) lIIith EI Baradei, The Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba: A New Legal Regime, 76 id. 532 (1982).
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operating in and over such a corridor. Accordingly, so long as they remain
beyond the territorial sea, all ships and aircraft of all nations have the
unencumbered right to navigate through and over such waters subject only to
due regard for the right of others to do so as well. 46
2.3.4 Archipelagic Waters
2.3.4.1 Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage. All ships and aircraft, including
warships and military aircraft, enjoy the right ofarchipelagic sea lanes passage while
transiting through, under or over archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial seas
via all routes normally used for international navigation and overflight.
Archipelagic sea lanes passage is defined under international law as the exercise of
the freedom of navigation and overflight for the sole purpose of continuous,
expeditious and unobstructed transit through archipelagic waters, in the normal
modes of operations, by the ships and aircraft involved. 47 This means that
submarines may transit while submerged48 and that surface warships may carry out
those activities normally undertaken during passage through such waters,
including activities necessary to their security, such as formation steaming and the
launching and recovery of aircraft. The right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is
substantially identical to the right of transit passage through international straits (see
paragraph 2.3.3.1).49 When archipelagic sea lanes are properly designated by the
archipelagic nation, the following additional rules apply:
1. Each such designated sea lane is defined by a continuous axis line from the
point of entry into the territorial sea adjacent to the archipelagic waters, through
those archipelagic waters, to the point ofexit from the territorial sea beyond. 50
2. Ships and aircraft engaged in archipelagic sea lanes passage through such
designated sea lanes are required to remain within 25 nautical miles either side of
the axis line and must approach no closer to the coast line than 10 percent of the
distance between the nearest islands. See Figure 2_1. 51

46. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 36. See Table A2-5 (p. 207). Table A2-6 (p. 209) lists other
straits less than 24 NM wide which could have a high seas route if the littoral nations continue to
claim less than a 12 NM territorial sea. While theoretically the regime of transit passage would
apply if the corridor is not suitable for passage, Alexander found no such strait. Alexander at
151-52. Compare, however, the suitability for the passage of deep draft tankers through the waters
in the vicinity of Abu Musa Island in the southern Persian Gul£
47. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 53(3).
48. Nordquist, Vol. II at 342 (para. 39.10(e» and 476-77 (paras. 53.9(c) & 53.9(d».
49. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 54. See discussion at paragraph 2.3.4.2, note 56 (p. 128).
50. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 53(5).
51. !d.
52. ld., art 53(3). See also Nordquist, Vol. II at 476-77.
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This right of archipelagic sea lanes passage, through designated sea lanes as
well as through all nonnal routes, cannot be hampered or suspended by the
. fcor any purpose. 52
· natlon
arc hipelaglc
2.3.4.2 Innocent Passage. Outside of archipelagic sea lanes, all ships,
including warships, enjoy the more limited right ofinnocentfassage throughout
archipelagic waters just as they do in the territorial sea. 5 Submarines must
remain on the surface and fly their national flag. Any threat or use of force
directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of
the archipelagic nation is prohibited. Lau~ching and recovery of aircraft are not
allowed, nor may weapons exercises be conducted. The archipelagic nation may
promulgate and enforce reasonable restrictions on the right of innocent passage
through its archipelagic waters for reasons of navigational safe~ and for customs,
fiscal, immigration, fishing, pollution, and sanitary purposes. 5 Innocent passage
may be suspended temporarily by the archipelagic nation in specified areas ofits
archipelagic waters when essential for the protection of its security, but it must
first promulgate notice ofits intentions to do so and must apply the suspension in
a nondiscriminating manner. 55 There is no right of overflifht through airspace
over archipelagic waters outside of archipelagic sea lanes. 5

53. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 52(1).
54. !d., arts. 52(1), 53 & 2l.
55. !d., art. 52(2).
56. Most of the essential elements of the transit passage regime in non-archipelagic
international straits (paragraph 2.3.4.1 (p. 127)) apply in straits forming part of an archipelagic sea
lane. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 54, applying mutatis mutandis art. 39 (duties ofships and aircraft
during transit passage), 40 (research and survey activities), and 42 and 44 (laws, regulations and
duties of the bordering State relating to passage). This right exists regardless of whether the strait
connects high seas/EEZ with archipelagic waters (e.g., Lombok Strait) or connects two areas of
archipelagic waters with one another (e.g., Wetar Strait). Alexander, 155-56. Although
theoretically only the regime ofinnocent passage exists in straits within archipelagic waters not part
of an archipelagic sea lane (paragraph 2.3.4.2 (p. 128); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 52(1);
Alexander, 156), since archipelagic sea lanes "shall include all normal passage routes ... and all
nonnal navigational channels . . . " (art. 53(4)), the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
effectively applies to these straits as well.
Ifa nation meets all the criteria but has not claimed archipelagic status, then high seas freedoms exist
in all maritime areas outside the territorial seas of the individual islands; transit passage applies in
straits susceptible of use for international navigation; and innocent passage applies in other areas of
the territorial sea. See also u.S. Statement in Right of Reply, Annex A1-1 (p.27).

International Status and Navigation of Warships

129

FIGURE 2-1. A Designated Archipelagic Sea Lane

DISTANCE IETWEEN ISLAHDS A AND. II 4D NIl, SIIlPS AND AIR·
CRAFT MUST APPItOACH NO CLOSER THAN .. NY TO EITHER
ISLAND (1D P!JICENTOF DlSTANC! BETWEEN ISLANDS).

2.4 NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFLIGHT OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERS
2.4.1 Contiguous Zones. The contiguous zone is comprised of international
waters in and over which the ships and aircraft, including warships and military
aircraft, ofall nations enj oy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight as
described in paragraph 2.4.3. Although the coastal nation may exercise in those
waters the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws that may occur within its territory
(including its territorial sea), it cannot otherwise interfere with international
. . and ove rfli gh'
'
naVlgatlon
t 10 an d ab ove th
e contlguous
zone.57
2.4.2 Exclusive Economic Zones. The coastal nation's jurisdiction and
control over the exclusive economic zone are limited to matters concerning the
exploration, exploitation, management, and conservation of the resources of
those international waters. The coastal nation may also exercise-in the zone
jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and
structures having economic purposes; over marine scientific research (with
reasonable limitations); and over some aspects of marine environmental
57. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 33. See paragraph 2.4.4
(p. 132) regarding security zones.
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protection. Accordingly, the coastal nation cannot unduly restrict or impede the
exercise of the freedoms of navigation in and overflight of the exclusive
economic zone. Since all ships and aircraft, including warships and military
aircraft, enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, in and over those
waters, the existence of an exclusive economic zone in an area of naval
operations need not, of itself, be of operational concern to the naval
commander. 58

2.4.2.1 Marine Scientific Research. Coastal nations may regulate marine
scientific research conducted in marine areas under theirjurisdiction. This includes
the EEZ and the continental she1£59 Marine scientific research includes activities
undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters to expand knowledge of the marine
environment for peaceful purposes, and includes: oceanography, marine biology,
geological/geophysical scientific surveying, as well as other activities with a
scientific purpose. The United States does not require that other nations obtain its
consent prior to conducting marine scientific research in the U.s. EEZ.60
2.4.2.2 Hydrographic Surveys and Military Surveys. Although coastal
nation consent must be obtained in order to conduct marine scientific research in
its exclusive economic zone, the coastal nation cannot regulate hydrographic
surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor can it require
61
notification of such activities.
A hydrographic survey is the obtaining of information in coastal or relatively
shallow areas for the purpose of making navigational charts and similar products to
support safety of navigation. A hydrographic survey may include measurements of
the depth of water, configuration and nature of the natural bottom, direction and
62
force of currents, heights and times of tides, and hazards to navigation.

58. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 56, 58 & 60; see paragraph 1.5.2, note 49 (p. 21). A few
nations explicidy claim the right to regulate the navigation offoreign vessels in their EEZ beyond
that authorized by customary law reflected in the LOS Convention: Brazil, Guyana, India,
Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Seychelles. See Tables A2-7 (p. 210) and A2-8
(p. 211); Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law 51-52,81 & 85-86 (1987);
Rose, Naval Activity in the EEZ-Troubled Waters Ahead?, 39 Naval L. Rev. 67 (1990). The
United States rejects those claims. U.S. Statement in Right of Reply, Annex A1-1 (p. 27), and
1983 Oceans Policy Statement, Annex A1-3 (p. 43).
59. 1982 LOS Convention art. 246.
60. See Annex A1-7 (p. 80).
61. See Commentary accompanying Letter of Transmittal, Oct. 7, 1994, Senate Treaty Doc.
103-39 (Annex A1-2 (p. 32)), at 80. The Commentary may be found in U.S. State Department,
Dispatch, Vol. 6, Supp. No.1 (Feb. 1995).
62. Roach, Research and Surveys in Coastal Waters, Vol. 20 Center for Oceans Law and
Policy, UVA, Annual Seminar (1996), at 187.
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A military survey is the collecting of marine data for military purposes. A
military survey may include collection of oceanographic, marine geological,
63
geophysical, chemical, biological, acoustic, and related data.

2.4.3 High Seas. All ships and aircraft, including warships and military aircraft,
enjoy complete freedom of movement and operation on and over the high seas.
For warships, this includes task force maneuvering, flight operations, military
exercises, surveillance, intelligence gathering activities, and ordnance testing and
firing. All nations also enjoy the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the
bed of the high seas as well as on the continental shelfbeyond the territorial sea,
with coastal nation approval for the course of pipelines on the continental
she1£64 All of these activities must be conducted with due regard for the rights of
other nations and the safe conduct and operation of other ships and aircraft. 65

63. !d., at 187-88. See also Roach, Marine Scientific Research and the New Law of the Sea, 27
Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 59 (1996) at 61.
64. Submarine cables include telegraph, telephone and high-voltage power cables.
Commentary of the International Law Commission on draft arts. 27 and 35 on the law of the sea,
U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159, II Int'l L. Comm. Y.B. 278 & 281 (1956). See also
Commentary accompanying Letters of Transmittal and Submittal in U.S. Department of State,
Dispatch, Vol. 6, Supp. No.1 (Feb. 1995) at 19. All nations enjoy the right to lay submarine cables
and pipelines on the bed of the high seas as well as on their own and other nations' continental
shelves. Consequendy, SOSUS arrays can be lawfully laid on other nations' continental shelves beyond the territorial sea without notice or approval. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 79.
Willfully or with culpable negligence damaging a submarine cable or pipeline, except in legitimate
life-saving or ship-saving situations, is a punishable offense under the laws of most nations. In
addition, provisions exist for compensation from a cable owner for an anchor, net or other fishing
gear sacrificed in order to avoid injuring the cable. Warships may approach and visit a vessel, other
than another warship, suspected of causing damage to submarine cables in investigation of such
incidents. Convention on the Protection ofSubmarine Cables, Paris, 14 March 1884,24 Stat. 989,
T .S. No. 380, as amended, 25 Stat. 1414, T .S. Nos. 380-1, 380-2, 380-3, reproduced in AFP 11 0-20 at
36-1; Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments 157-178 (U.S. Naval War
College, International Law Studies 1959-1960, v. 53, 1961) (discussing the boarding 9fthe Soviet
trawler NOVOROSSIISK by USS ROY O. HALE on 26 February 1959, 40 Dep't St. Bull. 555-58
(1959)). The 1884 Submarine Cables Convention is implemented in 47 u.s.c. sec. 21 etseq. (1982).
65. High Seas Convention, art. 2; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 4; 1982 LOS
Convention, arts. 79 & 87; Chicago Convention, art. 3(d) (military aircraft). The exercise ofany of
these freedoms is subject to the conditions that they be taken with "reasonable regard", according
to the High Seas Convention, or "due regard", according to the 1982 LOS Convention, for the
interests of other nations in light of all relevant circumstances. The "reasonable regard" or "due
regard" standards are one and the same and require any using nation to be cognizant of the interests
of others in using a high seas area, and to abstain from nonessential, exclusive uses which
substantially interfere with the exercise of other nations' high seas freedoms. Any attempt by a
nation to impose its sovereignty on the high seas is prohibited as that ocean space is designated open
to use by all nations. High Seas Convention, art. 2; 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 87 & 89. See
MacChesney 610-29. Section 101(c) of the Deep Seabed and Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30
U.S.C. sec. 1411(c) (1988), requires U.S. citizen licensees to exercise their rights on the high seas
with reasonable regard for the interests of other States in their exercise ofthe freedom of the high
(continued...)
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2.4.3.1 Warning Areas. Any nation may declare a temporary warning area in
international waters and airspace to advise other nations of the conduct of
activities that, although lawful, are hazardous to navigation and/or overflight.
The U.S. and other nations routinely declare such areas for missile testing,
gunnery exercises, space vehicle recovery operations, and other purposes
entailing some danger to other lawful uses of the high seas by others. Notice of
the establishment of such areas must be promulgated in advance, usually in the
form of a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) and/or a Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM). Ships and aircraft of other nations are not required to remain outside
a declared warning area, but are obliged to refrain from interfering with activities
therein. Consequently, ships and aircraft of one nation may operate in a warning
area within international waters and airspace declared by another nation, collect
intelligence and observe the activities involved, subject to the requirement of
due regard for the rights of the declaring nation to use international waters and
airspace for such lawful purposes. 66
2.4.4 Declared Security and Defense Zones. International law does not
recognize the right of any nation to restrict the navigation and overflight of

65.( ... continued)
seas. Section 111, codified at 30 U.S.C. sec. 1421, requires licensees to act in a manner that does
not unreasonably interfere with interests of other States in their exercise of freedom of the high
seas, as recognized under general principles of international law.
A legislative history of the articles of the 1982 LOS Convention regarding navigation on the high
seas (arts. 87, 89-94 and 96-98) may be found in U.N. Office for Oceans Affilirs and the Law ofthe
Sea, The Law of the Sea: Navigation on the High Seas, U.N. Sales No. E.89.V.2 (1989). See also
Commentary, paragraph 2.4.2.2, note 61 (p. 130) at 17-19; Nordquist, Vol. III at 72-86.
66. Franklin, paragraph 2.4.3, note 64 (p. 131), at 178-91; SECNAVINST 2110.3 (series),
Subj: Special Warnings to Mariners; OPNAVINST 3721.20 (series), Subj: The U.S. Military
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) System.
For example, in response to the terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel in Lebanon on 18 April and 23
October 1983, involving the use of extraordinarily powerful gas-enhanced explosive devices light
enough to be carried in cars and trucks, single engine private aircraft, or small high-speed boats,
U.S. forces in the Mediterranean off Lebanon and in the Persian Gulf took a series of defensive
measures designed to warn unidentified ships and aircraft whose intentions were unknown from
closing within lethal range of suicide attack. Warnings were promulgated through NOTMARS
and NOTAMS requesting unidentified contacts to communicate on the appropriate international
distress frequency and reflected NCA authorization of commanders to take the necessary and
reasonable steps to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. forces. See 78 Am.]. Int'l L. 884 (1984).
The effectiveness of such attacks was firmly established by the 23 October 1983 levelling of the
USMC BLT 1/8 Headquarters building at Beirut International Airport by a truck bomb
generating the explosive power of at least 12,000 pounds effective yield equivalent of TNT.
Report ofthe DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October23, 1983
(Long Commission Report), 20 Dec. 1983, at 86; Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984, at
152 (1987); Navy Times, 15 Dec. 1986, at 11.
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foreign warships and military aircraft beyond its territorial sea. Although several
coastal nations have asserted claims that purport to prohibit warships and military
aircraft from operating in so-called security zones extending beyond the
territorial sea, such claims have no basis in intemationallaw in time ofpeace, and
are not recognized by the United States. 67
The Charter of the United Nations and general principles ofintemationallaw
recognize that a nation may exercise measures of individual and collective
self-defense against an armed attack or imminent threat of armed attack. Those
measures may include the establishment of "defensive sea areas" or "maritime
control areas" in which the threatened nation seeks to enforce some degree of
control over foreign entry into those areas. Historically, the establishment of
such areas extending beyond the territorial sea has been restricted to periods of
war or to declared national emergency involving the outbreak of hostilities.
Intemationallaw does not determine the geographic limits of such areas or the
degree of control that a coastal nation may lawfully exercise over them, beyond
laying down the general requirement ofreasonableness in relation to the needs of
national security and defense. 68
67. Leiner, Maritime Security Zones: Prohibited Yet Perpetuated, 24 Va.]. Int'l L. 967,980 &
984-88 (1984). See paragraph 1.5.4, note 54 (p. 23). U.S. protest ofthe "restricted area" established
by Libya within 100 NM radius of Tripoli is recorded in 1973 Digest of U.S. Practice in
International Law 302-03. See also 1975 id. 451-52; 1977 id. 636; Note-Air Defense Zones,
Creeping Jurisdiction in the Airspace, 18 Va.]. Int'l L. 485 (1978). Roach & Smith discuss
so-called "security zones" at 104-106.
68. Difense Zones. Measures of protective jurisdiction referred to in this paragraph may be
accompanied by a special proclamation defining the area of control and describing the types of
control to be exercised therein. Typically, this is done where a state of belligerence exists, such as
during World War II. In addition, so-called "defensive sea areas," though usually limited in past
practice to the territorial sea, occasionally have included areas of the high seas as well. See U.S.
Naval War College, International Law Documents, "Blue Book" series, 1948-49, v. 46 (1950) at
157-76, MacChesney 603-04 & 607.
The statute authorizing the President to establish defensive sea areas by Executive Order (18
U.S.C. sec. 2152 (1988)) does not restrict these areas to the territorial sea. Executive Orders
establishing defensive sea areas are promulgated by the Department of the Navy in OPNAVINST
5500.11 (series) and 32 C.F.R. part 761. It should also be noted that establishment ofspecial control
areas extending beyond the territorial sea, whether established as "defensive sea areas" or
"maritime control areas," has been restricted in practice to periods of war or of declared nationhl
emergency. On the other hand, in time ofpeace the United States has exercised, and continues to
exercise, jurisdiction over foreign vessels in waters contiguous to its territorial sea consistent with
the authority recognized in art. 24 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and art. 33 of the 1982
LOS Convention. This limited jurisdiction has, of course, been exercised without establishing
special defensive sea areas or maritime control areas covering such waters. NWlP 10-2, art. 413d
n.21. See Woods, State and Federal Sovereignty Claims Over the Defensive Sea Areas in Hawaii,
39 Nav. L. Rev. 129 (1990).

Closed Seas and Zones rif Peace. Proposals have been advanced at various times to exclude
non-littoral warships from "closed" seas such as the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, where water access is
limited, or from the entire Indian Ocean as a designated "zone of peace." These claims have not
gained significantlegal or political momentum orsupport and are not recognized by the United
(continued...)
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2.4.5 Polar Regions
2.4.5.1 Arctic Region. The U.S. considers that the waters, ice pack, and
airspace of the Arctic region beyond the lawfully claimed territorial seas oflittoral
nations have international status and are open to navigation by the ships and
aircraft of all nations. Although several nations have, at times, attempted to claim
sovereignty over the Arctic on the basis of discovery, historic use, contiguity
(proximity), or the so-called "sector" theory, those claims are not recognized in
international law. Accordingly, all ships and aircraft enjoy the freedoms of high
seas navigation and overflight on, over, and under the waters and ice pack of the
Arctic region beyond the lawfully claimed territorial seas of littoral states. 69
68.(... continued)
States. Views of the fonner-Soviet Union on closed seas are discussed in Darby, The Soviet
Doctrine of the Closed Sea, 23 San Diego L. Rev. 685 (1986). See also paragraph 1.3.3.1, note 23
(p. 11). The proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace is discussed in Alexander, at 339-40.
Nuclear free zones are discussed in paragraph 2.4.6 (p. 136).
69. Arctic operations are described in Lyon, Submarine Combat in the Ice, U.S. Naval Inst.
Proc., Feb. 1992, at 33; Allard, To the North Pole!, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 56;
LeSchack, ComNavForArctic, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 74; Atkeson, Fighting Subs
Under the Ice, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 81; Le Marchand, Under Ice Operations, Nav.
War Coli. Rev., May-June 1985, at 19; and Caldwell, Arctic Submarine Warfare, The Submarine
Rev., July 1983, at 5. Alexander, Navigational Restrictions 311-19 & 358-59, notes the following
unilateral claims that adversely impact on navigational freedoms through Arctic straits:
- The [fonner] U.S.S.R. claims the White Sea and Cheshskaya Gulf to the
east as historic waters, and has delimited a series ofstraight baselines along its Arctic
coast closing off other coastal indentations, as well as joining the coastal islands and
island groups with the mainland, thereby purporting to close off the major straits of
the Northeast Passage. See Franckx, Non-Soviet Shipping in the Northeast Passage,
and the Legal Status of Proliv Vil'kitskogo, 24 Polar Record 269 (1988).
- Norway has delimited straight baselines about the Svalbard Archipelago
that do not confonn to art. 7 of the 1982 LOS Convention.
- Canada purports to close off its entire Arctic archipelago with straight
baselines and declares that the waters within the baselines - including the
Northwest Passage - are internal waters. 24 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1728 (1985). See
Figures A2-7 (p. 196) and A2-8 (p. 197). The United States has not accepted that
claim. See the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, 11 January 1988, 28 Int'l
Leg. Mat'ls 142 (1989). The negotiation of this agreement is discussed in Howson,
Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-American Dispute over the Arctic's Northwest
Passage, 26 Colum. J. Trans. L. 337 (1988). The October 1988 transit by the
icebreaker USCGC POLAR STAR pursuant to this agreement is discussed ill 83
Am. J. Int'l L. 63 and 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 144-45 (1989); the POLAR STAR's
August 1989 transit is summarized in West, Breaking Through the Arctic, U.S.
Naval Inst. Proc., Jan. 1990, at 57. The Canadian claim is discussed in Pullen, What
Price Canadian Sovereignty?, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 66 (Captain
Pullen, Canadian Navy retired, argues that the Northwest Passage is the sea route
(continued ...)
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2.4.5.2 Antarctic Region. A number of nations have asserted conflicting and
often overlapping claims to portions of Antarctica. These claims are premised
variously on discovery, contiguity, occupation and, in some cases, the "sector"
theory. The U.S. does not recognize the validity of the claims ofother nations to
n · area. 70
. 0 f th
any pomon
e Atarctlc
2.4.5.2.1 The Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The U.S. is a party to the
multilateral treaty of1959 governing Antarctica.71 Designed to encourage the
scientific exploration of the continent and to foster research and experiments in
Antarctica without regard to conflicting assertions of territorial sovereignty, the
1959 accord provides that no activity in the area undertaken while the treaty is in
force will constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying such claims. 72
The treaty also provides that Antarctica "shall be used for peaceful purposes
only," and that "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of
military bases and fortifications, the carrying out ofmilitary maneuvers, as well as
the testing of any type of weapons" shall be prohibited. 73 All stations and
installations, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargo
or personnel in Antarctica, are subject to inspection by designated foreign
observers?4 Therefore, classified activities are not conducted by the U.S. in
Antarctica, and all classified material is removed from U.S. ships and aircraft prior
to visits to the continent?5 In addition, the treaty prohibits nuclear explosions
and disposal of nuclear waste anywhere south of 60 0 South Latitude. 76 The
treaty does not, however, affect in any way the high seas freedoms of navigation
69.(... contined}
that links the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans north ofAmerica, and lists the 36 transits ofthe Passage
from 1906 to 1987}. See Figure A2-8 (p. 197). See also MacInnis, Braving the Northwest Passage,
Nat'l Geog., May 1989, at 584-601 and Roach & Smith, at 207-215.
Other Arctic straight baselines not drawn in conformity with the 1982 LOS Convention include
those around Iceland and Danish-drawn lines around Greenland and the Faeroe Islands.
70. Although the United States would be fully justified in asserting a claim to sovereignty over
one or more areas of Antarctica on the basis of its extensive and continuous scientific activities
there, it has not done so. SeeJoyner, Maritime Zones in the Southern Ocean: Problems conceming
the Correspondence of Natural and Legal Maritime Zones, 10 Applied Geog. 307 (1990);
Hinckley, Protecting American Interests in the Antarctic: The Territorial Claims Dilemma, 39
Naval L. Rev. 43 (1990).
71. Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1 December 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794; 402 U.N.T.S. 71;
T.1.A.S. 4780; text reprinted in AFP 110-20 at 4-21. Its provisions apply south of 60° South
Latitude.
72. Art. IV.2.
73. Art. 1.1.
74. Art. VI1.3.
75. For further information and guidance, see DOD Directive 2000.6, Subj: Conduct of
Operations in Antarctica, and OPNAVINST 3120.20 (series), Subj: Navy Policy in Antarctica and
Support of the U.S. Antarctic Program.
76. Arts. V and VI.
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and overflight in the Antarctic region. Antarctica has no territorial sea or
territorial airspace.
2.4.6 Nuclear Free Zones. The 1968 Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation
Treaty,77 to which the United States is a party, acknowledges the right of
groups of nations to conclude regional treaties establishing nuclear free
zones. 78 Such treaties or their provisions are binding only on parties to them or
to protocols incorporating those provisions. To the extent that the rights and
freedoms of other nations, including the .high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight, are not infringed upon, such treaties are not inconsistent with
international law. 79 The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 80 is an example of a nuclear free zone
arrangement that is fully consistent with international law, as evidenced by
U.S. ratification of its two Protocols. 81 This in no way affects the exercise by
77. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, London & Moscow,
1 July 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483; 729 U.N.T.S. 161; T.I.A.S. 6839.
78. Id., Art. VII.
79. The United States, therefore, does not oppose the establishment of nuclear free zones
provided certain fundamental rights are preserved in the area of their application. These include
non-interference with the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight beyond the territorial
sea, the right of innocent passage in territorial seas and archipelagic waters, the right of transit
passage of international straits and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters.
Parties to such agreements may, however, grant or deny transit privileges within their respective
land territory, internal waters and national airspace, to nuclear powered and nuclear capable ships
and aircraft of non-party nations, including port calls and overflight privileges. Dept St. Bull., Aug.
1978, at 46-47; 1978 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 1668; 1979 Digest ofPractice in
International Law 1844. See also Rosen, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Nav. War Coll. Rev.,
Autumn 1996, at 44.
80. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty ofTlateloco),
Mexico City, 14 February 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762; 64 U.N.T.S. 281, T.I.A.S. 7137; AFP 110-20 at
4-9, entered into force 22 April 1968. The Treaty ofTlateloco consists of the Treaty and two
Additional Protocols. The parties to the Treaty are listed in 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1404 (1989). By its
terms, the United States cannot be a party to the Treaty ofTlateloco since the United States does
not lie within the zone ofits application. See Figure A2-9 (p. 198). The United States is, however. a
party to both Additional Protocols.
81. Additional Protocol I to the Treaty ofTlateloco, 33 U.S.T. 1972; T.I.A.S. 10147; 634
U.N.T.S. 362, entered into force 11 December1969 (for the U.S., 23 November 1981), and calls
upon nuclear-weapons nations outside the treaty zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of
the Treaty to their territories in the zone. As of 1 January 1997, France, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States are parties to Additional Protocol I. Within the Latin
American nuclear-weapons free zone lie the Panama Canal, Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, the
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Since Addition Protocol I entered into force for the United States
on 23 November 1981, the U.S. may not store or deploy nuclear weapons in those areas, but its
ships and aircraft may still visit these ports and airfields, and overfly them, whether or not these
ships and aircraft carry nuclear weapons. In this regard, see also Articles III. 1(e) and VI.l ofthe 1977
Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operations of the Panama Canal, 33 U.S.T. 1;
T.I.A.S. 10,029, which specifically guarantee the right of U.S. military vessels to transit the Canal
regardless oftheir cargo or armament. This includes submarines as well as surface ships. The United
(continued ...)
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the U.S. of navigational rights and freedoms within waters covered by the Treaty
of Tlatelolco. 82
81.(... continued)
States also has the right to repair and service ships carrying nuclear weapons in ports in the Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo when incident to transit through the area. Further, the
United States retains the right to off-load nuclear weapons from vessels in these ports in the event
of emergency or operational requirements if such off-loading is temporary and is required in the
course of a transit through the area.
The U.S. ratification of Protocol I (and of Protocol II discussed below) was subject to
understandings and declarations that the Treaty ofTlateloco does not affect the right of a nation
adhering to Protocol I to grant or deny transit and transport privileges to its own or any other
vessels or aircraft irrespective ofcargo or armaments, and that the treaty does not affect the rights of
a nation adhering to Protocol I regarding exercise of the freedoms of the seas, or regarding passage
through or over waters subject to the sovereignty of a Treaty nation. See 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is
1410-12 (1989).
The terms "transit and transport" are not defined in the Treaty. These terms should be interpreted
on a case-by-case basis, bearing in mind the basic idea that the Treaty was not intended to inhibit
activities reasonably related to the passage of nuclear weapons through the zone. No Latin
American party to the Treaty objected when the United States and France made formal statements
confirming transit and transport rights when ratifYing Protocol II. No Latin American party has
denied transit or transport privileges on the basis ofthe Treaty or its Protocols, notwithstanding the
fact that U.S. military vessels and aircraft frequently engage in transit, port calls and overflights in
the region, and that it is U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons
in such cases. 1978 Digest at 1624; Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Hearing
before Sen. For. ReI. Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 Sept. 1981, at 18-20.
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty ofTlateloco, 22 U.S.T. 754; T.I.A.S. 7137; 634 U.N.T.S.
364; AFP 110-20 at 4-18, entered into force 11 December 1969 (for the U.S., 12 May 1971) and
obligates nuclear-weapons nations to respect the denuclearized status of the zone, not to
contribute to acts involving violation of obligations ofthe parties, and not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against the contracting parties (i.e., the Latin American countries). The United
States ratified Protocol II subject to understandings and declarations, 22 U.S.T. 760; 28 Int'l Leg.
Mat'ls at 1422-23 (1989), that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon the international
status of territorial claims; the Treaty does not affect the right ofthe Contracting Parties to grant or
deny transport and transit privileges to non-Contracting Parties; that the United States would
"consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a
nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the contracting Party's corresponding
obligations under Article I of the Treaty;" and. although not required to do so, the United States
will act, with respect to the territories ofProtocol I adherents that are within the Treaty zone, in the
same way as Protocol II requires it to act toward the territories of the Latin American Treaty
parties. China, France, the former-Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States are
parties to Protocol II. 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1413 (1989). See also id. at 1414-23.
82. Both the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the 1995 Mrican
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty seek the same goals as the Treaty ofTlateloco. The South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty ofRarotonga), Rarotonga, 6 August 1985, 24 Int'l Leg.
Mat'ls 1442 (1985) entered into force 11 December 1986. The Treaty ofRarotonga consists of the
Treaty and three Protocols. The Treaty itselfis open only to members of the South Pacific Forum
(Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa, all but
four ofwhom (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau and Tonga) are parties. Modeled after the
(continued ...)
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2.5. AIR NAVIGATION
2.5.1 National Airspace. 83 Under international law, every nation has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over its national airspace, that is, the airspace
82.(... continued)
Treaty of Tlateloco, the Treaty of Rarotonga does not impinge on international freedoms of
navigation and overflight in the area ofits application (See Figure A2-10 (p. 199».
- Protocol! to the Treaty ofRarotonga (not in force as ofl January 1997) calls
upon parties to apply the prohibitions of the Treaty to the territories for which they are
internationally responsible within the zone. Protocol 1 is open to France, the United
Kingdom and the United States, all of whom are signatories. U.S. ratification of
Protocol I was awaiting Senate advice and consent as ofl November 1997.
- Protocol II to the Treaty ofRarotonga (not in force for the U.S. as of
1 January 1997) calls upon the parties not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against any party of the Treaty. Protocol II is open to China, France, the
former-Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, all of whom are
signatories. U.S. ratification ofProtocol II was awaiting Senate advice and consent as
ofl November 1997.
- Protocol III to the Treaty ofRarotonga (not in force for the U.S. as of
1 January 1997) calls upon the parties not to test any nuclear explosive device within
the zone. Protocol III is open to China, France, the former-Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and the United States, all ofwhom are signatories. U.S. ratification
of Protocol III was awaiting Senate advice and consent as ofl November 1997.
Mrican Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), (Cairo), 11 April
1996,35 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 698 (1996) (not in force as oflJanuary 1997). The Treaty ofPelindaba
consists of the Treaty and three Protocols. The Treaty is open to all Mrican nations. As oflJanuary
1997, Mauritius was the only African nation to have ratified the Treaty. The Treaty ofPelindaba
explicitly upholds the freedoms of navigation and overflight of the international community in its
area of application (see Figure A2-11 (p. 200).
- Protocol I to the Treaty ofPelindaba (not in force as ofl January 1997)
calls upon its parties not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons ,vithin the
Mrican zone (see Figure A2-11 (p. 200). Protocol I is open to China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom and the United States, all of whom are signatories except
Russia. U.S. ratification of Protocol I was awaiting the advice and consent of the
Senate as ofl November 1997.
- Protocol II to the Treaty ofPelindaba (not in force as oflJanuary 1997) calls
upon its parties to refrain from testing any nuclear explosive device within the zone.
Protocol II is open to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United
States, all of whom are signatories except Russia. U.S. ratification of Protocol II was
awaiting the advice and consent of the Senate as ofl November 1997.
- Protocol III to the Treaty ofPelindaba (not yet in force) applies to nations
with dependent territories in the zone (e.g., France and Spain) and calls upon them to
observe certain provisions of the Treaty in those territories. Although France is a
signatory, neither France nor Spain are parties as of 1 November 1997.
83. Under international law, airspace is classified under two headings: national airspace
(airspace over the land, internal waters, archipelagic waters, and territorial sea of a nation) and
international airspace (airspace over a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone, and the high
(continued...)
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above its territory, its internal waters, its territorial sea, and, in the case of an
archipelagic nation, its archipelagic waters. 84 There is no right ofinnocent passage of
aircrqft through the airspace over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters analogous to the
right ofinnocent passage enjoyed by ships ofall nations. 85 Accordingly, unless party to
an international agreement to the contrary, all nations have complete discretion
in regulating or prohibiting flights within their national airspace (as opposed to a
Flight Information Region - see paragraph 2.5.2.2), with the sole exception of
overflight of international straits and archipelagic sea lanes. Aircraft wishing to
enter national airspace must identifY themselves, seek or confirm permission to
land or to transit, and must obey all reasonable orders to land, tum back, or fly a
prescribed course and/or altitude. Aircraft in distress are entitled to special
consideration and should be allowed entry and emergency landing rights. 86
Concerning the right of assistance entry, see paragraph 2.3.2.5. For jurisdiction
over aerial intruders, see paragraph 4.4.
2.5.1.1 International Straits Which Connect EEZ/High Seas to
EEZ/High Seas. All aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy the right of
unimpeded transit passage through the airspace above international straits
87
overlapped by territorial seas.
Such transits must be continuous and
expeditious, and the aircraft involved must refrain from the threat or the use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrtty, or political independence of
the nation or nations bordering the strait. 88 The exercise of the right of
overflight by aircraft engaged in the transit passage ofinternational straits cannot
89
be impeded or suspended in peacetime for any purpose.
In international straits not completely overlapped by territorial seas, all
aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy high seas freedoms while operating in
the high seas corridor beyond the territorial sea. (See paragraph 2.5.2 for a

83.(...continued)
seas, and over unoccupied territory (i.e., territory not subject to the sovereignty of any nation,
suchas Antarctica». Airspace has, in vertical dimension, an upward (but undefined) limit, above
which is outer space (see paragraph 1.1, note 1 (p. 1) and paragraph 2.9.2 (p. 149».
84. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 2; Chicago Convention, art. 1; 1982 LOS Convention,
art. 2. Effective upon the extension of the U.S. territorial sea on 27 December 1988, the Federal
Aviation Administration extended seaward the limits of controlled airspace and applicability of
certain air traffic rules. Amendment 91-207,54 Fed. Reg. 265,4 Jan. 1989, amending 14 C.F.R.
parts 71 and 91, and 54 Fed. Reg. 34292,18 Aug. 1989.
85. There is also no right of overflight of internal waters and land territory.
86. Chicago Convention, arts. 5-16.
87. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 38(1).
88. !d., art. 38(2). All aircraft must, however, monitor the internationally designated air-traffic
control circuit or distress radio frequency while engaged in transit passage. Art. 39.
89. [d., art. 44.
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discussion of permitted activities in international airspace.) If the high seas
corridor is not of similar converience (e.g., to stay within the high seas corridor
would be inconsistent with sound navigational practices), such aircraft enjoy the
right of unimpeded transit passage through the airspace of the strait. 90

2.5.1.2 Archipelagic Sea Lanes. All aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy the
right of unimpeded passage through the airspace above archipelagic sea lanes. The
right of overflight of such sea lanes is essentially identical to that of transit passage
through the airspace above international straits overlapped by territorial seas. 91
2.5.2 International Airspace. International airspace is the airspace over the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the high seas, and territories not
subject to national sovereignty (el' Antarctica). All international airspace is
open to the aircraft of all nations. 2 Accordingly, aircraft, including military
aircraft, are free to operate in international airspace without interference from
coastal nation authorities. Military aircraft may engage in flight operations,
including ordnance testing and firing, surveillance and intelligence gathering,
and support of other naval activities. All such activities must be conducted with
due re~rd for the rights of other nations and the safety of other aircraft and of
vessels. 3 (Note, however, that the Antarctic Treaty prohibits military
94
maneuvers and weapons testing in Antarctic airspace. ) These same principles
apply with respect to the overflight of high seas or EEZ corridors through that
95
part of international straits not overlapped by territorial seas.
2.5.2.1 Convention on International Civil Aviation. The United States is a
party to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (as are most
nations). That multilateral treaty, commonly referred to as the "Chicago
Convention," applies to civil aircraft. 96 It does not apply to military aircraft or
AMC-charter aircraft designated as "state aircraft" (see paragraph 2.2.2), other
than to require that they operate with "due regard for the safety of navigation of
civil aircraft.,,97 The Chicago Convention established the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop international airnavigation principles
90. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 38(1). See also, Nordquist, Vol. II at 312-315.
91. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 53. As in the case of transit passage, all aircraft overflying
archipelagic sea lanes must monitor the internationally designated air-traffic control circuit or
distress radio frequency. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 39 & 54.
92. High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24; 1982 LOS Convention,
arts. 87, 58 & 33.
93. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 87(2), Chicago Convention, art. 3(d).
94. See paragraph 2.4.5.2.1 (p. 135).
95. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 35(b), 87 & 58.
96. Art. 3(a); text reprinted ill AFP 110-20, at 6-3.
97. Art.3(d).
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and techniques and to "promote safety of flight in international air
. .
,,98
naVlganon.
Various operational situations do not lend themselves to ICAO flight
procedures. These include military contingencies, classified missions, politically
sensitive missions, or routine aircraft carrier operations. Operations not
conducted under I CAO flight procedures are conducted under the" due regard"
standard. (For additional information see DOD Dir. 4540.1 and OPNAVINST
3770.4 (series) and the Coast Guard Air Operations Manual, COMDTINST
M3710.1 (series).)

2.5.2.2 Flight Information Regions. A Flight Information
Region (FIR) is a
\
defined area of airspace within which flight infonnation and alerting services are
provided. FIRs are established by ICAO for the safety of civil aviation and
encompass both national and international airspace. Ordinarily, but only as a
matter of policy, U.s. military aircraft on routine point-to-point flights through
international airspace follow ICAO flight procedures and utilize FIR services. As
mentioned above, exceptions to this policy include military contingency
operations, classified or politically sensitive missions, and routine aircraft carrier
operations or other training activities. When U.S. military aircraft do not follow
ICAO flight procedures, they must navigate with "due regard" for civil aviation
safety.99
Some nations, however, purport to require all military aircraft in international
airspace within their FIRs to comply with FIR procedures, whether or not they
100
utilize FIR services or intend to enter national airspace.
The U.s. does not
recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its FIR procedures to foreign
military aircraft in such circumstances. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not
intending to enter national airspace need not identify themselves or otherwise

98. Art.44(h).
99. Chicago Convention, art. 3(d); DOD Directive 4540.1; 9 Whiteman 430-31; AFP
110-31, at 2-9 to 2-10 n.29. Acceptance by a government ofresponsibility in international airspace
for a FIR region does not grant such government sovereign rights in international airspace.
Consequendy, military and State aircraft are exempt from the payment of en route or overflight
fees, including charges for providing FIR services, when merely transiting international airspace
located in the FIR. The normal practice ofnations is to exempt military aircraft from such charges
even when operating in national airspace or landing in national territory. The only fees properly
chargeable against State aircraft are those which can be related direcdy to services provided at the
specific request of the aircraft commander or by other appropriate officials of the nation operating
the aircraft. 1993 State message 334332.
100. The United States has protested such claims by Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru, and
has asserted its right to operate its military aircraft in the international airspace oftheir FIRs without
notice to or authorization from their Air Traffic Control authorities. See Roach & Smith at
231-34.
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comply with FIR procedures established by other nations, unless the U.S. has
specifically agreed to do so.101

2.5.2.3 Air Defense Identification Zones in International Airspace.
International law does not prohibit nations from establishing Air Defense
Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the international airspace adjacent to th-::ir
territorial airspace. The legal basis for ADIZ regulations is the right of a nation to
establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory. Accordingly, an aircraft
approaching national airspace can be required to identify itself while in
international airspace as a condition of entry approval. ADIZ regulations
promulgated by the U.S. apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial airspace and
require the filing of flight plans and periodic position reports. 102 The U.S. does
not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to
foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the U.S. apply
its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace.
Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace need
not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established
by other nations, unless the U.S. has specifically agreed to do so.103
It should be emphasized that the foregoing contemplates a peacetime or
nonhostile environment. In the case of imminent or actual hostilities, a nation
may find it necessary to take measures in self-defense that will affect overflight in
.
. al·
mternauon
alrspace. 104

101. Chicago Convention, arts. 3(a), 11, 28; OPNAVINST 3770.4 (series), promulgating
DOD Directive 4540.1, Subj: Use ofAirspace by U.s. Military Aircraft and Firings Over the High
Seas. Applicable ROE should also be consulted. See also ALLANTFLT 016/97 (CINCLANTFLT
MSG 101900Z OCT 97).
102. United States air defense identification zones have been established by Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations, 14 C.F.R. part 99. (The ADIZs for the contiguous U.S. are set
out in 14 C.F.R. part 99.42; for Alaska in 99.43; for Guam in 99.45 and for Hawaii in 99.47.) In
order that the Administrator may properly carry out the responsibilities of that office, the authority
of the Administrator has been extended into the airspace beyond the territory of the United States.
U.S. law (49 U.S.C. sec. 1510) grants the president the power to order such extraterritorial
extension when requisite authority is found under an international agreement or arrangement; the
president invoked this power by Exec. Order 10,854, 27 November 1959, 3 C.F.R. part 389
(1959-1963 Comp.). See also MacChesney 579-600; NWIP 10-2, art. 422b.
103. Chicago Convention, art. 11; OPNAVINST 3770.4 (series), promulgating DOD
Directive 4540.1, Subj: Use of Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and Firings Over the High Seas;
OPNAVINST 3772.5 (series), Subj: Identification and Security Control of Military Aircraft;
General Planning Section, DoD Flight Information publications. Appropriate ROE should also be
consulted.
104. See also paragraph 2.4.4, note 68 (p. 133).
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2.6 EXERCISE AND ASSERTION OF NAVIGATION AND
OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
As announced in the President's United States Oceans Policy statement ofl0
March 1983,
"The United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and
freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of
interests reflected in the [1982 LOS] convention. The United States will not,
however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights
and freedoms of the international conununity in navigation and overflight and
other related high seas uses."
When maritime nations appear to acquiesce in excessive maritime claims and
fail to exercise their rights actively in the face of constraints on international
navigation and overflight, those claims and constraints may, in time, be
considered to have been accepted by the international community as reflecting
the practice of nations and as binding upon all users of the seas and superjacent
airspace. Consequently, it is incumbent upon maritime nations to protest
diplomatically all excessive claims of coastal nations and to exercise their
navigation and overflight rights in the face of such claims. The President's
Oceans Policy Statement makes clear that the United States has accepted this
responsibility as a fundamental element of its national policy. 105
105. Annex Al-3 (p. 43). See U.S. Dep't State, GIST: US Freedom of Navigation Program,
Dec. 1988, Annex A2-7 (p. 186); and DOD Instruction C2005.1, Subj: U.S. Program for the
Exercise ofNavigation and Overflight Rights at Sea (U). See also Roach & Smith, at 255; National
Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, at 15; and Rose, Naval Activity in the
Exclusive Economic Zone--Troubled Waters Ahead?, 39 Naval L. Rev. 67,85-90 (1990). On 23
September 1989 the United States and the former-Soviet Union issued a joint statement (Annex
A2-2 (p. 161» in which they recognized "the need to encourage all States to harmonize their
intemal laws, regulations and practices" with the navigational articles of the 1982 LOS
Convention.
The 1982 LOS Convention was designed in part to halt the creepingjurisdictional claims ofcoastal
nations, or ocean enclosure movement. While that effort appears to have met with some success, it
is clear that many nations currently purport to restrict navigational freedoms by a wide variety of
means that are neither consistent with the 1982 LOS Convention nor with customary
international law. See Negroponte, Who Will Protect the Oceans?, Dep't St. Bull., Oct. 1986, at
41-43; Smith, Global Maritime Claims, 20 Ocean Dev. & Int'lL. 83 (1989). Alexander warns ofa
continuation of the ocean enclosure movement. He particularly sees more unauthorized
restrictions on the movement of warships , military aircraft and "potentially polluting" vessels in
the territorial seas and EEZ, and on transit passage in international straits. Alexander 369-70. The
United States' view regarding the consistency of certain claims of maritime jurisdiction with the
provisions of the LOS Convention is set forth in its 3 March 1983 Statement in Right of Reply,
Annex Al-l (p. 27).
(continued ...)
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105. (...continued)
Since 1948, the Department of State has issued approximately 150 protest notes to other nations
concerning their excessive maritime claims, as well as engaging in numerous bilateral discussions with
many countries. Negroponte, Current Developments in U.S. Oceans Policy, Dep't St. Bull., Sept.
1986, at 84,85; Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra, Dep't St. Bull., Feb. 1987, at 70; Roach,
Excessive Maritime Claims, 1990 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 288, 290; Roach & Smith, at 4. United
States responses to excessive maritime claims are discussed in Limits in the Seas No. 112 (1992).

See 1 O'Connell 38-44 for a discussion of the significance of protest in the law of the sea. Compare
Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 957, at 969 (1986):
First, States should not regard legal statementS ofposition as provocative political acts.
They are a necessary tool of the international lawyer's trade and they have a purpose
beyond the political, since, occasionally, States do take their legal disputes to court.
Second, there is no requirement that a statement of position be made in a particular
form or tone. A soft tone and moderate words may still effectively make the necessary
legal statement.
Third, action by deed probably is not necessary to protect a State's legal position as a
persistent objector when that State has otherwise clearly stated its legal position.
Action by deed, however, promotes the formation oflaw consistent with the action
and deeds may be necessary in some circumstances to slow erosion in customary legal
practice.
Fourth, not every legal action needs an equal and opposite reaction to maintain one's
place in the legal cosmos.
Fifth, the more isolated a State becomes in its legal perspective, the more active it
must be in restating and making clear its position.
"The exercise of rights-the freedoms to navigate on the world's oceans-is not meant to be a
provocative act. Rather, in the framework of customary international law, it is a legitimate,
peaceful assertion of a legal position and nothing more." Negroponte, Who Will Protect the
Oceans?, Dep't St. Bull., Oct. 1986, at 42. In exercising its navigational rights and freedoms, the
United States "will continue to act stricdy in conformance with international law and we will
expect nothing less from other countries." Schachte, The Black Sea Challenge, U.S. Naval Inst.
Proc., June 1988, at 62.
"Passage does not cease to be innocent merely because its purpose is to test or assert a right disputed
or wrongfully denied by the coastal State." Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court ofJustice, 27 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 28 (1950), commenting on the Corfu Channel
Case in which the Court held that the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising
its right ofinnocent passage which Albania had illegally denied. 1949 IC] Rep. 4, 4 Whiteman 356.
The Special Working Committee on Maritime Claims of the American Society oflnternational
Law has advised that
programs for the routine exercise of rights should be just that, "routine" rather than
unnecessarily provocative. The sudden appearance of a warship for the first time in
years in a disputed area at a time of high tension is unlikely to be regarded as a largely
inoffensive exercise related solely to the preservation of an underlying legal position.
Those responsible for relations with particular coastal states should recognize that, so
long as a program of exercise ofrights is deemed necessary to protect underlying legal
positions, delay for the sake of immediate political concerns may invite a deeper
dispute at a latter [sic] time.
(continued...)
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105.(... continued)
Am. Soc. Int'l L. Newsletter, March-May 1988, at 6.
The United States has exercised its rights and freedoms against a variety of objectionable claims,
including: unrecognized historic waters claims; improperly drawn baselines for measuring
maritime claims; territorial sea claims greater than 12 NM; and territorial sea claims that impose
impermissible restrictions on the innocent passage of any type of vessel, such as requiring prior
notification or authorization. Since the policy was implemented in 1979, the United States has
exercised its rights against objectionable claims of over 35 nations, including the former-Soviet
Union, at the rate ofsome 30-40 per year. Department ofState Statement, 26 March 1986, Dep't
St. Bull., May 1986, at 79; Navigation Rights and the Gulf ofSidra, Dep't St. Bull., Feb. 1987, at
70. See also, Roach & Smith, at 6.
Perhaps the most widely publicized of these challenges has occurred with regard to the Gulf of
Sidra (closing line drawn across the Gulfat 30 30'N). See Figure A2-12 (p. 201) and Annex A2-8
(p. 188). The actions of the United States are described in Spinatto, Historic and Vital Bays: An
Analysis ofLibya's Claim to the Gulf ofSidra, 13 Ocean Dev. & Int'l LJ. 65 (1983); N.Y. Times,
27 July 1984, at 5; and Parks, Crossing the Line, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Nov. 1986, at 40.
0

Other publicized examples include the tranSits of the Black Sea in November 1984 and March
1986 (Washington Post, 19 March 1986, at 4 & 21; Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1986, at
1,40) and in February 1988 (N.Y. Times, 13 Feb. 1988, at 1 & 6) challenging the Soviet limitations
on innocent passage, see paragraph 2.3.2.1, note 27 (p. 117), and ofAvacha Bay, Petropavlovsk in
May 1987 (straight baseline) (Washington Post, 22 May 1987, atA34). Most challenges, however,
have occurred without publicity, and have been undertaken without protest or other reaction by
the coastal nations concerned.
Some public commentary on the Black Sea operations has incorrecdy characterized the passage as
being not innocent. Rubin, Innocent Passage in the Black Sea? Christian Sci. Mon., 1 Mar. 1988,
at 14; Carroll, Murk}' Mission in the Black Sea, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., 14-20 Mar. 1988, at
25; Carroll, Black Day on the Black Sea, Arms Control Today, May 1988, at 14; Arkin, Spying in
the Black Sea, Bull. of Atomic Scientists, May 1988, at 5. Authoritative responses include
Armitage, Asserting U.S. Rights On the Black Sea, Arms Control Today, June 1988, at 13;
Schachte, The Black Sea Challenge, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., June 1988, at 62; and Grunawalt,
Innocent Passage Rights, Christian Sci. Mon., 18 Mar. 1988, at 15. See also, Note, Oceans Law and
Superpower Relations: The Bumping of the Yorktown and the Caron in the Black Sea, 29 Va.].
Int'l L. 713 (1989); Franckx, Innocent Passage ofWarships, Marine Policy, Nov. 1990, at 484-90;
Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident: How "Innocent" Must
Innocent Passage Be? 135 Mil. L. Rev. 137 (1992); and Aceves, Diplomacy at Sea: U.S. Freedom
of Navigation Operations in the Black Sea, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Spring 1993, at 59. Mere
incidental observation of coastal defenses could not suffice to render noninnocent a passage not
undertaken for that purpose. Fitzmaurice, this note, 27 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 29, n.l, quoted in 4
Whiteman 357.
Other claims not consistent with the 1982 LOS Convention that adversely affect freedoms of
navigation and overflight and which are addressed by the U.S. FON program include:
- claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas beyond 12 NM which purport to
restrict non-resource related high seas freedoms, such as in the EEZ (paragraph 2.4.2
(p. 129» or security zones (paragraph 2.4.4 (p. 132»;
- archipelagic claims that do not conform with the 1982 LOS Convention
(paragraph 2.3.4 (p. 127», or do not permit archipelagic sea lanes passage in
(continued ...)
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2.7 RULES FOR NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY FOR VESSELS
AND AIRCRAFT
2.7.1 International Rules. Most rules for navigational safety governing surface
and subsurface vessels, including warships, are contained in the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, known infonnally as the
"International Rules ofthe Road" or "72 COLREGS." 106 These rules apply to all
international waters (i.e., the high seas, exclusive economic zones, and contiguous
zones) and, except where a coastal nation has established different rules, in that
nation's territorial sea, archipelagic waters, and inland waters as well. The 1972
COLREGS have been adopted as law by the United States. (See Title 33 U.S.
Code, Sections 1601 to 1606). Article 1139, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, directs
that all persons in the naval service responsible for the operation of naval ships and
craft "shall diligently observe" the 1972 COLREGS. Article 4-1-11 of U.S. Coast
Guard Regulations (COMDTINST M5000.3 (series)) requires compliance by
Coast Guard personnel with all Federal law and regulations.
2.7.2 National Rules. Many nations have adopted special rules for waters
subject to their territorial sovereignty (i.e., internal waters, archipelagic waters,
and territorial seas). Violation of these rules by U.S. government vessels,
including warships, may subject the U.S. to lawsuit for collision or other
damage, provide the basis for diplomatic protest, result in limitation on U.S.
. ports, or prompt oth er fc·
. 107
access to fcorelgn
orelgn actlOn.
2.7.2.1 U.S. Inland Rules. The U.S. has adopted special Inland Rules 108
applicable to navigation in U.S. waters landward of the demarcation lines
105.(... continued)
confonnity with the 1982 LOS Convention, including submerged passage of
submarines and overflight of military aircraft, and transit in a manner of
deployment consistent with the security of the forces involved (paragraph 2.3.4.1
(p. 127)); and
- territorial sea claims that overlap international straits, but do not permit
transit passage (paragraph 2.3.3.1 (p. 121)), or that require advance notification or
authorization for warships and auxiliaries, or apply discriminatory requirements to
such vessels (paragraph 2.3.2.4 (p. 119)), or apply requirements not recognized by
international law to nuclear powered warships or nuclear capable warships and
auxiliaries (paragraph 2.3.2.4, note 32 (p. 119)).
See also Boma, Troubled Waters off the Land of the Morning Calm: AJob for the Fleet, Nav. War
ColI. Rev., Spring 1989, at 33.
106. 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. 8587, 33 U.S.C. sec. 1602 note (1988), 33 C.F.R. part 81,
app.A.
107. See U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 1139.
108. 33 U.S.C. sec. 2001 et seq. (1988), implemented in 33 C.F.R. parts 84-90.
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established by U.S. law for that purpose. 109 (See U.S. Coast Guard publication
Navigational Rules, International- Inland, COMDTINST M16672.2 (series),
Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations part 80, and Title 33 U.S. Code, sections
2001 to 2073.) The 1972 COLREGS apply seaward of the demarcation lines in
U.S. national waters, in the U.S. contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone,
and on the high seas.
2.7.3 Navigational Rules for Aircraft. Rules for air navigation m
international airspace applicable to civil aircraft may be found in Annex 2 (Rules
of the Air) to the Chicago Convention, DOD Flight Infonnation Publication
(FLIP) General Planning, and OPNAVINST 3710.7 (series) NATOPS. The
same standardized technical principles and policies of ICAO that apply in
international and most foreign airspace are also in effect in the continental
United States. Consequently, U.S. pilots can fly all major international routes
following the same general rules of the air, using the same navigation equipment
and communication practices and procedures, and being governed by the same
air traffic control services with which they are familiar in the United States.
Although ICAO has not yet established an "International Language for
Aviation," English is customarily used internationally for air traffic control.

2.8 U.S.-U.S.S.R. AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF
INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE mGH SEAS
In order better to assure the safety of navigation and flight of their respective
warships and military aircraft during encounters at sea, the United States and the
fonner Soviet Union in 1972 entered into the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on the
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. This Navy-to-Navy
agreement, popularly referred to as the "Incidents at Sea" or "~NCSEA"
agreement, has been highly successful in minimizing the potential for harassing
actions and navigational one-upmanship between U.S. and fonner Soviet units
operating in close proximity at sea. Although the agreement applies to warships
and military aircraft operating on and over the "high seas," it is understood to
embrace such units operating in all international waters and international airsgace,
including that of the exclusive economic zone and the contiguous zone. 11
109. Such demarcation lines do not necessarily coincide with the boundaries ofintemal waters
or the territorial sea. For the U.S., they are indicated on navigational charts issued by the United
States Coast and Geographic Survey.
110. OPNAVINST C5711.94 (series), Subj: US/USSR Incidents at Sea and Dangerous
Military Activities Agreements; and U.S. Addendum to volume II of ATP 1. The 1972 INCSEA
Agreement, 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. 7379, and its 1973 Protocol, 24 U.S.T. 1063, T.I.A.S. 7624,
are reproduced ;11 AFP 110-20, at 36-4.
(continued...)
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Principal provisions of the INCSEA agreement include:
1. Ships will observe strictly both the letter and the spirit of the International
Rules of the Road.
2. Ships will remain well clear of one another to avoid risk of collision and,
when engaged in surveillance activities, will exercise good seamanship so as not to
embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.
3. Ships will utilize special signals for signalling their operation and intentions.
4. Ships of one party will not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile
launchers, torpedo tubes, or other weapons at the ships and aircraft of the other
party, and will not launch any object in the direction ofpassing ships nor illuminate
their navigation bridges.
5. Ships conducting exercises with submerged submarines will show the
appropriate signals to warn of submarines in the area.
6. Ships, when approaching ships ofthe other party, particularly those engaged
in replenishment or flight operations, will take appropriate measures not to hinder
maneuvers of such ships and will remain well clear.

110.(... continued)
The INCSEA Agreement does not prescribe minimum fIxed distances between ships or aircraft;
rules of prudent seamanship and airmanship apply.
Similar agreements, incorporating the provisions and special signals from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. INCSEA
Agreement, entered into force between the former-Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on 15 July
1986 (U.K.T.S. No.5 (1987», the Federal Republic of Germany on 28 October 1988; Canada on 20
November 1989; France on 4 July 1989; and Italy on 30 November 1989.
An agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities between the armed forces of the
United States and the former-Soviet Union operating in proximity to each other duringpeacetime
entered into force on 1 January 1990. The agreement provides procedures for resolving incidents
involving entry into the national territory, including the territorial sea, of the other nation "O\ving
to circumstances brought about by force majeure, or as a result of unintentional actions by such
personnel;" using a laser in such a manner that its radiation could cause harm to the other nation's
personnel or equipment; hampering the activities of the other nation in Special Caution Areas in a
manner which could cause harm to its personnel or damage to its equipment; and interference with
the command and conrrol networks of the other party in a manner which could cause harm to its
personnel or damage to its equipment. The text of the agreement, entided Agreement Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, which was signed in
Moscow, 12June 1989, appears in 28 Int'I Leg. Mat'ls 879 (1989); see also Leich, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law-Prevention of Dangerous Military
Activities, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 917 (1989).
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7. Aircraft will use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft
and ships of the other party, in particular ships engaged in launching and landing
aircraft, and will not simulate attacks by the simulated use of weapons or perfonn
aerobatics over ships of the other party nor drop objects near them.

The IN CSEA agreement was amended in a 1973 protocol to extend certain of
its provisions to include nonmilitary ships. Specifically, the 1973 protocol
provided that u.S. and Soviet military ships and aircraft shall not make simulated
attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons at
nonmilitary ships of the other party nor launch or drop any objects near
nonmilitary ships of the other party in such a manner as to be hazardous to these
ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.
The agreement also provides for an annual review meetinfi between Navy
representatives of the two parties to review its implementation. 11 The IN CSEA
agreement continues to apply to U.S. and Russian ships and military aircraft. 112

2.9 MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE
2.9.1 Outer Space Defined. As noted in paragraph 2.5.1, each nation has
complete and exclusive control over the use ofits national airspace. Except when
exercising transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage, overflight in national
airspace by foreign aircraft is not authorized without the consent of the territorial
sovereign. However, man-made satellites and other objects in earth orbit may
overfly foreign territory freely. Although there is no legally defined boundary
between the upper limit of national airspace and the lower limit of outer space,
international law recognizes freedom of transit by man-made space objects at
earth orbiting altitude and beyond. 113
2.9.2 The Law of Outer Space. International law, including the United
Nations Charter, applies to the outer space activities of nations. Outer space is
open to exploration and use by all nations. However, it is not subject to national
appropriation, and must be used for peaceful purposes. 114 The term "peaceful
111. The results of each annual review meeting are promulgated by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the operational commanders. Consult appropriate Fleet Commander instructions
and OPORDS for detailed guidance.
112. The INCSEA Agreement is also in force between the U.S. and Ukraine. Treaties in
Force 266 (1995).
113. See paragraph 1.1, note 1 (p. 1) and Schwetje, The Development of Space Law and a
Federal Space Law Bar, Fed. B. News &]., Sep. 1988, at 316.
114. Although a number of nations maintain that "peaceful purposes" excludes military
measures, the United States has consistendy interpreted "peaceful purposes" to mean nonaggressive
purposes. Military activity not constituting the use of armed force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, or political independence of another nation, and not otherwise inconsistent
(continued ...)
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purposes" does not preclude military activity. While acts of aggression in
violation of the United Nations Charter are precluded, space-based systems may
lawfully be employed to perform essential command, control, communications,
intelligence, navigation, environmental, surveillance and warning functions to
. mili' tary actlvltles
. . . on Ian d'
' an d on an d un d er t h e sea. 115 U sers 0 f
assIst
,m t h
e alr,
outer space must have due regard for the rights and interests of other users.
2.9.2.1 General Principles of the Law of Outer Space. International law
governing space activities addresses both the nature of the activity and the
location in space where the specific rules apply. As set out in paragraph 2.9.1,
outer space begins at the undefined upper limit of the earth's airspace and extends
to infinity. In general terms, outer space consists of both the earth's moon and
other natural celestial bodies, and the expanse between these natural objects.
The rules ofinternational law applicable to outer space include the following:
. free and open to a lnations.
l'
tt6
1 . A ccess to outer space IS
2. Outer space is free from claims of sovereignty and not otherwise subject to
. al
..
117
nation
appropnatlOn.
3. Outer space is to be used for peaceful purposes.tt 8
4. Each user of outer space must show due regard for the rights ofothers. 119

114.(... continued)
with the U.N. Charter, is permissible. The right of self-defense applicable generally in
international law also applies in space. For a discussion of the U.S. interpretation of "peaceful
purposes" and related issues see, De Saussure & Reed, Self-Defense--A Right in Outer Space, 7
AF JAG L. Rev. (No.5) 38 (1985), and Reed, The Outer Space Threaty:
Freedoms-Prohibitions-Duties, 9 AF JAG L. Rev. (No.5) 26 (1967).
115. Naval operations in support ofnational security objectives are increasingly dependent upon
space systems support services. Today, virtually every fleet unit relies to some extent on space systems
for support, and the military applications of space technology are steadily increasing. See Holland,
The Challenge in Space: The Navy's Case, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Feb. 1990, at 37; Skolnick, The
Navy's Final Frontier, id. Jan. 1989, at 28; Howard, Satellites and Naval Warfare, id. April 1988, at
39; Jones, Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance, id., June 1980, at 41; U.S. Naval Space
Command: Supporting the Fleet, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 21,1988, at 38-51;
Burrows, Deep-Black: Space Espionage and National Security (1986); Yost, Spy-Tech (1985);
Karas, The New High Ground: Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War (1983); Canan, War in
Space (1982); Stine, Confrontation in Space (1981); and Jane's Spaceflight Directory (annual).
116. Art. I, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities ofStates in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2411; T J .A.S. 6347; 610 U.N. T .S. 205; AFP 110-20 at 6-2 [hereinafter "Outer Space Treaty"].
117. ld., art. II.
118. ld., arts. III & IV.
119. ld., art. IX.
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5. No nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction may be stationed in outer
120
space.
· ·In outer space are prohib·lte.
d 121
6 . N ucIear expIoSlOns
7. Exploration of outer space must avoid contamination ofthe environment of
122
outer space and of the earth's biosphere.
8. Astronauts must render all possible assistance to other astronauts in distress. 123

2.9.2.2 Natural Celestial Bodies. Natural celestial bodies include the earth's
moon, but not the earth. Under international law, military bases, installations
and forts may not be erected nor may weapons tests or maneuvers be undertaken
on natural celestial bodies. Moreover, all equipment, stations, and vehicles
located there are open to inspection on a reciprocal basis. There is no
corresponding right of physical inspection of man-made objects located in the
expanse between celestial bodies. Military personnel may be employed on
natural celestial bodies for scientific research and for other activities undertaken
124
for peaceful purposes.
2.9.3 International Agreements on Outer Space Activities. The key
legal principles governing outer space activities are contained in four widely
ratified multilateral agreements: the 1967 Outer Sface Treaty; 125 the 1968
Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement; 12 the Liability Treaty of
120. M., art. IV.
121. Art. I, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and
Under Water, 5 August 1963,14 U.S.T. 1313; T.I.A.S. 5433; 480 U.N.T.S. 43; AFP 110-20 at 4-3.
122. Note 116, Outer Space Treaty, art. IX.
123. M., art. V.
124. See paragraph 2.9.2, note 114 (p. 149) for the U.S. interpretation of " peaceful purposes."
125. See paragraph 2.9.2.1, note 116 (p. 150), regarding the Outer Space Treaty.
126. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, 22 April 1968, 19 U.S. T. 7570; T .LA.S. 6599; 672 U.N.T.5.
119; AFP 110-20 at 6-34.
127. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 June
1971,24 U.S.T. 2389; T.I.A.S. 7762, AFP 110-20 at 6-37. The "launching nation" is responsible
for damage. The launching nation is, for purposes of international liability, the nation launching,
procuring the launch, or from whose territory the launch is made. Thus, with respect to any
particular space object, more than one nation may be liable for the damage it causes. The launching
nation is internationally liable for damages even if the launch is conducted entirely by a private,
commercial undertaking.

The launching nation is said to be absolutely liable for space-object damage caused on earth or to an
aircrafr in flight. Liability can be avoided only if it can be shown that the claimant was grossly
negligent. The question ofliability for space object damage to another space object, at any location
(continued ...)
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1972; 127 and the Space Objects Registration Treaty of1975.

128

A fifth, the 1979
all

Moon Treaty,129 has not been widely ratified. The United States is a party to
of these agreements except the Moon Treaty.130

2.9.3.1

Related International Agreements. Several other international

agreements restrict specific types of activity in outer space. The US-USSR
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of1972 prohibits the development, testing,
and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. Also prohibited,
127.( ... continued)
other than the surface of the earth, is detennined by the relative negligence or fault of the parties
involved. The Liability Convention elaborates the general principle of international liability for
damage set forth in Art. VII of the Outer Space Treaty in Arts. la, II, III and VI. Arts. IV and V
address joint and several liability. The crash ofCOSMOS 954 in the Canadian Arctic on 24January
1978 is discussed in Galloway, Nuclear Powered Satellites: The U.S.S.R. Cosmos 954 and the
Canadian Claim, 12 Akron L. Rev. 401 (1979), and Christol, International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, 74 Am.]. Int'l L. 346 (1980). The Canadian claim is set forth in 18 Int'l
Leg. Mat'Is 899-930 (1979); its resolution is at 20 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 689 (1981) wherein the USSR
agreed to pay C$3M in setdement. See also Lee & Sproule, Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Debris: The Cosmos 954 Claim, 26 Can. YB. Int'l L. 273 (1988).
There are no "rules ofthe road" for outer space to determine which spacecraft has the right ofway.
The Liability Convention does not distinguish between civil and military space objects. If military
weapons are involved, the irUured nation may take the view that the principle of self-defense,
rather than the Liability Convention, applies. Advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the
Convention came only after the Department ofState provided assurances to the Senate that it was
inapplicable to intentionally caused harm. Christol at 367 dting Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, S. Exec.
Rep. 92-38, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).
128. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 14 January 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695; T.I.A.S. 8480; 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; AFP 110-20 at 6-42. In order to enhance safety of
space operations, a dual system for registering space objects launched from earth has been
established in the Registration Treaty.
The first obligation is for each launching nation to maintain a registry containing certain
information about every space object launched.
The second obligation is to pass this basic information to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations "as soon as practicable," and to advise the Secretary-General when the object is no longer
in earth orbit. A United Nations registry is thereby maintained for all space objects launched from
earth. Objects in space remain subject to the jurisdiction and control of the nation ofregistry. Arts.
II(1), II(2), III, IV & VIII, Outer Space Treaty, (paragraph 2.9.2.1, note 116 (p. 150). Ifmore than
one nation is involved in a launch, one of those nations must agree to act as the nation of registry
(article II(2)). The term "as soon as practicable" is not defined in the Registration Treaty. State
practice has established that the extent and timeliness of information given concerning space
missions may be limited as required by national security.
129. Agreement Governing the Activities ofStates on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 18
December 1979, 18 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1434 (1979), reprinted in AFP 110-20 at 6-45.
130. The United States' objections to the Moon Treaty include those advanced regarding the
deep seabed provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention. See paragraph 1.6, note 57 (p. 24). See also
Hosenball, Relevant Treaties Governing Space Activities: A Summary of World Wide
Agreements, Fed. Bar News &]., April 1991, at 128.
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is any interference with the surveillance satellites both nations use to monitor
ABM Treaty compliance. 131 The ABM Treaty continues in force between the
U.S. and Russia.
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (a multilateral treaty) includes an
agreement not to test nuclear weapons or to carry out any other nuclear
· ·m outer space. 132
expI OSlons
The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (also a multilateral
treaty) prohibits military or other hostile use of environmental modification
l·
. Iu ding outer space. 133
. sever aenVlronments,
tec hni ques m
mc
The 1982 International Telecommunication Convention134 and the 1979
Radio Regulations 135 govern the use of the radio frequency spectrum by
satellites and the location of satellites in the geostationary-satellite orbit.
2.9.4 Rescue and Return of Astronauts. Both the Outer Space Treaty and
the Rescue and Return ofAstronauts Agreement establish specific requirements
for coming to the aid of astronauts. The treaties do not distinguish between
civilian and military astronauts.
Astronauts of one nation engaged in outer space activities are to render all
possible assistance to astronauts of other nations in the event of accident or
distress. If a nation learns that spacecraft personnel are in distress or have made an
emergency or unintended landing in its territory, the high seas, or other
international area (e.g., Antarctica), it must notify the launching nation and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, take immediate steps to rescue the
personnel if within its territory, and, ifin a position to do so, extend search and

131. Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation ofAnti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 26 May 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435; T .LA.S. 7503, reprinted
ill AFP 110-20 at 4-29. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1972, and Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of'Exotic' Systems Under the ABM
Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1956 (1986), discuss the
interpretation ofthe scope ofthe obligation in article V ofthe ABM Treaty not to "develop, test or
deploy space-based ABM systems or components." See 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 282 (1987), ide 1130,
and ide 1743 for additional debates on this issue, as well as 133 Congo Rec. S6623 (19 May 1987), ide
S12181 (16 Sep. 1987) (State Department Legal Adviser's report to Congress), and ide S6809 (20
May 1987) (fourth part of Sen. Nunn's restrictive view). See also the series of articles and
commentaries in Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1351-1558 (1989).
132. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, 5 August 1963,14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted inAFP 110-20,
at 4-3. See paragraph 10.2.2.5, note 9 (p. 463).
133. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use ofEnvironmental
Modification Techniques, 18 May 1977, 31 U.S. T. 333; T .LA.S. 9614, reprinted in AFP 11 0-20 at
4-74.
134. Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-6, Sen. Ex. Rep. 99-4, entered into force for the United States 10
January 1986.
135. Sen. Treaty Doc. 97-21, entered into force for the United States 27 October 1983.
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rescue assistance if a high seas or other international area landing is involved.
Rescued personnel are to be safely and promptly returned. 136
Nations also have an obligation to inform the other parties to the Outer Space
Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations if they discover outer
.
space p h enomena w hi c h constltute
a danger to astronauts. 137
2.9.S Return of Outer Space Objects. A party to the Rescue and Return of
Astronauts Agreement must also notifY the Secretary-General of the United
Nations ifit learns of an outer space object's return to earth in its territory, on the
high seas, or in another international area. If the object is located in sovereign
territory and the launching authority requests the territorial sovereign's
assistance, the latter must take steps to recover and return the object. Similarly,
such objects found in international areas shall be held for or returned to the
launching authority. Expenses incurre in assisting the launching authority in
either case are to be borne by the launching authority. Should a nation discover
that such an object is of a "hazardous or deleterious" nature, it is entitled to
immediate action by the launching authority to eliminate the danger of harm
.
.
138
firom Its terntory.

136. Outer Space Treaty, paragraph 2.9.2.1, note 116 (p. 150). art. V; Rescue and Return
Agreement, paragraph 2.9.3, note 126 (p. 151), arts. 1 - 4. If the astronauts land during an armed
conflict between the launching nations and the nations in which they land, the law of armed
conflict would likely apply and permit retention of the astronauts under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. See Part II, Chapter 11 of this publication.
137. Outer Space Treaty, art. V.
138. Rescue and Return Agreement, art. 5.
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ANNEXA2-1
R 020525Z JUN 94
FM CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
TO ALPACFLT
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//NOO//
BT
UNCLAS //NOOOOO//
ALPACFLT 016/94
SUBJ/SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY POLICY
REF/A/DOC/OPNAV/050CT89
REF/B/DOC/SECNAV/14SEP90
REF/C/DOC/CINCPACFLT/24JAN85
REF/D/DOC/SECNAV/24JAN92
NARR/REF A IS PARAS 2.1.2 AND 3.2.3 OF NWP-9A. REF B IS
ARTS
0828, 0859, AND 0860 OF U.S. NAVY REGULATIONS 1990. REF
C IS
CINCPACFLTINST 5440.3H, ART. 2605. REF D IS SECNAVINT
6210.2,
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES, PARA I.5.
RMKS/1. PURPOSE. TO PROVIDE PERIODIC EMPHASIS ON UNITED
STATES
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY POLICY. REFS A THROUGH DARE
PERTINENT POLICY DIRECTIVES.
2. U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT, WARSHIPS, AND AUXILIARIES
(INCLUDING USNS VESSELS AND AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED FORCE
SHIPS) ENJOY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM INTERFERENCE· BY
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES (E.G., POLICE, HEALTH,
CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION, MILITARY, ETC.) WHETHER WITHIN
FOREIGN TERRITORY, FOREIGN TERRITORIAL SEAS/AIRSPACE, OR
INTERNATIONAL WATERS/AIRSPACE. THIS IMMUNITY PRECLUDES
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS SUCH AS SEARCH, INSPECTION,
OR DETENTION; AND ALSO PROHIBITS FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL
OFFICIALS FROM EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER PASSENGERS OR
CREW WHEN EMBARKED, OR WITH RESPECT TO OFFICIAL OR
PRIVATE ACTS PERFORMED ON BOARD.
3. ALTHOUGH IMMUNE FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES, U.S. MILITARY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
PROCEEDING TO AND FROM A FOREIGN PORT UNDER DIPLOMATIC
CLEARANCE SHALL COMPLY WITH REASONABLE HOST COUNTRY
REQUIREMENTS AND/OR RESTRICTIONS ON TRAFFIC, HEALTH,
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CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION, QUARANTINE, ETC. NONCOMPLIANCE,
HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT ONLY TO BEING ASKED TO COMPLY,
PURSUING DIPLOMATIC PROTEST, OR TO BEING ORDERED TO
LEAVE THE HOST COUNTRY'S TERRITORY OR TERRITORIAL
SEA/AIRSPACE, NOT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.
4. WHILE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY FOREIGN OFFICIALS TO
ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH HOST COUNTRY LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
ARE NOT PERMITTED, COMMANDING OFFICERS, MASTERS, AND
AIRCRAFT COMMANDERS MAY THEMSELVES, OR THROUGH THEIR
REPRESENTATIVES, CERTIFY COMPLIANCE WITH HOST COUNTRY
LAWS/REQUIREMENTS. IF REQUESTED BY HOST COUNTRY
AUTHORITIES, CERTIFICATION MAY INCLUDE A GENERAL
DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES TAKEN BY U.S. OFFICIALS TO
COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. AT THE DISCRETION OF THE
COMMANDING OFFICER, MASTER, OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER,
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES MAY BE RECEIVED ON BOARD FOR PURPOSE
OF ACCEPTING CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE, BUT UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THEY BE PERMITTED TO EXERCISE
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY, NOR MAY THEY INSPECT THE
SHIP/AIRCRAFT OR ACT AS AN OBSERVER WHILE U.S. PERSONNEL
CONDUCT SUCH INSPECTIONS.
5. BEFORE ENTERING THE TERRITORY, TERRITORIAL SEA, OR
AIRSPACE OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, COMMANDING OFFICERS,
MASTERS, OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDERS SHOULD DETERMINE THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF LOCAL LAWS/REQUIREMENTS BY
REVIEWING APPLICABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION, E.G.,
FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE, PORT DIRECTORY, OPORDS, LOGREQ
RESPONSES, NCIS SUMMARIZES OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
ISSUES, OR OTHER PERTINENT REFERENCE SOURCES.
6. GUIDANCE FOR SPECIFIC SITUATIONS IS PROVIDED BELOW:
SITUATION
A.

FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
REQUEST
PERMISSION/DEMAND TO
SEARCH SHIP, AIRCRAFT,
OR ANY PART THEREOF,
INCLUDING PERSONAL
EFFECTS OR LOCKERS, FOR
CONTRABAND, EVIDENCE OF
CRIME, ETC.

GUIDANCE
DO NOT PERMIT THE
SHIP/AIRCRAFT TO BE
SEARCHED FOR ANY REASON BY
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES.
EXPLAIN U.S. SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY POLICY. U.S.
AUTHORITIES MAY THEMSELVES
CONDUCT CONSENT, COMMAND
AUTHORIZED, OR OTHER LAWFUL
SEARCHES OR INSPECTIONS AND
PRESERVE EVIDENCE WITHOUT
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FOREIGN OFFICIALS BEING
PRESENT, BUT EVIDENCE
SEIZED SHALL NOT BE TURNED
OVER TO FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
ABSENT SPECIFIC DIRECTION
BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.
B.

FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL OR
HEALTH INSPECTIONS
DEMAND/ REQUEST TO COME
ON BOARD U.S. AIRCRAFT
OR SHIP TO CONDUCT
SPRAYING/INSPECTION lAW
FOREIGN COUNTRY
REGULATIONS.

U.S. AUTHORITIES SHALL
REFUSE FOREIGN OFFICIALS
ACCESS TO INSPECT OR SPRAY,
BUT MAY AGREE TO CONDUCT
REQUIRED
INSPECTION/SPRAYING
THEMSELVES AND CERTIFY THAT
APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS
HAVE BEEN MET.

C.

FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
REQUEST/ DEMAND CREW
LIST, PERSONNEL RECORDS
OR PERSONAL INFORMATION
ON MILITARY PERSONNEL.

COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE
STATUS OF FORCE AGREEMENTS
(SOFA), OR OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.
ABSENT AN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT REQUIRING
DISCLOSURE, U.S.
AUTHORITIES MAY NOT PROVIDE
SUCH INFORMATION, BUT MAY
CERTIFY COMPLIANCE WITH
INOCULATION OR OTHER PUBLIC
HEALTH REQUIREMENTS THAT
CREW IS FREE OF
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE. WITH
RESPECT TO HOST COUNTRY
INQUIRIES ABOUT HIV
INFECTION, THE FOLLOWING
CERTIFICATION MAY BE
OFFERED: U.S. POLICY
REQUIRES ALL MILITARY
PERSONNEL TO BE SCREENED
FOR SEROLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF
HIV INFECTION. THOSE
TESTING POSITIVE FOR HIV
ARE ASSIGNED WITHIN THE
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UNITED STATES AND NOT TO
DEPLOYING UNITS.
D.

FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
REQUEST/ DEMAND CREW
LISTS, PERSONNEL
RECORDS OR PERSONAL
INFORMATION ABOUT
NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL,
INCLUDING CREWMEMBERS
(CIVIL SERVICE AND
COMMERCIAL MARINERS),
OTHER CIVIL CONTRACTOR
PERSONNEL (E.G. TECH
REPS) .

COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE SOFA
OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT. ABSENT AN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
REQUIRING DISCLOSURE, A
LIST LIMITED TO NAMES AND
PASSPORT NUMBERS OF
NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL ON
BOARD USN SHIPS (VESSELS)/
AIRCRAFT MAY BE PROVIDED TO
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES. OTHER
INFORMATION CONCERNING
EMBARKED NON-MILITARY
PERSONNEL, SUCH AS HEALTH
RECORDS, JOB DESCRIPTION,
OR EMPLOYER, MAY NOT BE
PROVIDED.

E.

FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
REQUEST/ DEMAND A LIST
OF STORES OR FIREARMS
ON BOARD VESSELS/ ACFT.

DO NOT PROVIDE LIST OF
STORES/ FIREARMS WHICH ARE
TO REMAIN ON BOARD
VESSEL/ACFT. LIST OF ITEMS
TO BE TAKEN OFF VESSEL/ACFT
MAY BE PROVIDED.

F.

FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
ATTEMPT TO LEVY FINE OR
TAX ON VESSEL/ACFT.

PAYMENT OF ANY FINES OR
TAXES IS PROHIBITED
REGARDLESS OF REASONS
OFFERED FOR IMPOSITION.
APPROPRIATE CHARGES FOR
PILOTS, TUGBOATS, SEWER,
WATER, POWER AND OTHER
REQUIRED GOODS OR SERVICES
MAY BE PAID.

G.

FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
REQUIRE VESSELS TO FLY
FOREIGN COUNTRY'S FLAG
WHILE IN PORT.

FLYING FOREIGN COUNTRY'S
FLAG IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT
IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AS
PROVIDED IN NAVY
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REGULATIONS. WHEN IN DOUBT
CONSULT HIGHER AUTHORITY.

H.

IN A COUNTRY WHICH DOES
NOT HAVE A SOFA WITH
THE U.S., FOREIGN
AUTHORITIES DEMAND/
REQUEST THAT AN
INDIVIDUAL (MILITARY OR
EMBARKED CIVILIAN)
SUSPECTED OF AN OFFENSE
BE TURNED OVER FOR
ARREST OR INVESTIGATION
PURPOSES.

IF AN INDIVIDUAL (MILITARY
OR EMBARKED CIVILIAN)
SUSPECTED OF AN OFFENSE
ASHORE IS ON BOARD, EITHER
BECAUSE HE HAS RETURNED TO
THE VESSEL/ACFT BEFORE
BEING APPREHENDED, OR
BECAUSE HE WAS RETURNED BY
LOCAL POLICE OR SHORE
PATROL BEFORE FORMAL DEMAND
FOR CUSTODY WAS MADE BY
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES, DO NOT
TURN OVER INDIVIDUAL
WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM
HIGHER AUTHORITY.
IF
FOREIGN OFFICIALS RETURN
SOMEONE TO U.S.
JURISDICTION, U.S.
OFFICIALS MAY NOT PROMISE
TO RETURN THE INDIVIDUAL
UPON LATER DEMAND BY
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES.

I.

IN A COUNTRY WHICH HAS
A SOFA WITH THE U.S.,
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
REQUEST AN INDIVIDUAL
WHO IS SUSPECTED OF AN
OFFENSE BE TURNED OVER
TO THEM FOR ARREST OR
INVESTIGATION.

IAW SOFA, U.S. OFFICIALS
MAY BE REQUIRED TO
SURRENDER AN INDIVIDUAL
SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING AN
OFFENSE IN THE FOREIGN
JURISDICTION; TO TURN OVER
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
VESSEL/ACFT INVESTIGATORS;
OR TO PROVIDE SUSPECTED
PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE IN
OFF SHIP/ACFT
IDENTIFICATION OR LINE-UP.
IF ANY DOUBT EXISTS AS TO
SOFA TERMS, GUIDANCE SHOULD
BE SOUGHT FROM HIGHER
AUTHORITY.
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DURING GENERAL PUBLIC
VISITING IN FOREIGN
PORTS, VISITORS ENGAGE
IN PROTEST AND/OR
DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY, OR
OTHERWISE VIOLATE
CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO
SHIP OR AIRCRAFT.

RESTORE ORDER, ESCORT
OFFENDERS OFF SHIP OR
AIRCRAFT AND TURN OVER TO
LOCAL AUTHORITIES. DO NOT
ALLOW/ INVITE FOREIGN
POLICE ON BOARD TO ARREST
OR TAKE CUSTODY OF THE
OFFENDERS.

7. ALL CINCPACFLT PERSONNEL WHO ARE LIKELY TO DEAL WITH
FOREIGN OFFICIALS (E.G., CO, MASTER OF A SHIP, ACFT
COMMANDER, SUPPLY OFFICER, SHORE PATROL OFFICER, MEDICAL
DEPT REPRESENTATIVE, LIAISON PERSONNEL, ETC.) SHOULD
UNDERSTAND U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY POLICY AND COMPLY
WITH REQUIREMENTS. IF IN DOUBT ABOUT APPLICATION OF
PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS,
CONSULT A JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE,
AND/OR SEEK GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.
8. ADM R. J. KELLY, USN.
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ANNEXA2-2
JOINT STATEMENT BY
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBliCS

UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
GOVERNING INNOCENT PASSAGE

Since 1986, representatives of the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics have been conducting
friendly and constructive discussions of certain
international legal aspects of traditional uses of
the oceans, in particular, navigation.
The Governments are guided by the
provisions of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which, with
respect to traditional uses of the oceans,
generally constitute international law and
practice and balance fairly the interests of all
States. They recognize the need to encourage all
States to harmonize their international laws,
regulations and practices with those provisions.
The Governments consider it useful to issue
the attached Uniform Interpretation of the
Rules of International Law Governing
Innocent Passage. Both Governments have
agreed to take the necessary steps to conform
their internal laws, regulations and practices
with this understanding of the rules.
FOR THE
AMERICA:

UNITED

James A. Baker, III
FOR THE UNION
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
E.A. Shevardnadze
Jackson Hole, Wyoming
September 23, 1989

1. The relevant rules of international law
governing innocent passage of ships in the
territorial sea are stated in the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Convention of 1982), particularly in Part II,
Section 3.
2. All ships, including warships, regardless
of cargo, annament or means of propulsion,
enjoy the right ofinnocent passage through the
territorial sea in accordance with international
law, for which neither prior notification nor
authorization is required.
3. Article 19 ofthe Convention of1982 sets
out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities
that would render passage not innocent. A ship
passing through the territorial sea that does not
engage in any of those activities is in innocent
passage.
4. A coastal State which questions whether
the particular passage of a ship through its
territorial sea is innocent shall inform the ship of
the reason why it questions the innocence of the
passage, and provide the ship an opportunity to
STATES OF clarify its intentions or correct its conduct in a
reasonably short period of time.
5. Ships exercising the right of innocent
passage shall comply with all laws and
regulations of the coastal State adopted in
OF SOVIET conformity with relevant rules ofinternational
law as reflected in Articles 21,22,23 and 25 of
the Convention of1982. These include the laws
and regulations requiring ships exercising the
right of innocent passage through its territorial
sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes as it may prescribe where needed to
protect safety of navigation. In areas where no
such sea lanes or traffic separation schemes have
been prescribed, ships nevertheless enjoy the
right of innocent passage.

Department of State Bulletin/November 1989
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6. Such laws and regulations of the coastal
State may not have the practical effect of
denying or impairing the exercise of the right of
innocent passage as set forth in Article 24 of the
Convention of 1982.
7. If a warship engages in conduct which
violates such laws or regulations or renders its
passage not innocent and does not take
corrective action upon request the coastal State
may require it to leave the territorial sea, as set

forth in Article 30 of the Convention of 1982.
In such case the warship shall do so
immediately.
8. Without prejudice to the exercise of
rights of coastal and flag States, all differences
which may arise regarding a particular case of
passage of ships through the territorial sea shall
be settled through diplomatic channels or other
agreed means.

International Status and Navigation of Warships

163

ANNEXA2-3
STATEMENT OF POLICY
BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
AND

THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
CONCERNING
EXERCISE OF
THE RIGHT OF ASSISTANCE ENTRY
I. purpose. To establish a unifonn policy for the exercise of the right of
assistance entry by United States military ships and aircraft.

II. Background. For centuries, mariners have recognized a humanitarian duty to
rescue others, regardless of nationality, in danger or distress from perils of the sea.
The right to enter a foreign territorial sea to engage in bona fide efforts to render
emergency assistance to those in danger or distress from perils of the sea
(hereinafter referred to as the right ofassistance entry) has been recognized since
the development of the modem territorial sea concept in the eighteenth century.
Acknowledgment of the right of assistance entry is evidenced in customary
international law. The right of assistance entry is independent of the rights of
innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passages.

III. Rjght of Assjstance Entry. The right of assistance entry is not dependent
upon seeking or receiving the permission of the coastal State. While the
permission of the coastal State is not required, notification of the entry should be
given to the coastal State both as a matter of comity and for the purpose of
alerting the rescue forces of that State. The right of assistance entry extends only
to rescues where the location of the danger or distress is reasonably well known.
The right does not extend to conducting searches within the foreign territorial
sea without the permission of the coastal State. The determination of whether a
danger or distress requiring assistance entry exists properly rests with the
operational commander on scene.
IV.~.

a. Assistance Entry by Military Vessels. When the operational commander of
a United States military vessel determines or is infonned that a person, ship, or
aircraft in a foreign territorial sea (12nm or less) is in danger or distress from perils
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of the sea, that the location is reasonably well known, and that the United States
military vessel is in a position to render assistance, assistance may be rendered.
Notification of higher authority and the coastal State will be as specified in
applicable implementing directives. Implementing directives will provide for
prompt notification of the Department of State.
b. Assistance Entry by Military Aircraft. In accordance with applicable
implementing directives, when the appropriate operational commander
determines or is informed that a person, ship, or aircraft in a foreign territorial sea is
in danger or distress from perils of the sea, that the location is reasonably well
known, and that he is in a position to render assistance by deploying or employing
military aircraft, he shall request guidance from higher authority by the fastest
means available. Implementing directives will provide for consultation with the
Department ofState prior to responding to such requests. If, in the judgment of the
operational commander, however, any delay in rendering assistance could be
life-threatening, the operational commander may immediately render the
assistance. Notification of higher authority and the coastal State will be as specified
in applicable implementing directives. Implementing directives will provide for
prompt notification of the Department of State.
V. Application. This statement ofpolicy applies only in cases not covered by prior
agreement with the coastal State concerned. Where the rendering of assistance to
persons, ships, or aircraft in a foreign territorial sea is specifically addressed by an
agreement with that coastal State, the terms of the agreemen.t are controlling.

VI. Implementation. The parties to this statement of policy will implement the
policy in directives, instructions, and manuals promulgated by them or by
subordinate commands and organizatinus.
Tune 27. 1986
Date

July 20. 1986
Date
Aug 8. 1986
Date

lSI
for the Department of State
Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser

lSI
for the Department of Defense
Hugh O'Neill, Oceans Policy Adviser

lSI
for the U.S. Coast Guard
P.A. Yost
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant
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ANNEXA2-4
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
INSTRUCTION

J-5
DISTRIBUTION: A,C,S

ClCSI2410.01A
23 APRIL 1997

GUIDANCE FOR THE EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF
ASSISTANCE ENTRY
References:
a. "Statement of Policy by the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, and the United States Coast Guard
Concerning Exercise of the Right of Assistance Entry," 8 August 1986
b. Joint Pub 3-50/COMDTINST M1620.5 (Coast Guard), 1 February
1991, "National Search and Rescue Manual," Volume 1
c. DOD 2500.1M, 6 January 1997, "Maritime Claims Reference Manual"
d. CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing rules of Engagement for US Forces,"
Enclosure A, subpragraph 8(e)
1. purpose. This instruction establishes uniform policy for the exercise of the
right ofassistance entry (RAE) by US ships or aircraft within the territorial seas or
archipelagic waters of foreign states.
2. Cancellation. ClCSI 2410.01,20 July 1993, "Guidance for the Exercise of
right of Assistance Entry" is hereby canceled.
3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the CINCs, Services, and the
Directors for Operations and Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint staff. Copies are
provided to the Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Coast Guard for
information and use as appropriate.
4. Background.
a. For centuries, mariners have recognized a humanitarian duty to rescue
persons in distress due to perils of the sea, regardless of their nationality or
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location. The international community has long accepted the right of vessels of
any nation to enter a foreign state's territorial sea to engage in good faith efforts to
render emergency assistance. RAE is independent of the customary
international legal rights ofinnocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea
lanes passage.
b. Following incidents in which US vessels on scene failed to assist ships in
distress because of excessive concern about entry into the territorial sea of
another state, the Department of Defense, DOS and US Coast Guard reviewed
US Government policy. The result was a unified statement ofpolicy concerning
RAE within the territorial sea of another state, issued in August 1986
(reference a).
c. The UN Law of the Sea Convention provides that ships of all states enjoy
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of other states. Article 18
of the Convention provides that passage includes stopping and anchoring for the
purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships, or aircraft in danger or distress.
As the regime of innocent passage now applies in archipelagic waters, and given
the longstanding duty ofmariners to render assistance to persons in distress due to
perils of the sea, it follows that the right of assistance entry is equally applicable to
archipelagic waters.
d. This instruction implements the 1986 statement of policy and extends it
to include archipelagic waters. This instruction applies in all cases except those
specifically covered by prior agreements with foreign states that address assistance
to persons, ships, or aircraft in their territorial seas or archipelagic waters. The
enclosure discusses bilateral RAE agreements with Canada and Mexico.
5.~.

a. RAE applies only to rescues in which the location of the persons or
property in danger or distress is reasonably well known. The right does not
extend to conducting area searches for persons or property in danger or distress
when their location is not yet reasonably well known. US forces will conduct
area searches within a U.S. recognized foreign territorial sea or archipelagic
waters only with the permission of the coastal state. Such permission may be by
international agreement, such as a search and rescue (SAR) agreement with that
state, as listed in Appendix B of reference b. When considering or conducting
area searches within a claimed or U.S. recognized foreign territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, commanders should inform those agencies listed in
Enclosure A, subparagraph 4a.

International Status and Navigation of Warships

167

b. RAE into the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a foreign state
involves two conflicting principles: (1) the right of nations to regulate entry into
and the operations within territory under their sovereignty, and (2) the
time-honored mariners' imperative to render rapid and effective assistance to
persons, ships, or aircraft in imminent peril at sea without regard to nationality or
location.
c. The operational commander on the scene must determine whether RAE
is appropriate under the circumstances. The test is whether a person, ship, or
aircraft, whose position within the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of
another state is reasonably well known, is in danger or distress due to perils of the
sea and requires emergency assistance.
d. In determining whether to undertake RAE actions, commanders must
consider the safety of the military ships and aircraft they command, and of their
crews, as well as the safety of persons, ships, and aircraft in danger or distress.
e. Commanders should also consider whether other rescue units, capable
and willing to render timely and effective assistance, are on the scene or
immediately en route.

£ The customary international law of RAE is more fully developed for
vessels than for aircraft. Therefore, the military commander must consider the
possible reaction of the coastal or archipelagic state, especially if the commander
intends to employ military aircraft within its territorial sea or its archipelagic
waters.
g. Although exercise of RAE does not require the permission of the foreign
coastal or archipelagic state, US commanders should notify the state's authorities
of the entry in order to promote international comity, avoid misunderstanding,
and alert local rescue and medical assets.
h. Because of the implications for international relations and for US security,
commanders should keep appropriate authorities and the NM CC informed. See
subparagraph 8d(1) below.

i. RAE actions should comply with any applicable bilateral RAE and SAR
agreements (Enclosure B), including those listed in Appendix B of reference b.
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J. Reference c is the DOD source document for determining the scope of a
particular maritime claim (e.g., extent ofa claimed territorial sea) and whether or
not that particular maritime claim is recognized by the United States. The fact
that the United States has conducted an operational freedom of navigation
assertion or sent a protest note regarding a particular coastal state claim can be
taken as nonrecognition of the claim in question. Otherwise, the territorial sea of
a coastal state or the archipelagic waters ofan archipelagic state will be regarded as
presumptively valid for the purpose of this instruction. The DOS "Limits of the
Seas" series and the Naval War College ~'Blue Book, Vol. 66," are secondary
sources for determining whether and to what extent a particular country's
maritime claims are considered excessive by the United States.
k. The policy set forth in this instruction is consistent with the current
standing rules of engagement for US forces pursuant to reference d.
6. Definitions.
a. Operational commander on the scene. The senior officer in tactical
command of the unites) capable of rendering meaningful and timely assistance;
this commander is responsible for coordinating rescue efforts at the site.
b. Territorial sea. The belt of ocean measured seaward up to 12 nm from a
state's baselines determined in accordance with intemationallaw and subject to
the state's sovereignty. The U.S. does not recognize the portions of claimed
territorial sea more than 12 nm from properly drawn baselines.
c. Archipelagic waters. An archipelagic state is a state that is constituted
wholly of one or more groups of islands. Such states may draw straight
archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of their outermost islands,
providing the ratio of water to land within the baselines is between 1 to 1 and
9 to 1. The waters enclosed within properly drawn archipelagic baselines are
called archipelagic waters and are subject to the archipelagic state's sovereignty.
d. Danger or distress. A clearly apparent risk of death, disabling injury, loss,
or significant damage.
e. Perils of the sea. Accidents and dangers peculiar to maritime activities,
including storms, waves, and wind; grounding; fire, smoke and noxious fumes;
flooding, sinking, and capsizing; loss of propulsion or steering; and other hazards
of the sea.
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£ Emergency assistance. Rescue action that must be taken without delay to
avoid significant risk of death or serious injury or the loss of or major damage to a
ship or aircraft.
g. Military ships and aircraft. For the purposes of this instruction, a US
military ship is either a warship designated "USS" or an auxiliary in the Military
Sealift Command (MSC) force. For the purposes of this instruction, a US
military aircraft is an aircraft operated by a unit of the US Armed Forces, other
than the Coast Guard (except when operating as part of the Navy), bearing
military markings and commanded and manned by personnel of the Armed
Forces.
7. Responsibilities.
a. The Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff will monitor the exercise of
RAE and develop further procedural guidance for the CINCs and the Chiefs of
the Services under the overall DOD policy guidance.
b. The combatant commanders will issue policy guidance and specific
procedural reporting requirements tailored to their areas of regional
responsibility and the forces under their operational controL
c. The NMCC will follow routine procedures to coordinate with cognizant
DOS and US Coast Guard officials to ensure timely notification, review, and
response to CINCs and operational commanders in RAE situations.
d. The Military Services will provide training on RAE operations,
coordination, and communications procedures.
e. Guidance for operational commanders is contained in Enclosure A.
8. Summary ofCbanges. This revision updates qCSI 2410.01 to include the
right of assistance entry within archipelagic waters, clarifies that RAE only
applies within a foreign state's US-recognized territorial sea or archipelagic
waters and clarifies that the instruction applies to auxiliaries in the MSC Force.
9. Effectiye Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.
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For the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
/s/
Dennis C. Blair
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:
A-Guidance for Operational Commanders
B-Bilateral Agreements Affecting Right of Assistance Entry
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ENCLOSURE A

GUIDANCE FOR OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS
1. The operational commander of a US military ship should exercise RAE and
immediately enter a foreign state's US-recognized territorial sea or archipelagic
waters when all three following conditions are met:

a. A person, ship, or aircraft within the foreign territorial sea or archipelagic
waters is in danger or distress from perils of the sea and requires emergency
assistance.
b. The location is reasonably well known.
c. The US military ship is in a position to render timely and effective
assistance.
Although not a required condition, the operational commander should also
consider whether other rescue units, capable and willing to render timely and
effective assistance, are on the scene or immediately en route. Military ships
conducting RAE operations will not deploy aircraft (including helicopters)
within a US-recognized foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters unless
paragraphs 2 or 3 below apply.
2. An operational commander may render emergency assistance employing US
military aircraft in a US recognized foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters
under RAE only when the commander determines that all four following
conditions apply:
a. A person, ship, or aircraft in the foreign territorial sea or archipelagic
waters is in danger or distress from perils of the sea and requires emergency
assistance.
b. The location is reasonably well known.
c. The US military aircraft is able to render timely and effective assistance. If
available, unarmed aircraft will be used to conduct RAE activities.
d. Any delay in rendering assistance could be life threatening.
Enclosure A
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Although not a required condition, the operational commander should also
consider whether other rescue units, capable and willing to render timely and
effective assistance, are on the scene or immediately en route.
3. An operational commander may render assistance in non-life-threatening
situations employing US military aircraft in a US-recognized foreign territorial
sea or archipelagic waters under RAE when the following two conditions are
met:
a. The Conditions in subparagraphs 2a, b, and c above are met.
b. The cognizant CINC or other appropriate authority in the operational
chain of command has specifically authorized the exercise of RAE employing
aircraft. Before authorizing RAE employing aircraft, such higher authority will
consult with the DOS (Operations Center) by contacting the NMCC.
4. When a commander enters or authorizes entry into the claimed or
US-recognized territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a foreign state under
RAE, the commander will immediately notify:
a. Appropriate authorities and the NMCC by an OPREP-3 PINNACLE.
The OPREP-3 PINNACLE will describe location; unit(s) involved; nature of
the emergency assistance; reaction by the coastal or archipelagic state, including
efforts to deny entry or offers of assistance; and estimated time to complete the
mission. The NMCC will immediately inform the DOS (Operations Center)
and Headquarters, US Coast Guard (Flag Plot). (USCG HQ is prepared to
facilitate contacting foreign state rescue authorities to notify them of the RAE
operation, as appropriate.) The cogninnt Chief of Mission and US Defense
Attache Office (USDAO) will be information addresses.
b. The coastal or archipelagic state, by the fastest means available, of the
location, unit(s) involved, nature of the emergency and assistance required,
whether any assistance is needed from that government, and estimated time of
departure from the territorial sea or archipelagic waters. Contact will normally
be with the Rescue Coordination Center of the foreign state involved.

Enclosure A
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ENCLOSUREB
BIT..ATERAL AGREEMENTS AFFECTING
RIGHT OF ASSISTANCE ENTRY
International agreements to which the United States is a party and that modify
the application of this guidance are discussed below. (For more information, see
Appendix B of reference b.)
a. Canada. "Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States
Coast Guard, the United States Air Force, the Canadian Forces and the Canadian
Coast Guard on Search and Rescue," 24 March 1995.
(1) This understanding states that in accordance with customary
international law, solely for the purposes of rendering emergency rescue
assistance to persons, vessels, or aircraft in danger or distress, when the location is
reasonably well known, SAR units of either country may immediately enter
onto or over the territory or the territorial seas of the other country, with
notification of such entry made as soon as practicable.
(2) Pursuant to this understanding, commanders should notify the nearest
Canadian Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC). (Upon receipt by the NMCC
of the OPREP-3 required in subparagraph 4a, Enclosure A of this instruction,
the NMCC will notify US Coast Guard Headquarters, which will arrange
contact with the appropriate Canadian RCC.)
b. Mexico. Treaty to Facilitate Assistance to and Salvage of Vessels
Territorial Waters," 13 June 1935, T.I.A.S. No. 905,49 Stat. 3359.

In

(1) This treaty permits vessels and rescue equipment of either country to
assist vessels (and crews) of their own nationals that are disabled or in distress
within the territorial waters or on the shores of the other country:
(a) Within a nO-nm radius of the intersection of the international
boundary line and the Pacific Coast.

(b) Within a 200-nm radius of the intersection of the international
boundary line and the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.
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(2) The treaty requires the commander to send notice of entry to assist a
distressed vessel to appropriate authorities of the other country at the earliest
possible moment. Assistance efforts may proceed unless the authorities advise
that such assistance is unnecessary.
(3) In this treaty, assistance means any act that helps prevent injury arising
from a marine peril to persons or property, and the term vessel includes aircraft.

Enclosure B
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ANNEXA2-5

R 061630Z JUN 88
FM NAVY JAG ALEXANDRIA VA
TO AIG NINE NINE ZERO TWO
BT
UNCLAS

//N05800//

SUBJ: GUIDANCE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES CONCERNING THE
TRANSIT PASSAGE REGIME IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS
1. PASS TO ASSIGNED JUDGE ADVOCATES.
2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE AND AMPLIFYING
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AS IT EXISTS IN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS REFLECTED IN THE 1982 U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (HEREINAFTER REFERRED
TO AS "THE 1982 CONVENTION"). THE US IS NOT A SIGNATORY
TO THE 1982 CONVENTION DUE TO ITS SEABED MINING
PROVISIONS. HOWEVER, IN HIS STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES
OCEANS POLICY OF MARCH 10, 1983, PRESIDENT REAGAN
ANNOUNCED THAT THE US CONSIDERS THE NON-SEABED
PROVISIONS OF THE 1982 CONVENTION AS REFLECTIVE OF
EXISTING MARITIME LAW AND PRACTICE AND THAT THE US WOULD
ACT ACCORDINGLY.
3. THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE IS DEFINED IN PART III
(ARTICLES 34 THROUGH 45) OF THE 1982 CONVENTION. TRANSIT
PASSAGE MEANS THE EXERCISE OF THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
AND OVERFLIGHT, SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUOUS AND
EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT OF A STRAIT. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT
OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO OR AUTHORIZATION OF THE STATE
OR STATES BORDERING A STRAIT. WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS,
SOME NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW, THE REGIME APPLIES TO
ALL STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION BETWEEN
ONE PART OF THE HIGH SEAS OR AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
(EEZ) AND ANOTHER PART OF THE HIGH SEAS OR AN EEZ, IF
EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS EXIST: (A) THE
TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS (OF 12 NM OR LESS) OF THE STATE
OR STATES BORDERING THE STRAIT OVERLAP SO THAT THERE IS

176

Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

NO HIGH SEAS OR EEZ ROUTE THROUGH THE STRAIT, OR (B)
THERE IS NO OVERLAP, BUT THE RESULTING CORRIDOR BETWEEN
THE AREAS OF TERRITORIAL SEA IS UNSUITABLE FOR SURFACE
OR SUBSURFACE TRANSIT BECAUSE OF ITS NAVIGATIONAL AND
HYDROGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS.
4. THE GEOGRAPHICS OF STRAITS VARY. THE AREAS OF
OVERLAPPING TERRITORIAL SEAS IN MANY CASES DO NOT
ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE AREA OF THE STRAIT IN WHICH THE
TRANSIT PASSAGE REGIME APPLIES. THE REGIME APPLIES NOT
ONLY IN OR OVER THE WATERS OVERLAPPED BY TERRITORIAL
SEAS BUT ALSO THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT AND IN ITS
APPROACHES, INCLUDING AREAS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA THAT
ARE OVERLAPPED. THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ PROVIDES A CASE IN
POINT; ALTHOUGH THE AREA OF OVERLAP OF THE TERRITORIAL
SEAS OF IRAN AND OMAN IS RELATIVELY SMALL, THE REGIME OF
TRANSIT PASSAGE APPLIES THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT AS WELL AS
IN ITS APPROACHES INCLUDING AREAS OF THE OMANI AND THE
IRANIAN TERRITORIAL SEAS NOT OVERLAPPED BY THE OTHER.
(NOTE: THE ESSENCE OF TRANSIT PASSAGE IS THAT A VESSEL
OR AIRCRAFT IN A STRAIT CONTINUOUSLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY
MOVING BETWEEN TWO BODIES OF WATER (IN WHICH THE FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT IS THE APPLICABLE REGIME)
NEED NOT BECOME SUBJECT TO THE REGIME OF INNOCENT
PASSAGE WHEN REQUIRED TO ENTER A TERRITORIAL SEA IN THE
STRAIT OR ITS APPROACHES.)
5. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE ARE
SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS DESCRIBED IN
ARTICLE 39 OF THE 1982 CONVENTION. THEY MUST REFRAIN
FROM ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN THOSE INCIDENT TO THEIR
"NORMAL MODES" OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT.
THUS, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT MAY PROCEED IN THEIR NORMAL
MODES, I.E., SUBMARINES MAY TRANSIT SUBMERGED, SHIPS MAY
DEPLOY AIRCRAFT, AND NAVAL/AIR FORCES GENERALLY MAY BE
DEPLOYED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE NORMAL SECURITY
NEEDS OF THOSE FORCES WHILE IN THE STRAIT. ALSO, THEY
MUST PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY, REFRAIN FROM ANY THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE, COMPLY WITH ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL (I.E.,
IMO-TYPE) REGULATIONS, ETC. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR
STATE (INCLUDING MILITARY) AIRCRAFT (ARTICLE 39) OR FOR
SUBMERGED NAVIGATION TO FOLLOW ANY PARTICULAR ROUTE
WHILE EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE.

International Status and Navigation of Warships

177

6. THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE DOES NOT IN OTHER
RESPECTS AFFECT THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE WATERS FORMING
THE STRAITS (ARTICLE 34.1). JURIDICALLY, INTERNAL WATERS
REMAIN INTERNAL WATERS; TERRITORIAL SEAS REMAIN
TERRITORIAL SEA; EEZ'S AND HIGH SEAS AREAS REMAIN EEZ'S
AND HIGH SEAS. (ARTICLE 35). ANY ACTIVITY WHICH IS NOT
AN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE REMAINS
SUBJECT TO WHATEVER LEGAL REGIME IS APPLICABLE UNDER THE
1982 CONVENTION TO THE WATER AREA OF THE STRAIT IN WHICH
THE ACTIVITY OCCURS. (ARTICLE 38.3). THUS, IF NOT
ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE, E.G., IF THE SHIP IS NOT
TRANSITING CONTINUOUSLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY THROUGH THE
STRAIT, THE SHIP IS SUBJECT TO THE RULES FOR NAVIGATING
IN INTERNAL WATERS, TERRITORIAL SEAS, EEZ'S, AND HIGH
SEAS, AS THE CASE MAY BE.
7. IN SUMMARY, THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE CONFERS
CERTAIN RIGHTS AND IMPOSES CERTAIN DUTIES ON SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE. THESE
RIGHTS AND DUTIES COMMENCE AS SOON AS THE SHIP OR
AIRCRAFT ENTERS THE APPROACHES TO AN INTERNATIONAL
STRAIT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS
TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT, AND THEY CEASE AS SOON AS THE
SHIP OR AIRCRAFT DEPARTS THE APPROACHES ON THE OTHER
SIDE. HOWEVER, THE PROVISIONS FOR TRANSIT PASSAGE DO NOT
ALTER THE UNDERLYING JURIDICAL NATURE OF THE WATERS
WHICH MAKE UP THE STRAIT.
8. AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 3, ABOVE, THE 1982 CONVENTION
PROVIDES THAT THERE ARE A FEW STRAITS USED FOR
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION IN WHICH THE REGIME OF TRANSIT
PASSAGE DOES NOT APPLY. ONE CATEGORY (ARTICLE 35(C)) IS
STRAITS SPECIFICALLY REGULATED BY LONG-STANDING
CONVENTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BOSPORUS AND DARDANELLES,
WHICH ARE GOVERNED BY PROVISIONS OF THE MONTREUX
CONVENTION. ANOTHER CATEGORY (ARTICLE 38.1) IS STRAITS
FORMED BY AN ISLAND AND THE MAINLAND OF A STATE, IF
THERE EXISTS, SEAWARD OF THE ISLAND, A HIGH SEAS OR EEZ
ROUTE OF SIMILAR NAVIGATIONAL AND HYDROGRAPHIC
CONVENIENCE. THE PRIME EXAMPLE OF THIS LATTER CATEGORY
IS THE STRAIT OF MESSINA; IN SUCH A STRAIT, THE REGIME
OF NON-SUSPENDABLE INNOCENT PASSAGE APPLIES. (ARTICLE
45.1 (A) ) .
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9. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE AND REFLECTS OFFICIAL US POLICY. QUESTIONS
SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CODE 10 (DSN: 227-9161,
COMMERCIAL: 202-697-9161).
BT
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ANNEXA2-6
(In draft as of 1 November 1997)

FM
TO
INFO
BT
UNCLAS//NOOOOO//
MSGID/GENADMINXXXXXXXXX/-//
SUBJ/TRANSIT PASSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS POLICY//
REF/A/DOD 4500.54~G/-/NOTAL//
NARR/REF A IS DOD FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE. CHAPTER FIVE
CONTAINS JOINT STAFF GUIDANCE ON MILITARY FLIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND
ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES.//
RMKS/1. SUMMARY. RECENT CHALLENGES TO U.S. TRANSIT
RIGHTS THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ BY OMAN AND IRAN
HAVE MADE IT NECESSARY TO CLARIFY GUIDANCE ON POLICY AND
PROCEDURES FOR U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ENGAGED IN
TRANSIT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS. U.S.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ENJOY A RIGHT OF TRANSIT
PASSAGE THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT (SHORELINE TO SHORELINE),
AS WELL AS ITS APPROACHES (INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA
OF ADJACENT COASTAL STATES). ALTHOUGH U.S. SOVEREIGN
IMMUNE VESSELS WILL NORMALLY USE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
ORGANIZATION (IMO)-APPROVED TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES
(TSS) AND COMPLY WITH RULE 10 OF COLREGS WHILE
TRANSITING AN INTERNATIONAL STRAIT, THERE IS NO LEGAL
REQUIREMENT TO DO SO IF SUCH VESSELS DO NOT ELECT TO
VOLUNTARILY USE THE TSS. TRANSITS THAT DO NOT MAKE USE
OF A TSS SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE
SAFETY OF NAVIGATION. IF CHALLENGED BY COASTAL STATE
AUTHORITIES, A U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSEL SHOULD
RESPOND THAT IT IS A U.S. WARSHIP OR OTHER SOVEREIGN
IMMUNE VESSEL AND STATE, "I AM ENGAGED IN TRANSIT
PASSAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW." A
DETAILED LEGAL ANALYSIS FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPHS 3 THROUGH
6 FOR USE BY COMMAND JUDGE ADVOCATES.
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2. PURPOSE.
A. TO CLARIFY GUIDANCE AND PROVIDE AMPLIFYING
INFORMATION ON U.S. POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR U.S.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS CONNECTING ONE PORTION OF
THE HIGH SEAS/EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) WITH ANOTHER
PORTION OF THE HIGH SEAS/EEZ.
B. THIS GUIDANCE DOES NOT APPLY TO STRAITS
SPECIFICALLY REGULATED BY LONG-STANDING CONVENTIONS
(SUCH AS THE TURKISH STRAITS), TO STRAITS FORMED BY AN
ISLAND AND THE MAINLAND OF A STATE, IF THERE EXISTS,
SEAWARD OF THE ISLAND, A HIGH SEAS/EEZ ROUTE OF SIMILAR
NAVIGATIONAL AND HYDROGRAPHIC CONVENIENCE (SUCH AS THE
STRAIT OF MESSINA) OR TO STRAITS IN WHICH THERE EXISTS A
HIGH SEAS/EEZ CORRIDOR OF SIMILAR NAVIGATIONAL AND
HYDROGRAPHIC CONVENIENCE (SUCH AS THE FEMER BELT) .
C. GUIDANCE ON MILITARY FLIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
STRAITS IS PROVIDED IN REF A.
D. NOTHING IN THIS GUIDANCE IS INTENDED TO IMPAIR THE
ABILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY OF
NAVIGATION OR THE COMMANDER'S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND
OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS AVAILABLE AND TO
TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE OF THE
COMMANDER'S UNIT AND OTHER U.S. FORCES IN THE VICINITY.
3. BACKGROUND/REGULATORY REGIME.
A. THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA (1982 LOS CONVENTION).
(1) THE UNITED STATES IS NOT YET A PARTY TO THE
1982 LOS CONVENTION. HOWEVER, IN HIS STATEMENT ON U.S.
OCEAN POLICY OF MARCH 10, 1983, PRESIDENT REAGAN
ANNOUNCED THAT THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THE
NON-SEABED PROVISIONS OF UNCLOS AS REFLECTIVE OF
EXISTING MARITIME LAW AND PRACTICE AND THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY. THIS VIEW HAS BEEN
REITERATED BY EVERY SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATION.
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(2) THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE IS SET OUT IN
PART III OF THE 1982 LOS CONVENTION (ARTICLES 37 THROUGH
44). TRANSIT PASSAGE IS DEFINED AS THE FREEDOM OF
NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT IN THE
NORMAL MODE OF OPERATION. THIS MEANS THAT SUBMARINES MAY
TRANSIT SUBMERGED; MILITARY AIRCRAFT MAY OVERFLY IN
COMBAT FORMATION AND WITH NORMAL EQUIPMENT OPERATION;
AND SURFACE SHIPS MAY TRANSIT IN A MANNER NECESSARY FOR
THEIR SECURITY, INCLUDING FORMATION STEAMING AND THE
LAUNCHING AND RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT, WHERE CONSISTENT
WITH SOUND NAVIGATIONAL PRACTICES. ALL SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF CARGO, ARMAMENT OR MEANS OF
PROPULSION, ENJOY THIS NONSUSPENDABLE RIGHT OF TRANSIT
PASSAGE, WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL BY OR NOTIFICATION TO
THE COASTAL STATES BORDERING THE STRAIT.
(3) COASTAL STATES BORDERING INTERNATIONAL STRAITS
MAY DESIGNATE SEA LANES AND TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES
(TSS) FOR NAVIGATION IN STRAITS WHERE NECESSARY TO
PROMOTE THE SAFE PASSAGE OF SHIPS. SUCH ROUTING MEASURES
SHALL CONFORM TO IMO STANDARDS (I.E., REGULATION V/8 OF
THE 1974 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE
AT SEA (SOLAS) AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND
CRITERIA) AND SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE IMO FOR ADOPTION
PRIOR TO THEIR DESIGNATION. SHIPS IN TRANSIT PASSAGE
SHALL RESPECT APPLICABLE SEA LANES AND TSS ESTABLISHED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH IMO STANDARDS. (NOTE: IMO-APPROVED
ROUTING MEASURES APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS ARE
SET OUT IN IMO PUBLICATION "SHIPS' ROUTEING" (SIXTH
EDITION), AS AMENDED.)
(4) SHIPS IN TRANSIT PASSAGE SHALL COMPLY WITH
GENERALLY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS, PROCEDURES
AND PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AT SEA, INCLUDING THE 1972
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT
SEA (COLREGS). SHIPS IN TRANSIT PASSAGE SHALL ALSO
PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY THROUGH THE STRAIT, REFRAIN FROM
ANY THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE
STATES BORDERING THE STRAIT; AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN THOSE INCIDENT TO THEIR NORMAL
MODE OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT UNLESS
RENDERED NECESSARY BY~ORCE MAJEURE OR BY DISTRESS.
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B. THE 1974 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY
OF LIFE AT SEA (SOLAS), AS AMENDED.
(1) REGULATION VIS OF SOLAS RECOGNIZES THE
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) AS THE ONLY
INTERNATIONAL BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR ESTABLISHING AND
ADOPTING SHIPS' ROUTING MEASURES, INCLUDING TSS, ON AN
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.
(2) RULES GOVERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SHIPS'
ROUTING MEASURES ARE CONTAINED IN REGULATION VIS OF
SOLAS AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA (I.E.,
IMO ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A.572(14), AS AMENDED).
REGULATION viS AND RESOLUTION A.572(14) DO NOT APPLY TO
WARSHIPS, NAVAL AUXILIARIES OR OTHER GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
OPERATED VESSELS USED ONLY FOR NON-COMMERCIAL SERVICE.
HOWEVER, SUCH SHIPS ARE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE IN
IMO-APPROVED SHIPS' ROUTING SYSTEMS.
(3) ADDITIONALLY, NOTHING IN REGULATION VIS NOR
ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA SHALL PREJUDICE
THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
OR THE LEGAL REGIMES OF STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL
NAVIGATION AND ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES.
(4) THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY TO SOLAS.
C. THE 1972 INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING
COLLISIONS AT SEA (COLREGS), AS AMENDED.
(1) PURSUANT TO RULE 1, COLREGS APPLY TO ALL
VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN ALL WATERS CONNECTED
THEREWITH NAVIGABLE BY SEAGOING VESSELS, INCLUDING
VESSELS ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
(2) RULE 10 OF COLREGS PRESCRIBES THE CONDUCT OF
VESSELS WITHIN OR NEAR TSS ADOPTED BY THE IMO IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATION viS OF SOLAS. PURSUANT TO
RULE 10 OF COLREGS, A VESSEL USING A TSS SHALL NOT USE
AN INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONE WHEN IT CAN SAFELY USE THE
APPROPRIATE TRAFFIC LANE WITHIN THE ADJACENT TSS, EXCEPT
THAT A VESSEL MAY USE AN INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONE WHEN EN
ROUTE TO OR FROM A PORT, OFFSHORE INSTALLATION OR
STRUCTURE, PILOT STATION OR ANY OTHER PLACE SITUATED
WITHIN THE INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONE, OR TO AVOID IMMEDIATE
DANGER. VESSELS NOT USING A TSS SHALL AVOID THE
SEPARATION SCHEME BY AS WIDE A MARGIN AS IS PRACTICABLE.
(NOTE: A VESSEL RESTRICTED IN HER ABILITY TO MANEUVER
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WHEN ENGAGED IN AN OPERATION (1) FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF
SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN A TSS OR (2) FOR THE LAYING,
SERVICING OR PICKING UP OF A SUBMARINE CABLE, WITHIN A
TSS IS EXEMPT FROM COMPLYING WITH RULE 10 TO THE EXTENT
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE OPERATION.)
(3) THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY TO COLREGS.
D. U.S. NAVY REGULATIONS (1990).
(1) PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1139, ALL PERSONS IN THE
NAVAL SERVICE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPERATION OF NAVAL
SHIPS AND CRAFT SHALL DILIGENTLY OBSERVE COLREGS AND THE
INLAND NAVIGATION RULES, WHERE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE APPLICABLE TO NAVAL SHIPS.
(2) IN THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE SUCH RULES OR
REGULATIONS ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO NAVAL SHIPS OR CRAFT,
THEY SHALL BE OPERATED WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF
OTHERS.
4. ANALYSIS.
A. FOR TRANSIT PASSAGE TO HAVE ANY MEANING, SURFACE,
SUBSURFACE AND OVERFLIGHT NAVIGATION OF WATERS
CONSTITUTING THE APPROACHES TO THE STRAIT MUST BE
INCLUDED. IF THE RIGHT OF OVERFLIGHT OR SUBMERGED
TRANSIT APPLIED ONLY WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL DELINEATION
OF A CERTAIN STRAIT, BUT NOT TO AREAS LEADING INTO/OUT
OF THE STRAIT, IT WOULD EFFECTIVELY PREVENT THE EXERCISE
OF THE RIGHT OF OVERFLIGHT AND SUBMERGED TRANSIT.
MOREOVER, REQUIRING SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT TO CONVERGE AT
THE HYPOTHETICAL ENTRANCE TO THE STRAIT WOULD BE
INCONSISTENT WITH SOUND NAVIGATIONAL PRACTICES. THE
RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE THEREFORE APPLIES NOT ONLY TO
THE WATERS OF THE STRAIT ITSELF, BUT ALSO TO ALL
NORMALLY USED APPROACHES TO THE STRAIT.
B. THE 1982 LOS CONVENTION RECOGNIZES THE AUTHORITY
OF COASTAL STATES TO DESIGNATE, AND REQUIRES SHIPS IN
TRANSIT PASSAGE TO RESPECT, IMO-APPROVED TSS IN
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS, PROVIDED SUCH ROUTING MEASURES
CONFORM TO IMO STANDARDS SET OUT IN REGULATION V/8 OF
SOLAS AND RESOLUTION A.572(14). HOWEVER, AS DISCUSSED
ABOVE, ROUTING MEASURES ADOPTED PURSUANT TO REGULATION
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VIS AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA (I.E.,
RESOLUTION A.572(14)) DO NOT APPLY TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNE
VESSELS. HENCE, COMPLIANCE WITH AN IMO-APPROVED TSS IN
AN INTERNATIONAL STRAIT IS NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS.
C. SIMILARLY, RULE 1 OF COLREGS PROVIDES THAT TSS MAY
BE ADOPTED BY THE IMO FOR THE SAFETY OF NAVIGATION. RULE
10 OF COLREGS APPLIES TO ANY TSS ADOPTED BY THE IMO,
PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER REGULATION viS OF SOLAS
AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES: HOWEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY
DISCUSSED, SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ARE SPECIFICALLY
EXEMPT FROM COMPLIANCE WITH IMO-APPROVED ROUTING
MEASURES. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ARE ENCOURAGED TO
COMPLY VOLUNTARILY WITH SUCH MEASURES, BUT THERE IS NO
LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO DO SO. HENCE, COMPLIANCE WITH RULE
10 OF COLREGS, WHICH PROHIBITS THE USE OF AN INSHORE
TRAFFIC ZONE WHEN A SHIP CAN SAFELY USE THE APPROPRIATE
TRAFFIC LANE WITHIN THE ADJACENT TSS AND REQUIRES SHIPS
NOT USING THE TSS TO AVOID IT BY AS WIDE A MARGIN AS IS
PRACTICABLE, IS NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNE
VESSELS THAT HAVE ELECTED NOT TO USE THE TSS.
ACCORDINGLY, TRANSIT PASSAGE APPLIES THROUGHOUT THE
STRAIT, SHORELINE TO SHORELINE.
5. POLICY.
A. FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS, THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT
PASSAGE APPLIES THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT (SHORELINE TO
SHORELINE), AS WELL AS IN ITS APPROACHES (INCLUDING THE
TERRITORIAL SEA OF AN ADJACENT COASTAL STATE) .
B. ALTHOUGH U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS WILL
NORMALLY USE IMO-APPROVED TSS (WHEN PRACTICABLE AND
COMPATIBLE WITH THE MILITARY MISSION) AND COMPLY WITH
RULE 10 OF COLREGS (INCLUDING ITS PROHIBITION ON THE USE
OF INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONES) WHILE TRANSITING AN
INTERNATIONAL STRAIT, THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO
DO SO IF SUCH VESSELS DO NOT ELECT TO VOLUNTARILY USE
THE TSS. WHEN VOLUNTARILY USING AN IMO-APPROVED TSS,
RULE 10 OF COLREGS MUST BE OBSERVED.
C. SITUATIONS WHICH MAY NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO
COMPLIANCE WITH AN IMO-APPROVED ROUTING MEASURE INCLUDE:
MILITARY CONTINGENCIES; CLASSIFIED MISSIONS; POLITICALLY
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SENSITIVE AREA MISSIONS; FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
ASSERTIONS; ROUTINE AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS; MINE
CLEARANCE OPERATIONS; SUBMERGED OPERATIONS; OR VARIOUS
OTHER LEGITIMATE PURPOSES/MISSIONS. SUCH OPERATIONS
SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF
NAVIGATION.
D. IF CHALLENGED BY AUTHORITIES OF A COASTAL STATE
WHILE TRANSITING AN INTERNATIONAL STRAIT, U.S. SOVEREIGN
IMMUNE VESSELS SHOULD ADVISE COASTAL STATE AUTHORITIES
THAT IT IS A U.S. WARSHIP OR OTHER SOVEREIGN IMMUNE
VESSEL AND STATE, "I AM ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW." THE VESSEL SHOULD
THEN CONTINUE ON ITS PLANNED TRACK.
6. CONCLUSION. THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE CONFERS
CERTAIN RIGHTS AND IMPOSES CERTAIN DUTIES ON SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE. THESE
RIGHTS AND DUTIES COMMENCE AS SOON AS THE SHIP OR
AIRCRAFT ENTERS THE APPROACHES TO AN INTERNATIONAL
STRAIT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS
TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT, AND THEY CEASE AS SOON AS THE
SHIP OR AIRCRAFT DEPARTS THE APPROACHES ON THE OTHER
SIDE. THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNE
VESSELS TO COMPLY WITH IMO-APPROVED ROUTING MEASURES IN
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ARE ONLY
LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO EXERCISE DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY
OF NAVIGATION WHILE ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE. HOWEVER,
SUCH VESSEL MAY VOLUNTARILY COMPLY WITH IMO-APPROVED
ROUTING MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS WHEN
PRACTICABLE AND COMPATIBLE WITH THE MILITARY MISSION.
WHILE VOLUNTARILY USING AN IMO-APPROVED TSS, RULE 10 OF
COLREGS MUST BE OBSERVED.
7. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE AND REFLECTS OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY. QUESTIONS
SHOULD BE REFERRED TO DOD REPOPA (DSN 227-9161, COMM
703-697-9161) OR N3L/N5L (DSN 227-0835, COMM
703-697-0835) .
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ANNEXA2-7

A quick reference aid on U S foreign relations
Not a comprehensive policy statement
Bureau of Public AfErirs 0 Department of State

US Freedom of Navigation Program

December 1988

Background: US interests span the world's oceans geopolitically and
economically. US national security and commerce depend gready upon the
internationally recognized legal rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight
of the seas. Since World War II, more than 75 coastal nations have asserted
various maritime claims that threaten those rights and freedoms. These
"objectionable claims" include unrecognized historic waters claims; improperly
drawn baselines for measuring maritime claims; territorial sea claims greater than
12 nautical miles; and territorial sea claims that impose impermissible restrictions
on the innocent passage of military and commercial vessels, as well as ships
owned or operated by a state and used only on government noncommerical
servIce.
US policy: The US is committed to protecting and promoting rights and
freedoms of navigation and overflight guaranteed to all nations under
international law. One way in which the US protects these maritime rights is
through the US Freedom of Navigation Program. The program combines
diplomatic action and operational assertion of our navigation and overflight
rights by means of exercises to discourage state claims inconsistent with
international law and to demonstrate US resolve to protect navigational
freedoms. The Departments of State and Defense are joindy responsible for
conducting the program.
The program started in 1979, and President Reagan again outlined our position
in an ocean policy statement in March 1983:
... the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and
freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of
interests reflected in the [1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea]. The
United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states
designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in
navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses.
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The US considers that the customary rules of international law affecting
maritime navigation and overflight freedoms are reflected and stated in the
applicable provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Nature of the program: The Freedom of Navigation Program is a peaceful
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by international law and is not
intended to be provocative. The program impartially rejects excessive maritime
claims of allied, friendly, neutral, and unfriendly states alike. Its objective is to
preserve and enhance navigational freedoms on behalf of all states.
Diplomatic action: Under the program, the US undertakes diplomatic action at
several levels to preserve its rights under international law. It conducts bilateral
consultations with many coastal states stressing the need for and obligation of all
states to adhere to the international law customary rules and practices reflected in
the 1982 convention. When appropriate, the Department of State files formal
diplomatic protests addressing specific maritime claims that are inconsistent with
international law. Since 1948, the US has filed more than 70 such protests,
including more than 50 since the Freedom of Navigation Program began.
Operational assertions: Although diplomatic action provides a channel for
presenting and preserving US rights, the operational assertion by US naval and
air forces of internationally recognized navigational rights and freedoms
complements diplomatic efforts. Operational assertions tangibly manifest the US
determination not to acquiesce in excessive claims to maritime jurisdiction by
other countries. Although some operations asserting US navigational rights
receive intense public scrutiny (such as those that have occurred in the Black Sea
and the Gulf of Sidra) , most do not. Since 1979, US military ships and aircraft
have exercised their rights and freedoms in all oceans against objectionable
claims of more than 35 nations at the rate of some 30-40 per year.
Future intentions: The US is committed to preserve traditional freedoms of
navigation and overflight throughout the world, while recognizing the
legitimate rights of other states in the waters off their coasts. The preservation of
effective navigation and overflight rights is essential to maritime commerce and
global naval and air mobility. It is imperative if all nations are to share in the full
benefits of the world's oceans.
For further infoDDation: See also GISTs, "Law of the Sea," June 1986, and
"Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra," December 1986.
Harriet Culley, Editor (202) 647-1208
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ANNEXA2-8
Navigation Rights
and the Gulf of Sidra
Background
In October 1973, Libya
announced that it considered
all water in the Gulf of Sidra
south of a straight baseline
drawn at 32° 30' north latitude
to be internal Libyan waters
because
of
the
gulfs
geographic
location
and
Libya's historic control over it.
The United States and other
countries,
including
the
U.S.S.R., protested Libya's
claim as lacking any historic or
legal justification and as
illegally restricting freedom of
navigation on the high seas.
Further, the U.S. Navy has
conducted many operations
within the gulf during the past
12 years to protest the Libyan
claim. These exercises have
resulted in two shooting
incidents between Libyan and
U.S. forces. The first was in
1981, when two Libyan
aircraft fired on U.S. aircraft
and were shot down in
air-to-air combat, and the
second in March 1986, when
the Libyans fired several
missiles at U.S. forces and the
United States responded by
attacking
Libyan
radar
installations and patrol boats.
Barbary Coast History
This is not the first time that
the
United
States
has
contended with navigational
hindrances imposed by North
African states. After the
American Revolution, the
United States adhered to the

following a ground assault led
by U.S. marines that captured a
port near Tripoli. In 1810
Algiers and Tripoli renewed
raids against U.S. shipping, and
in
1815,
Commodore
Decatur's squadron caught the
Algerian fleet at sea and forced
the Dey of Algiers to agree to
terms favorable to the United
States. Decatur then proceeded
to Tunis and Tripoli and
obtained their consent to
similar treaties. A U.S.
squadron remained in the
Mediterranean for several years
then common practice of to ensure compliance with the
paying tribute to the Barbary treaties.
Coast states to ensure safe
Current Law and Custom
passage of U.S. merchant
vessels. In 1796, the United By custom, nations may lay
States paid a one-time sum historic claim to those bays and
(equal to one-third of its gulfS over which they have
defense budget) to Algiers with exhibited such a degree of
guarantees of further annual open, notorious, continuous,
payments. In 1801, the United and unchallenged control for
States refused to conclude a an extended period of time as
similar
agreement
with to preclude rraditional high
Tripoli, and the Pasha of seas freedoms within such
Tripoli declared war on the waters. Those waters (closed
States.
After off by srraight baselines) are
United
negotiations failed, the United treated as if they were part of
States blockaded Tripoli, in the the nation's land mass, and the
autumn of 1803 Commodore navigation of foreign vessels is
Edward Preble led a squadron, generally subject to complete
U.S.S. control by the nation. Beyond
including
the
Constitution ("Old Ironsides"), lawfully closed-off bays and
to the Mediterranean to other areas along their coasts,
continue the blockade. Shortly nations may claim a "territorial
after the squadron arrived off sea" of no more than 12
Tripoli, a U.S. frigate, the nautical miles in breadth
Philadelphia, ran aground and (measured 12 miles out from
was captured. Lt. Stephen the coast's low water line--or
Decatur led a team into Tripoli legal srraight baseline) within
harbor and successfully burned which foreign vessels enjoy the
the Philadelphia. InJune 1805, limited navigational "right of
the Pasha agreed to terms innocent passage." Beyond the

[See map at Figure A2-12
(p. 2-82)]

International Status and Navigation of Warships
Since Libya cannot make a
valid historic waters claim and
meets no other international
law criteria for enclosing the
Gulf of Sidra, it may validly
claim a 12-nautical-mile
territorial sea as measured from
the normal low-water line
along its coast (see map).
Libya also may claim up to a
20D-nautical-mile exclusive
economic zone in which it
may
exercise
resource
jurisdiction, but such a claim
would not affect freedom of
navigation and overflight.
(The United States has
confined its exercises to areas
beyond 12 miles from Libya's
coast.)

U.s. Position
The United States supports
and seeks to uphold the
customary law outlined above,
and it has an ongoing global
program
of
protecting
traditional navigation rights
and
freedoms
from
encroachment
by
illegal

maritime claims. This program
includes diplomatic protests
(delivered to more than 50
countries since 1975) and ship
and aircraft operations to
preserve those navigation
rights. Illegal maritime claims
to which the United States
responds include:
• Excessive territorial sea
claims;
• Improperly
drawn
baselines
for
measuring
maritime claims; and
Attempts
to
require
notification or permission
before foreign vessels can
transit a nation's territorial sea
under the right of innocent
passage.
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the U.S. exercise of traditional
navigation
rights
was
regrettable and without any
basis in international law.

u.s. Intentions
The United States will pursue
actively its efforts to preserve
traditional navigation rights
and freedoms that are equally
guaranteed to all nations. The
preservation of rights is
essential
to
maritime
commerce and global naval
and air mobility and is
imperative if all nations are to
share equally in the benefits of
the world's oceans. As always,
the United States will exercise
its rights and freedoms fully in
accord with international law
and hopes to avoid futther
military confrontations, but it
will not acquiesce in unlawful
maname claims and is
prepared to defend itself if
circumstances so require.

Thus Libya has not been
singled out for special
consideration but represents
simply one instance in the
continuing U.S. effort to
preserve
worldwide
navigational
rights
and Taken from the GIST series of
freedoms. The fact that Libya December 1986, published by the
chose to respond militarily to Bureau of Public AfEIirs,
Department of State.
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FIGURE A2-1
DANISH STRAITS
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FIGURE A2-2
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FIGURE A2-3
STRAIT OF BAB ELMANDEB
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FIGURE A2-4
STRAIT OF HORMUZ
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FIGURE A2-S

STRAIT OF MALACCA
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FIGURE A2-6
STRAIT OF TIRAN

Gu I f
o f
Aqaba

..

'

:
~

'.

.

....
'",0'

,0'

.'

Red

Sea

o
I

o

Source: Roach & Smith, at 220.

5 kiometers
I'

I II

II

I

5

",illS

195

196

Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

FIGURE A2-7
CANADIAN ARCTIC
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FIGURE A2-8
THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE
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FIGURE A2-9
LATIN AMERICA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
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FIGURE A2-10
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE
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FIGURE A2-11
AFRICAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

Source: Rosen, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Autumn 1996 at 50.
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FIGURE A2-12
GULF OF SIDRA
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TABLE A2-1
Restrictions on Warship Innocent Passage
(As of 1 January 1997)

Nation

B,estriction Year of !:;I!!im

Protest

Albania

Special permission; 1946

Algeria

Prior permission; 1963

1989
a
1964

u.S. Assertion
of Right of
Innocent Passage
a
1985
a
1979

u.s.

Antigua & Barbuda

Prior permission; 1982

1987

1987

Bangladesh

Prior permission; 1974

1982

Barbados

Prior permission; 1979

1982

1996
a
1982

Brazil

Prior permission; 1954

Bulgaria

Limited to sea lanes; 1987

1982

Burma

Prior permission; 1977

1982

Cambodia

Prior permission; 1982

1985

a

a
1986

Cape Verde

Prior permission; 1982

1989

1991

China (PRC)

Prior permission; 1958; 1992, 1996

a
1992

a
1986

Congo

Prior permission; 1977

1987

Croatia

Prior notification; 1995

Denmark

Prior permission; 1976

1991

Djibouti

Nuclear power/materials; 1979

1989

Egypt

Prior notification; 1983

1985

Nuclear power/materials; 1982

1983

Finland

Prior notification; 1981

Grenada

Prior permission; 1978

1989
a
1982

1988

Guyana

Prior notification; 1977

India

Prior notification; 1976

1982
a
1976

1988
a
1985

Indonesia

Prior notice; 1962

Iran

Prior permission; 1982, 1994

a
1989

Korea, South

Prior notification; 1978

a
1987
a
1977

Libya

Prior notice; 1985

1985

Maldives

Prior permission; 1976

Malta

Prior notification; 1981

1982
a
1981

Mauritius

Prior notification; 1977

1982

Oman

Prior permission; 1989

1991

Nuclear power/materials; 1989

1991

Pakistan

Prior permission; 1976

1982

Nuclear power/materials; 1976

1982

Philippines

Prior permission; 1968

1969

a
1993

1981

1991

a

a

a
1986

1994

International Status and Navigation of Warships
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TABLE A2-1 (cent.)

U.S.
Restriction Year of Claim
Poland

Prior permission; 1968

1989

Romania

Prior permission; 1956

1989

U.S. Assertion
of Right of
Innocent Passage

1985

a

St. Vincent & the
Grenadines

Prior notification; 1977

1982

Somalia

Prior permission; 1972

1982

Sri Lanka

Prior permission; 1977

1986

Sudan

Prior permission; 1970

1989

Syria

Prior permission; 1963

1989

United Arab Emirates

Prior permission; 1993

Vietnam

Prior permission; 1980

1982

Limit on number; 1980

1982

Prior permission (PDRY); 1967

1982

Yemen

Yugoslavia, Former

a

Prior permission; 1983

Seychelles

a
1979
a
1985
a
1979
a
1984
1995
a
1982
a
1982

Nuclear power/materials (PDRY); 1977

1982

Prior notification (YAR); 1978

1986

a
1979

Nuclear power (YAR); 1982
Prior notification; 1965

1986
a
1986

1990

Limit on number; 1986

1986

Multiple protests or assertions

Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of Ocean Affairs; Roach & Smith, at 158-9.
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TABLE A2-2
Straits Formed by an Island of a Nation and the Mainland Where
There Exists Seaward of the Island a. Route Through the High Seas
or an Exclusive Economic Zone of Similar Convenience
Coastal Nation

Strait

Island

Alternative Route

Argentina

Estrecho de la Maire

Isla de los Estados

high seas! eez

Canada

Canso

Cape Breton

Cabot Strait

Canada

Georgia

Vancouver

high seas! eez

Canada

Jacques Cartier Passage

Anticosti

Cabot Strait

Canada

Johnstone

Vancouver

high seas! eez

Canada

Northumberland

Prince Edward

route east of Isla de los Estados

route west of Vancouver Island

route west of Vancouver Island
high seas!eez
route north of Prince Edward Island
Canada

Queen Charlotte

Vancouver

high seas! eez

China

Hainan

Hainan

high seas! eez

route west of Vancouver Island

route south ofHainan Island
France

IIe d'Yeu

IIe d'Yeu

high seas!eez

Greece

Elafonisou

Kithira

Kithira or Andirkithiron Straits

Italy

Messina

Sicily

high seas! eez

Japan

Okushiri-kaikyo

Okushiri

high seas! eez

route west of IIe d'Yeu
1

route south of Sicily

route west of Okushiri Island
Japan

Rishiri-suido

Rishiri

Japan

Sado-kaikyo

Sado

high seas! eez
route west of Rishiri Island
high seas! eez
route west of Sado Island

New Zealand

Foveaux

Stewart

high seas! eez

Russia

Provirv Litke

Karaginsky

high seas! eez

route south of Stewart Island

route east of Ostov Karaginsky
Sweden

Kalmar Sund

Oland

high seas!eez

Tanzania

Mafia

Mafia

high seas! eez

route east of Oland Island

route east of Mafia Island
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TABLE A2-2 (cant.)
Coastal Nation

Wit

Island

Alternative Route

Tanzania

Zanzibar Channel

Zanzibar

high seas/eez

Turkey

Imroz

Imroz

United Kingdom

Pentland Firth

Orkney Islands

high seas/eez

United Kingdom

The Solent

Isle of Wight

high seas/eez

route east of Zanzibar Island
high seas/eez
route west ofImroz Island

route north of the Orkneys

route south of the Isle of Wight
Andikithiron Strait has a least width of16 miles. Given Greece's 6-mile territorial sea claim, this leaves a high
seas/eez corridor of 4 miles through the strait.

Source: Alexander, at 206-7.

TABLEA2-3
Straits in Which Passage is Regulated by Long-Standing
Conventions in Force
Bosoms

Magellan

Dardanelles

Oresund

Source: Alexander, Navigational Restrictions, at 205.

Store Baelt
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TABLE A2-4
Straits Which do not Connect Two Parts of the High Seas or an
Exclusive Economic Zone with One Another
(1) Straits Connecting the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone with the Territorial Sea of a
Foreign State

Head Harbour Passage
Strait ofTiran

Bahran-Qatar Passage
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage

(2) Straits Connecting the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone with Claimed Historic Waters

Strait

State

Claimed Historic Waters

Amundsen Gulf

Canada

Arctic Archipelago

Barrow Strait

Canada

Arctic Archipelago

Entrance to the Bay D'Amatique

Guatemala

Bay D' Amatique

Geographe Channel

Australia

Shark Bay

Hainan Strait*

China

Gulf of Tonkin

Hudson Strait

Canada

Hudson Bay

Investigator Strait

Australia

Gulf of St. Vincent

Kerch Strait

USSR

Sea of Azov

Lancaster Sound

Canada

Arctic Archipelago

M'Clure Strait

Canada

Arctic Archipelago

Naturaliste Channel

Australia

Shark Bay

Palk Strait

India

Gulf of Manaar

Pohai Strait

China

Gulf ofPohai

Prince of Wales Strait

Canada

Arctic Archipelago

Viscount Melville Sound

Canada

Arctic Archipelago

·China Claims the strait itself as historic, rather than the gulf with which it connects.
(3) Straits Connecting with Claimed "Special Status" Waters
Provliv Blagoveshchenskiy

Provliv Longa

Provliv Dmityra Lapteva

Provliv Sannikova

Provliv Karskiye Vorota

Provliv Shokal'skogo

Source: Alexander, at 207-8.

Provliv Vilkit'skogo
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TABLEA2-5
International Straits: Least Width
Less than Six Miles in Width (52)
Alalakeiki Channel
Apolima Sttait
Bali Channel
Beagle Channel
Bonifacio, Sttait of
Bosporus
Canso Sttait
Chatham Strait
Clarence Strait [U.S.]
Corfu Channel
Dardanelles
Dragon's Mouths
Durian Strait
Eafonisou Sttait
Gaspar Strait
Georgia, Strait of
Goschen Strait
Head Harbour Passage

Icy Strait
Johnstone Sttait
KalmarSund
Kerch Strait
Kuchinoshima-suido
Lamma Channel
Langeland Belt
Little Belt
Magellan,Straitof
Maqueda Channel
Massawa Strait
Messina, Strait of
Oresund
Palk Strait
Pentland Firth
Prince of Wales Strait
Provliv Nevel'skogo
Queen Charlotte Strait

Rosario Sttait
Roti Sttait
Saipan Channel
San Bernardino Strait
Sape Strait
Serpent's Mouth
Singapore Sttait
The Solent
Store Baelt
Sumner Strait
Sunda Strait
Tiran, Strait of
Torees Strait
Vatu-I-Ra Channel
Verde Island Passage
Vieques Passage

Berween Six and Twenty-four Miles in Width (153)
Adak Strait
Agattu Sttait
Aland's Hav
Alas Sttait
Andikithiron Strait
Api Passage
Aruba-Paraguana Passage
Auau Channel
Bab el Mandeb
Babuyan Channel (Luzon Strait)
Bahrain-Qatar Passage
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage
Balabac Strait
Balintang Channel (Luzon Strait)
Bangka Passage
Bangka Strait
Banks Strait
Barrow Strait
Basilan Strait
Bass Strait
Belle Isle, Strait of
Berhala Strait
Bering Strait, East
Bering Strait, West
Boeton Passage
Bomholmsgat
Bougainville Strait
Bristol Channel

Cameroon Strait
Cheju Strait
Clarence Strait [Australia]
Coco Channel
Cook Strait
Dampier Strait
Dominica Channel
Dover Strait
Dundas Strait
Entrance to Bay d'Amatique
Entrance to the Gulf of Finland
Enttance to Gulf of Fonseca
Estrecho de la Maire
Etolin Strait
Etorofu-kaikyo
FehmamBelt
Foveaux Strait
Freu de Menorca
Galleons Passage
Geographe Channel
Gibraltar, Strait of
Greyhound Strait
Hainan Strait
Herbert Pass
Hecate Strait
The Hole
HuksanJedo
lie d'Yeu

Imroz Strait
Indispensable Strait
Investigator Strait
Isumrud Strait
Jacques Chartier Passage
Jailolo Passage
Juan de Fuca, Strait of
Jubal, Strait of
Kadet Channel
Kafireos Strait
Kaiwi Channel
Kalohi Channel
Kandavu Strait
Karpathos Strait
Kasos Strait
Kasos Strait
KauJakahi Channel
Kealaikahiki Channel
Keas Strait
Kennedy Channel
Kithira Strait
Korea Strait, West
Koti Passage
Kunashiri-suido
Little Minch
Lombok Strait
Maemel Sudo
Mafia Strait
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TABLE A2-5 (cont.)
Between Six and Twenty-four Miles in Width (cont.)
Malacca Strait
Manipa Strait
Manning Strait
Martinique Channel
Mayaguana Passage
Mindoro Strait
Mouchoir Passage
Nakanoshima-suido
Nanuku Passage
Nares Strait
Naturaliste Channel
Neumuro-kaikyo
North Channel
North Minch
Northumberland Strait
Notsuke-suido
Obi Strait
Okushiri-kaikyo
Old Bahama Channel
Ombai Strait
Osurni-kaikyo
Pailolo Channel
Pervyy Kuril'sky Provliv
Pescadores Channel
Pohai Strait

Polillo Strait
Provliv Alaid
Provliv Diany
Provliv Blagoveschenskiy
Provliv Golovnina
Provliv Krenitsyna
Provliv Litke
Provliv Luzhinka
Provliv Nadezhedy
Provliv Rikorda
Provliv Severgina
Provliv Shokal'skogo
Provliv Urup
Provliv Yevreinova
Rishiri-suido
Robeson Channel
Sado-kaikyo
St. George's Channel
St. Lucia Channel
St. Vincent Passage
Samalga Pass
Samsoe Belt
Santa Barbara Channel
Sapudi Strait

Seguam Pass
Serasan Passage
Shelikof Srrait
Shikotan-siudo
Sibutu Passage
Soya-kaikyo
Surigao Strait
Suwanose-suido
Tanaga Pass
Tanegashima-kaikyo
Taraku-suido
Tokara-kaikyo
Tsugaru-kaikyo
Turks Island Passage
Unimak Pass
Virgin Passage
Vitiaz Strait
Wetar Strait
Yakushima-kaikyo
Yunaska Pass
Zanzibar Channel

More than Twenty-four Miles in Width (60)
Alenuihaha Channel
Amami Passage
Amchitka Pass
Amundsen Gulf
Amutka Pass
Anegada Passage
Balut Channel
Bashi Channel (Luzon Strait)
Cabot Strait
Caicos Passage
Chetvertyy Kuril'sky Provliv
Corsica-Elba Passage
Crooked Island Passage
Davis Strait
Denmark Strait
Detroit d'Honguedo
Dixon Entrance
Eight Degree Channel
Florida, Straits of, East
Florida, Straits of, South
Formosa Strait
Source: Alexander, at 202-3.

Gorlo Strait
Great Channel
Grenada-Tobago Passage
Guadeloupe Passage
Hormuz, Strait of
Hudson Strait
Jamaica Passage
Kamchatsky Provliv
Karimata Strait
Kauai Channel
Korea Strait,East
Lancaster Sound
Makassar Strait
Malta Channel
M'Clure Strait
Mona Passage
Moxambique Channel
Otranto, Strait of
Pemba Channel
Preparis North Channel
Pre paris North Channel

Preparis South Channel
Providence Channel, Northeast
Providence Channel, Northwest
Provliv Bussol
Provliv Dmitrya Lapteva
Provliv Karskiye Vorota
Provliv Kruzenshtema
Provliv Longa
Provliv Sannikova
Provliv Tatarskiy
Provliv Vil'kitskogo
St. George's Channel
(U.K.-Ireland)
Sicily, Strait of
Silver Bank Passage
Sumba Strait
Ten Degree Channel
Viscount Melville Sound
Windward Passage
Yucatan Channel
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TABLEA2-6
Straits, Less Than 24 Miles in Least Width, in Which There Exists a
Route Through the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone of
Sitnilar Convenience With Respect to Navigational or
Hydrographical Characteristics
Andikithiron Strait-4 (Greece)
Bahrain-Qatar Passage-13
(Bahraini Qatar)
Banks Strait-3 (Australia)
Bass Strait-17 (Australia)
BomhoImsgat-6.5 (Denmark)
Bristol Channel-4 (U.K.)
Dover Strait-6 (U.K.)
Entrance to Gulf of
Finland-3.4 (Finland)
Fehmarn Belt-4 (Denmark!
Gennany)

The Hole-14 (U.K.)
Kadet Channel-12
(Denmark!F.R.G.)
Karpathos Strait-ll (Greece)
Kasos Strait-ll.8 (Grc;ece)
Kennedy Channel-4.5
(Denmark)
Korea Strait West-7 (South
KorealJapan)
Litrle Minch-3 (U.K.)
Mayaguana Passage-14 (The
Bahamas)
Mouchoir Passage-17 (U.K.)

Nares Strait-4 (Denmark)
North Channel-5 (U.K.)
Old Bahama Channel-3 (Bahamas)
Osumi-kaikyo-ll (Japan)
Robeson Channel-2 (Denmark)
Sarnsoe Belt-l (Denmark)
Soya-kaikyo-7.5 (Japan/Russia)
Tsugaru-kaiky0-4 (Japan)
Turks Island Passage-12 (U.K.)

Distance given is for least width of the belt of high seaslEEZ, assuming current breadths claimed for
territorial seas continue. Countries named are those off whose coasts the belt of high seaslEEZ exists.
Source: Alexander, at 206.

210

Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

TABLEA2-7
States Whose EEZ Proclamations and/or National Laws Appear
Inconsistent with the Convention Provisions Regarding Freedoms of
Navigation and Overflight
Bangladesh-a, c, f
Burma-e
Cape Verde-b, c, f
Colombia-a, c, e
Comoros-a, c
Cook Islands-a, c, f
Costa Rica-a
Cuba-a
Dominican Republic-a
Fiji-a
France---c
Guinea-Bissau-a, c
Guyana-a, d, e
Haiti-b
Iceland---c
India-d, e

Indonesia---c
Ivory Coast-f
Kampuchea---c
Kenya---c
Malaysia-a, c
Maldives-a, d
Mauritania-d
Mauritius-d, e
Mexico-a
Mozambique-a, c
New Zealand-a, c
Nigeria-a, d
Norway-a, f
Oman-a,c
Pakistan-d, e, f
Portugal-f

Russia-d
Samoa---c, f
Sao Tome & Principe-a
Seychelles-d, e, f
Spain-f
Sri Lanka---c
Suriname-a, f
Togo-a, c
Trinidad & Tobago-a
United Arab Ernirates-a
-Uruguay-b
Vanuatu---c, e
Venezuela-a
Vietnam---c
Yemen (Aden)-e

a. States silent on the question of residual rights in their EEZ.
b. States claiming possession of residual rights in their EEZ.
c. States whose EEZ proclamations and/or national laws are silent on foreign rights to navigation and
overflight in their EEZ.
d. States whose EEZ proclamations and/or national laws allow the government to regulate the
navigation offoreign vessels in the EEZ or in nationally designated zones of the EEZ (see Table A2-8 (p.
2-89».
e. States claiming "exclusive jurisdiction" over environemtnal protection in their EEZ.
( States having special formulations with respect to environmental protection in their EEZ.
Source: Alexander, at 91.
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TABLEA2-8
State Proclamations Regarding Navigation and Overflight
in and over the EEZ
A. States whose EEZ proclamations and! or laws explicitly recognize the right of foreign navigation
through and overflight over their national EEZ.
Barbados
Bunna
Cuba
Democratic Yemen
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Grenada

Guatemala
Ivory Coast
Mexico
Norway
Philippines
Portugal
Sao Tome and Principe

Spain
Suriname
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates (1)
United States
Venezuela

(1) The UAE legislation provides that national rights in the EEZ "shall not prejudice international
navigation rights exercised by states in accordance with the rules of international law." It is not clear if
this provision applies to aircraft.
B. States whose EEZ proclamations and!or laws are silent on foreign navigation through and overflight
over their national EEZ.
Bangladesh
Cape Verde
Colombia
Comoros
Cook Islands
France
Guinea-Bissau

Iceland
Indonesia
Kampuchea
Kenya
Malaysia
Mozambique
New Zealand

Oman
Sri Lanka
Togo
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Western Samoa

C. States whose EEZ proclamations and! or laws explicitly allow the government to regulate the navigation
of foreign vessels in the EEZ or nationally designed zones of the EEZ (article citations refers to the
respective national legislation).
Guyana: The President may declare any area of the EEZ to be a designated area and make provisions he
deems necessary with respect to "entry into and passage through the designated area offoreign ships by the
establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of
navigation which is not prejudicial to the interests of Guyana." [article 18(a) and (b) (vi»)
India: The government may provide for regulation of entry passage through designated area "by
establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of
navigation which is not prejudicial to the interests ofIndia." [article 7(6) (Explanation»)
Maldives: "Ships of all States shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters and
other exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the Maldives ... [No) foreign fishing vessel shall enter its
economic zone without prior consent of the Government of the Maldives." [article 1)
Mauritania: In its EEZ the rights and freedoms ofStates with respect to navigation, overflight, the laying of
cables and pipelines, as provided for on the high seas, shall not be amended unless they adversely affect the
provisions of Article 185 above [treating Mauritania's sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ) and the
security of the Mauritanian State." [article 186)
Mauritius: The Prime Minister may provide in designated areas of the EEZ or continental shelf necessary
provisions with respect to "the regulation of entry into the passage of foreign ships through the designated
area" and "the establishment offairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring
freedom of navigation which is not prejudicial to the interest of Mauritius." [article 9(a) and (b) (vi»)
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TABLE A2-8 (cont.)
Nigeria: The government "may, for the purpose ofprotecting any installation in a designated area... prohibit
ships... from entering without its consent such part of that area as may be specified." [article 392)]
Pakistan: The government may declare any area of the EEZ to be a designated area and make provisions as it
deems necessary with respect to "the regulation of entry into the passage through the designated area of
foreign ships by the establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of
ensuring freedom ofnavigation which is not prejudicial to the interest of Pakistan." [article 6(a) and (b) (vi)]
Seychelles: The President may declare any area of the continental shelf or EEZ to be a designated area and
make provisions as he considers necessary with respect to "the regulation of entry into and passage offoreign
ships through the designated area [and] the establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or
any mode of ensuring freedom of navigation which is not prejupjcial to the interest of Seychelles." [article
9(a) and (b) (vii)]
Russia: "In connection with certain specifically bounded regions of the economic zone of the USSR in
which, for technical reasons connected with oceanographic and ecological conditions, as well as for the use of
these regions or for the protection of their resources, or because of the special requirements for navigation in
them, it is necessary that special obligatory measutes shall be taken to prevent pollution from vessels, such
measures, including those connected with navigation practices, may be established by the Council of
Ministers of the USSR in regions determined by it. The borders of these special regions should be noted in
'Notification to Mariners' .. " [article 13]

Source: Alexander, at 91-92.

